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Zusammenfassung
“Accident Management” (AM) Programme werden gemeinhin als wichtiger Punkt des “Defence in Depths”
Konzepts für Kernkraftwerke gesehen. Durch sorgfältige Analyse von auslegungsüberschreitenden Reak-
torstörfällen ist es möglich, dem Reaktorfahrers eines Kernkraftwerks Richtlinien zu geben, die den Ge-
brauch von Systemen ausserhalb ihrer Auslegung zur Rückführung des Reaktors in ein sicheres Regime
erlauben, oder zumindest mildernd auf den Unfallhergang einwirken. Accident Management Programme
wurden erstmalig in den USA eingeführt, sind aber mittlerweile auch in Europa weit verbreitet. In den
letzten Jahren entschlossen sich auch die Staaten, die ehemals der Sowjetunion angehörten, Accident Man-
agement Programme zu übernehmen.
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist im Rahmen eines Europaid-Projekts entstanden, welches zum Ziel hatte, die
Entwicklung von AM für den VVER 1000 voranzutreiben. Der VVER 1000 ist ein Druckwasserreaktor
russischen Designs der in Russland, der Ukraine, Bulgarien, Indien, Iran, China und Tschechien im Bau
oder im Betrieb ist. Das Projekt wurde von Europaid, TACIS Programm der Europaischen Kommission
zur Verbesserung der Sicherheit von russischen Kernkraftwerken finanziert. Das Projekt hatte mehrere
Zielsetzungen. Eine wichtige Zielsetzung war die Ausführung von Experimenten mit komplexen Unfall-
hergang an der integralen Versuchsanlage PSB-VVER. Die Versuchsanlage bildet den Reaktor VVER 1000
mit einer Höhenskala von 1:1, einer Volumen- und Leistunsskalierung von 1:300 ab. Zwölf Versuche, und
drei zusätzliche Einzelvariationen zu je einem der zwölf Versuche wurden durchgeführt. Als auslösender
Unfall wurden Primärkühlmittelverlust durch kleine Lecks, Primär- zu Sekundärlecks, Speisewasserver-
lust und Netzverlust mit gleichzeitigem Versagen aller Dieselgeneratoren angenommen. Zusätzlich wurden
Mehrfachversagen verschiedener Sicherheitssysteme angenommen. Als AM-Strategien wurden Primär- und
Sekundärseitige Druckentlastung, und Einspeisung aus unkonventionellen Quellen getestet.
Die entstandene experimentelle Datenbank wurde verwendet, um die Codes Relap5 und Cathare2 für
auslegungsüberschreitende Störfälle zu qualifizieren - eine weitere Zielsetzung des Projekts. Vorhersagen
von Computerprogrammen und experimentelle Daten wurden verglichen. Es wurde versucht, den Störfall-
hergang aller Experimente vor und nach Durchführung des Experiments vorherzusagen. Obwohl die Ver-
suchsanlage PSB-VVER gut skaliert wurde, ist anzunehmen, dass das Verhalten des Kraftwerks bei gleichen
Rahmenbedingungen beträchtliche Unterschiede aufzeigen würde. Das Ziel der Experimente ist deshalb
in erster Linie, qualitativ die gleichen physikalischen Phänomene nachzubilden. Es soll gezeigt werden,
dass die Computercodes in der Lage sind, das Verhalten der Versuchsanlage hinreichend genau nachzu-
bilden. Schlussfolgerungen für das Kernkraftwerk müssen dann auf Code Simulationen des Kernkraftwerks
basieren.
Eine dritte Zielsetzung war es, die Wirksamkeit der untersuchten AM-Strategien zu testen. Die Simula-
tionen, die während des Projekts mit dem Code Relap5 ausgeführt wurden, um Aussagen für das eigentliche
Kraftwerk zu stützen, sind in dieser Arbeit präsentiert. Simulationen des Kraftwerks war zu mehreren An-
lässen für das Projekt von Nöten. In der Planungsphase der Experimente wurden die experimentellen Rah-
menbedingungen vorerst in der Kraftwerkssimulation getestet, um ihre Relevanz fuer AM sicherzustellen.
Nach der Ausführung aller Experimente, und den Erkenntnissen aus den Post-Test Simulationen der Exper-
imente, wurde die Simulation des eigentlichen Kraftwerks entsprechend adaptiert, und die Berechnungen
wurden wiederholt, um Aussagen über die Effizienz der angewandten AM Strategien treffen zu können.
In enger Zusammenarbeit mit dem Referenzkraftwerk Balakovo, Block 3, wurde ein Störfall und eine
AM Strategie zur detailierten Analyse und Optimierung ausgewählt. Ein lang andauernder Verlust des
Netzanschluss mit gleichzeitigem Versagen aller Dieselgeneratoren (Station Blackout) wurde als Störfall
ausgewählt. Verlust des Netzanschluss über einen längeren Zeitraum als zwei Stunden ist unter normalen
Bedingungen sehr unwahrscheinlich. Allerdings ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines solchen Störfalls schwer
abzuschätzen, wenn man auch terroristische Anschläge als möglich erachtet. Leitungen und Dieselgener-
atoren könnten weniger geschützt, oder schwerer zu schützen sein, als andere Sicherheitssysteme. Aber
selbst wenn alle aktiven systeme in diesem Fall nicht verfügbar sind, die Speisewasserleitungen und die
Deaeratoren bleiben für einige Zeit unter Druck und können als zusätzliches Speisewasser genutzt werden,
wenn eine sekundärseitige Druckentlastung zeitgerecht durchgeführt wird. Ebenfalls primärseitig stehen die
Druckspeicher zur Verfügung, bei entsprechender primärseitiger Druckentlastung. Die AM Strategie, die im
Detail untersucht wurde, war eine Kombination von Sekundär- und/oder Primärseitiger Druckentlastung.
Um den Zeitpunkt der Intervention zu optimieren wurde eine Methode zur generellen Optimierung von
accident management interventionen entwickelt. Die Methode umfasst vier Schritte. Die Parameter, die op-
timiert werden sollen, müssen festgelegt werden. Die Randbedingungen müssen festgelegt werden. Es muss
definiert werden, welches Ziel die Optimierung erreichen will. Ein Algorithmus muss angewandt werden,
iii
um schrittweise-iterativ den Zielparameter zu verbessern, und letzlich müssen die Resultate entsprechend
dargestellt werden.
Das Ergebnis der Arbeit ist, dass die “Gnadenfrist”, d.h. die Zeit bis zum Eintritt der (teilweisen) Kern-
schmelze, mit der richtigen AM-Strategie bedeutend verlängert werden konnte. Während in einem Station
Blackout ohne AM nach zwei- bis drei Stunden Schaden am Reaktorkern zu erwarten ist, kann sekundärseit-
ige Druckentlastung und damit die passive Verfügbarkeit von zusätzlichem Speisewasser aus Speisewasser-
leitungen und Deaeratoren den Naturumlauf erneut in Gang setzen und die Gnadenzeit verlängern. Primär-
seitige Druckentlastung erlaubt die Intervention der Druckspeicher, und senkt den primärseitigen Druck.
Sollte die Stromversorgung nicht wiederhersgestellt werden können, verhindert Primärseitige Druckentlas-
tung Versagen des Reaktordruckgefäßes bei hohem Druck.
Summary
Accident management (AM) programmes are considered to be an important step in the defense in depth
concept for nuclear power plants. By carefully analyzing possible accident conditions in advance, a nuclear
power plant operator may use plant equipment outside of its foreseen functions to cope with situations
beyond the design of the plant. Accident management programmes have been first introduced in NPP in the
USA, but are now also widely adopted in Europe. The introduction of AM in Republics of the former Soviet
Union is a rather recent development.
The present work has been performed as part of a Europaid Project with the goal to support the develop-
ment of AM for the VVER 1000, a pressurized water reactor used in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, India, Iran,
China, Czech Republic. The project was funded by Europaid, TACIS programme, with the aim to enhance
the safety of Russian nuclear reactors. The project had several objectives. One of the main goals was to exe-
cute complex experiments on the PSB-VVER integral test facility. The facility is a full height, 1:300 volume
and power scaled model of the VVER 1000. Twelve diverse and three additional single variant experiments
have been executed. The initiating events for the experiments were small break loss of coolant accidents,
primary to secondary side leaks, loss of feed water and station black out. In addition, multiple failures of the
safety systems and accident management strategies like primary side and secondary side depressurization,
and injection into primary and/or secondary side with non standard equipment have been assumed.
The experimental database has then been used for the next main goal of the project, to qualify the codes
Relap5 and Cathare2 for simulation of beyond design basis accidents at the VVER 1000, by performing code
- experiment comparisons. All experiments have been tried to predict at a pre- and post test level. Although
the PSB-VVER facility is well scaled, the behavior of the real NPP will differ considerable. Therefore, the
experiments serve to show qualitatively the phenomena that can be expected, and to confirm that the available
thermal hydraulic system codes are capable of predicting these phenomena for the facility. Conclusions for
the real plant have to be based on simulation with a plant nodalisation.
A third main goal of the project was to test the effectiveness of the adopted AM-Strategies. The sim-
ulations, that have been performed with the thermal hydraulic system code Relap5 for the actual NPP to
support this part of the project are presented in the current work. Support was given on several occasions.
In the planning phase of the experiments, all test designs have been simulated with a plant simulation to
confirm their relevance for accident management. After the experimental campaign, the calculations have
been repeated, taking into account the experience gained. All AM strategies have been evaluated for their
effectiveness.
In close cooperation with the reference NPP, Balakovo Unit 3, one initiating event and AM strategy has
been selected for detailed study and optimization. A long term station black out was the selected initiating
event. While an SBO of more than 2 hours is extremely unlikely under normal conditions, it is still important
if one considers terroristic attacks - the power lines and diesel generators might be less protected than other
systems. Even if all active systems are unavailable in this case, the feed water in the feed water lines and
deaerator tanks stays pressurized for some time and might be an additional source of water for the secondary
side. Likewise, the hydro accumulators can be used as water source for the primary side. The strategy that
has been investigated was based on depressurization of secondary and/or primary side, to be able to use the
above mentioned sources of water.
To optimize the intervention of the operator, a method for optimization of accident management proce-
dures has been worked out. The method is based on four steps. The parameters to be optimized have to be
selected and the boundary conditions have to be fixed. The goal of the optimization (target parameter) has to
be defined. An algorithm to iteratively improve the target parameter has to be applied, and finally, the results
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have to be displayed.
The findings of the work are that the grace time, i.e. the time before core damage takes place, can be
considerably extended by the right accident management strategy. While a in a station black out without
accident management after two to three hours core damage can be expected to take place, depressurizing
the secondary side and thereby furnishing additional feed water from feed water lines and deaerator tanks
passively into the steam generators can restart natural circulation and gain additional grace time. Depressur-
izing the primary side allows the hydro accumulators to intervene, and to lower the primary side pressure.
In case the connection to the grid or emergency power can not recovered, by depressurizing the primary side
failure of the reactor pressure vessel at high pressure can be avoided.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2003 the University of Pisa, Department of Nuclear, Mechanical and Production Engineering was awarded
a service contract by the European Union to support the development of Accident Management Programs
for Russian Nuclear Power Plants. The work has been commissioned as part of the TACIS program of the
EC. The nuclear part of the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) in
the period from 1990-2006 aimed to upgrade the safety of Nuclear Power Plants in countries which have
been part of the soviet union.
The project had two parts. The first part, part A, was dedicated to the VVER-1000 reactor, the Russian
pendant of the western pressurized water reactor. The second part, part B, had the scope to contribute
to safety analysis for RBMK reactors. Apart from the University of Pisa the research center EREC in
Elektrogorsk, near Moscow, was involved to carry out the experimental campaign. Contributions came also
from the research departments from Gidropress and Nikiet, as well as the Kurchatov Institute. To ensure that
the results of the project will help the safety of current Russian NPP, the NPP Balakovo, unit 3, participated
as reference NPP to the project. Final recipient of the action was the regulatory authority in Russia, GAN.
The present work has been performed in the frame of Part A of the project and deals exclusively with
VVER-1000 reactors. Part A had several objectives:
• work out a database containing experimental results of an integral test facility for VVER-1000 reactor
• the experiments should be relevant for accident management to allow to
– validate thermal hydraulic system computer codes, simulating the NPP behavior, for simulation
of AM relevant transients for VVER 1000
– verify, as far as possible on a test facility, the effectiveness of accident management strategies
• ensure that the design experiments are relevant for accident management by performing NPP analysis
• use the experience gained by the experiments to improve the NPP calculations performed before the
experimental campaign
• investigate the effectiveness of selected AM strategies by the means of NPP calculations
• develop a “reference accident management strategy” and investigate its effectiveness
The current work has been performed in the frame of the project mentioned above.
The project was aimed to fill a hole in the development of accident management programmes for russian
NPP, which was ongoing at the time of this work. To implement accident management programmes, analytic
support is needed. Main tool for analysis and development of EOPs are thermal hydraulic system codes.
Together with the analysis the analyst should be able to estimate to what extend his analysis reproduces the
real situation at the plant. For this purpose, for validation of the tools, the computer codes should be tested
by predicting scenarios, physical phenomena at the plant that can be compared against data coming from
experiments. The experiments for the code - experiment comparison should come as close to the situation
for which the code will be used, as possible. For the development of preventive accident management
procedures this would be experiments at the plants, with a broad spectrum of initiating events and multiple
failures of safety systems. Since such experiments cannot be conducted for obvious reasons, one has to
1
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resort to integral test facilities. A large number of such experiments have been conducted for western type
PWR. One goal of the project was to create an experimental database for validation of thermal hydraulic
system codes for VVER reactors. The current work contributed to this goal.
A second goal of the current work (and the project) was to provide analytic support in the development
of one specific accident management strategy - use of passive non safety equipment in case of a total station
blackout, to extend the grace time (i.e. time before core damage) of the reactor as long as possible. In case of
a station blackout the operator aims to maintain the heat sink until power can be restored. Mobile pumps, if
available at the station, or fire brigade trucks could be used. A feed water flow of 90 tons/h is needed to keep
the situation stable, 150 tons/h if cooldown should be achieved. While the analysis for use of mobile pumps
in case of a station blackout for Balakovo3 NPP has already been performed, the possible use of water from
deaerator tanks, and water still present in the feed water line was not yet fully investigated. The present work
aimed to contribute to fill this gap.
1.1 Scope
The work is concerned with the simulation of beyond design basis accidents in nuclear power plants, and was
embedded in the project mentioned above. Simulation of beyond design basis accidents for NPP in general
is a huge field, so to be more precise, the analysis was restricted to accidents at the VVER-1000 reactor, and
a certain type of beyond design basis accidents has been chosen:
The distinction between design basis and beyond design basis accidents is usually based upon a statistical
criteria. Accidents, whose initiating event are more likely to occur than a certain figure per year (typical
values range from 10−7 to 10−4). The evaluation of the probability for each initiating event should derive
from a probabilistic safety assessment of the NPP. Depending on the legislation in force, for the evaluation
of each design basis accident a the availability of the safety- and non-safety systems has to be considered.
Most countries request that non-safety related systems should be considered to fail, unless their availability
would worsen the accident, while for safety related systems the so called “single failure” criterion applies -
which means, that the NPP must be able to fulfill given acceptance criteria (peak cladding temperature lower
than a certain limit, energy release to the fuel lower than a certain limit, etc) without the most relevant safety
system.
Everything beyond this set of accidents is called beyond design basis accident. Beyond design basis
accidents are characterized by low probability and a large range of possible consequences. The cases that
have been investigated in the current work fall in the category BDBA because multiple failures of safety
equipment is assumed. In this case, even if the accidents are BDBA, the plant operator still has the possibility
to prevent core damage by following accident management procedures. For example, the failure of all three
independent trains of the high pressure safety injection system is a triple failure and therefore a beyond
design basis accident. Nevertheless, the operator could eventually recover the make-up system, and still lead
the reactor to save conditions.
The analysis that has been performed, i.e. simulation of beyond design basis accidents, falls in the field
of deterministic analysis. While as mentioned before, probabilistic safety assessment aims to calculate prob-
abilities for initiating events, and tries to give a complete picture of the all over risk, deterministic analysis
tries to simulate an accident and evaluate its consequences under given initial and boundary conditions.
The present work falls into deterministic safety analysis. Twelve accidents with a set of initiating events,
determined initial and boundary conditions have been chosen and analyzed.
Within the deterministic safety analysis one distinguishes conservative and best estimate analysis. Con-
servative analysis uses codes which try to worsen the situation by introducing a bias for certain parameters
(e.g. core decay power for conservative analysis usually is assumed to be 20% higher than what would be re-
alistically expected). The results of a conservative analysis typically give an upper bound for key parameters
like peak cladding temperature. Application of conservative calculations typically can be found in licensing
calculations. On the other hand best estimate calculations try to portrait the situation as realistically as pos-
sible. Since uncertainties are connected with the results in both directions, best estimate calculations on its
own give an indication of the evolvement of a certain accident, but cannot assure with a certain probability
that a certain parameter stays below or above a certain set point. Best estimate calculations are used in
accident management, where the goal is to find an effective strategy for the plant operator. A new trend is
to introduce best estimate calculations also for licensing applications, but here they have to be accompanied
by uncertainty evaluation. The current work uses Relap5 mod 3.3 for the simulation, which is a one dimen-
sional, best estimate, thermal hydraulic system code. The input parameters have not been penalized, so all
2
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simulation results are best estimate calculations.
Beyond design basis accidents can evolve into accidents showing core damage. Upon impending core
damage the operator switches priorities. Instead of preventing core damage, the operator now tries to prevent
releases to the environment. He follows a different set of procedures. Up to impending core damage, the
actions he should take are described in the emergency operating procedures. After core damage took place,
he utilizes severe accident management guidelines. The present work focuses on the development of the
accident up to impending core damage. If the cladding temperature shows values indicating core damage,
the calculation is stopped and the accident management strategy is assumed to have failed.
Accident management procedures can be “symptom based” or “event based”. The former do not clearly
identify the cause of the accident and are based on the plant stage. A huge amount of TH-SYS analysis
has to ensure that the procedure is effective or at least not worsening the accident for all initiating events
that might lead to the same plant state. The latter assume that the operator can clearly identify the initiating
event. The current work focuses on event based accident management strategies.
Summarizing, the scope of the present work is in italic:
• Safety barriers - a series of consecutive barriers, to prevent the release of fission product to the envi-
ronment
• Safety analysis - investigation on the effectiveness of the safety barriers
– Probabilistic safety assessment Analysis with the aim to quantify the probability of core damage,
releases to the environment, and off-site consequences.
– Deterministic safety analysis Analysis with the aim to assess the plant response for a postulated
initiating event with a given set of initial and boundary conditions
∗ Conservative safety analysis Biased analysis penalizing models and key plant parameters.
The result should be an upper bound for the real plant behavior
∗ Best estimate safety analysis Analysis trying to predict the plant behavior as accurate as
possible
· Accident management A set of procedures to guide the plant operator during accident
conditions
· State or symptom based procedures - procedures applicable to a variety of accident
conditions, stemming from different initiating events
· Event based procedures - procedures where the initiating event can be clearly identified,
analysis up to impending core damage (EOP)
1.2 Objective
The objective is to investigate the effectiveness of a number of accident management procedures for several
postulated initiating events. The response of the plant in design basis conditions is well known and part of
the final safety analysis report, upon which the operation of the plant will be licensed.
The goal of this work is to investigate the plant behavior in beyond design basis conditions. The method
of investigation is numerical simulation.
The objective should not restrict itself in just analyzing the effectiveness. In addition, a selected strategy
should be optimized. In order to do so, a method for optimization has to be elaborated, and applied.
1.3 Achievement of the objective
The present work is structured in three main sections. The next section 2 provides the information that
has been used as basis for the present work. The terms and latest developments in the field of accident
management is described. The basic concepts of AM (division in separate AM phases, the role of AM in the
defense in depths concept, the difference between preventive and mitigative AM is explained).
The focus is on the VVER 1000, a Russian type pressurized water reactor. About 40 units of this type
of reactor are under operation or construction, mainly in Russia, but also in countries associated previously
with the soviet union. Key features of the reactor are described, as well as the status of AM programs
for the VVER1000. All AM strategies that are described here have been tested on the integral test facility
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PSB-VVER, to ensure that the codes used are capable of simulating the phenomena that can be expected.
The PSB facility is shortly described. Finally, the main features of the computational tools that have been
used, and their mathematical background, are shortly portrayed. The tools are mainly Relap5, the UMAE
methodology which has been used to qualify the VVER 1000 nodalisation, and the FFTBM, which is a
method to quantify the quality of code predictions.
Section 3 describes the simulations that have been performed to evaluate the main strategies primary
side depressurization, secondary side depressurization and injection into primary and/or secondary side by
non-standard equipment. The nodalisation that has been adopted and its qualification process are shown
at the beginning of the section. The transients are numbered according to the number that they had in the
project, and grouped after initiating events. For each transient, the results of key parameters are displayed.
A large number of parameters for each transient can be found in an Appendix to the present work.
Section 4 describes the optimization process. A reference strategy has been selected and optimized for
the project. The selection of the strategy, the general approach to optimize a AM strategy, and the application
of the approach are described in this section.
The conclusions in Section 5 summarize the main findings from the previous two sections.
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Background
The work which is presented here was performed within the frame of the Project “Software Development
for Accident Analysis of VVER and RBMK Reactors in Russia”, part A, dealing with VVER 1000 reactors
D’Auria et al. [2006]. The University of Pisa implemented the project together with Elektrogorsk Research
and Engineering Center (EREC), Kurchatov Institute and Gidropress.
The aim of the project was to confirm the availability of computational tools for accident management
(AM) optimization studies in VVER 1000 reactor types.
To reach this goal an experimental campaign at Elektrogorsk was drawn up and executed in 2005. Fifteen
experiments have been performed at the PSB-VVER integral test facility.
2.1 Accident Management
Accident Management Programmes are considered to be a key component in the “Defense in Depths” con-
cept in NPP Safety [Misak, 2004a],[IAEA-INSAG-10, 1996]. The five levels commonly considered are
1. prevention of abnormal operation and failures,
2. control of abnormal operation and detection of failures,
3. control of accidents within the design basis.
4. The objective at the fourth level is to ensure that both the likelihood of an accident entailing significant
core damage (severe accident) and the magnitude of radioactive releases following a severe accident
are kept as low as reasonably achievable.
5. Off-site emergency response measures, with the objective of mitigating the radiological consequences
of significant releases of radioactive material.
Level four is covered by accident management and complementary measures.
Figure 2.1 visualizes the scope of accident management.
Accident management takes over in case an accident leaves the design basis of a nuclear power plant.
It means, that an organizational structure, provisions and procedures are in place, capable of coping with
situations that haven’t been envisaged during the design phase of the plant.
2.1.1 Three Mile Island
Nuclear safety developed gradually. The trigger for the development of what is understood as accident
management for NPP has been the TMI-2 accident. Various literature exists on the TMI-2 accident, e.g.
[Petrangeli, 2005] or [Walker, 2004].
TMI-2 was the most serious accident of an commercial nuclear power plant in the USA. The initiating
event was failure of the feed water pumps, causing the shut down of the reactor and turbine. As result,
primary side pressure increased up to the set point of the pressurizer relief valve. The PORV, after opening
as foreseen, did not close as expected. But the panel in the control room reported the valve as closed. Primary
pressure started to drop (without any reason for the operators). Primary coolant inventory was leaking from
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Figure 2.1: Scope of accident management
the system, without knowledge of the operators. The safety injection systems started to inject - but since
the operators were not able to diagnose the situation correctly, they saw no reason for safety injection. In
addition, the pressurizer level, that was taken as indication for the amount of coolant in the primary system,
continued to rise (due to counter current flow). So also this reading led to a wrong conclusion - and the crew
decided to shut down the safety injection system.
This led to core dry-out, heat up, start of the zirconium-water reaction and hydrogen generation. Sharp
pressure spikes in the containment have been diagnosed later on as explosions of smaller hydrogen bubbles.
Up to now there is a discussion ongoing whether or not releases of radioactive material did occur.
One lesson learned from TMI was that support for the crew of an NPP is needed in case of an accident.
An operator might or might not diagnose the situation of the plant correctly. Therefore, a organizational
structure, together with guidelines and procedure have been developed, aimed to relieve the operator from his
responsibility to understand exactly whats going on in the plant. Leading in the development of emergency
response guidelines was Westinghouse.
2.1.2 Safety barriers
Themost widespread safety concept of NPP puts in place four different physical barriers against release of ra-
dioactive materials [IAEA-INSAG-10, 1996]. They are (for pressurized water reactors, like the VVER1000):
• the fuel matrix;
• the fuel cladding;
• the boundary of the reactor coolant system;
• the containment system.
Each level is different from the previous one, because one may assume that if one barrier of one type
fails, a second barrier of the same type is also likely to fail.
2.1.3 Phases of AM
Accident management starts when an accident progresses beyond the design bases. This means, that the
automatic systems and operational procedures are no longer the best course of action. At this point the
operator can rely on a set of clear cut AM procedures, that permit to take a measure based on the plant
symptoms, available to the operator.
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2.1.4 Preventive AM
Generic
One signal is very important - the core exit temperature. A core exit temperature of more than 600 ◦C (value
depending on country and NPP) is taken as indication that core damage is impending, or did already happen.
This or an equivalent signal marks the transition from preventive measures to mitigative measures, with a
quite significant change of priorities and way of working. The priorities of AM at various stages are [Misak,
2004a]
• Prevention of the accident from leading to core damage
• Termination of core damage
• Maintaining the integrity of the containment for as long as possible
• Minimizing on-site and off-site releases and their adverse consequences.
While the core exit temperature stays below this value, the decisions are taken in the control room by
the operator, based on the emergency operating procedures (EOP). Aim is to prevent the accident from
leading to core damage. If the initiating event could be clearly identified, i.e. the operator knows exactly
what happens in the plant, the event-based EOP can be used as basis for the decision. Event based EOP
are a collection of possible countermeasures for a clear known initial event. The initiating and the strategy
has been investigated with best estimate thermal hydraulic system codes like Relap5, to make sure that the
adopted strategy is capable of preventing further progression of the accident, and are capable of preventing
core damage. The barrier in focus is the cladding of the reactor. If enough coolant can be provided, if it is
possible to guarantee long term removal of the decay heat, core heat up will be prevented and the cladding
will not fail.
If the operator cannot identify the initiating event, a second set of procedures should be at his disposition
- symptom (or state) based procedures. The aim is still to prevent the accident to leading to core damage.
The operator checks the state of the plant following a check-list, and tries to take action accordingly. The
development of symptom based procedures needs a considerable amount of work, since a strategy has to be
tested for all scenarios below a certain probabilistic cut-off criteria [IAEA, 1998], [Misak, 2004a].
Westinghouse approach
Russia decided in the late 1990 to change the Russian approach of accident management. The major part
of the plants will take over the Westinghouse based approach. Balakovo3 will act as reference plant for
VVER1000 in Russia, which means that after the Westinghouse procedures are implemented in Balakovo3,
other VVER1000 units will follow. The section briefly reports the approach of Westinghouse to AM, fol-
lowing [Prior et al., 2000].
Scenario oriented in case the initial event can be clearly identified, the “Optimal Recovery Guidelines”
ORG are applied. The OGR are typically applied after a reactor trip or occurrence of safety injection. If the
operator successfully identifies the initial event, he applies the appropriate recovery procedure.
The list of initial events is chosen by a probabilistic cut-off criteria. Initial events occurring not less than
−8 · 10per reactor year have been considered. For each scenario, different types of instructions have been
developed, in case the main strategy fails. The accident has to be periodical re-diagnosed.
State based if identification of the initial event is not possible, or the accident was diagnosed but doesn’t
develop as foreseen, the operator switches to the state based approach. Westinghouse developed six so-
called “critical safety functions” (CSF), which identify the state of the NPP. A table called status tree lists
symptoms of the plant, and the corresponding state of each safety function.
The safety functions (in order of importance) are:
• Subcriticality
• Core cooling
• Heat sink
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• Integrity of primary circuit
• Containment integrity
• Primary coolant inventory
Each function can have one of the following states:
• satisfied - (green)
• not satisfied - (yellow)
• severe challenge - (orange)
• extreme challenge - (red)
The operator should monitor the status tree, to see if one or more critical safety function is not satisfied.
If so, he should take the “function restoration guidelines” (this are the state based procedures), and try to
restore the safety functions. The operator should start with the function of the highest priority.
Balakovo3 adaptation
Balakovo3 is following the Westinghouse approach. Balakovo at the moment finished developing and im-
plementing their EOP, and is currently working on the severe accident management guidance (SAMG). The
following is taken from Sevastyanov et al. [2004].
Guidelines corresponding to the Westinghouse ORG are called in Balakovo terminology Accident Ter-
mination Guidance (ATG). The state based approach is called beyond design basis accident management
guidance (BDBAMG). Balakovo added one safety function to the Westinghouse safety functions - equip-
ment. The safety functions, and the symptoms indicating their state, is shown in Table 2.1.
Critical
Safety Func-
tion
Parameters/Symptoms
Extreme challenge Severe challenge Unsatisfactory
1 Equipment All electricity is lost, rooms are flooded, the control room is lost
2 Subcriticality neutron power value
above 5% after a reactor
trip
positive velocity of the
reactor run-away
neutron power and pos-
itive velocity of reactor
runaway
3 Core cooling Core outlet > 400◦C Core outlet > 350◦C or
THL − TCL > 20
◦C
Subcooling less than
10◦C anywhere in the
loops
4 Heat sink (lsg < 150cm in 3 or
4 SGs) AND (V˙FW <
90m3/h(≈ 20kg/s))
1.) PSG > 7.4MPa
in one or more SGs, 2.)
lSG > 3.9m in one or
more SGs, 3.) lSG <
1.5m in one or more SGs
5 Primary cir-
cuit integrity
∆TCL > 60K within
one hour in one or more
of the cold legs AND PS
pressure is high
6 Containment
integrity
Pcontainment >
0.4MPa
Pcontainment >
0.13MPa
7 Primary
Coolant
inventory
lPRZ < 3.5m AND
lsump < 1.5m after re-
actor trip
lPRZ < 3.5m AND
lsump > 1.5m after re-
actor trip
Table 2.1: Critical safety functions of Balakovo3
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SAMG
Once the integrity of the core is lost, which is usually indicated by a high core outlet temperature, the
technical support center (TSC) takes control. The priorities now are to maintain containment integrity.
Severe accidents involve a large number of physical phenomena, and are therefore very difficult to predict.
The analyst therefore can only provide very rough guidance, and one must be aware of the fact that huge
uncertainties are connected to the analysis results.
The tools for preparing the EOP and the SAMGs are quite different. EOP are developed based on a
PSA level 1, and investigation of the applicability of a certain procedure is done by TH-System codes. The
SAMG sequences are chosen based on a PSA level 2, and integral codes like Melcor or MAAP are adopted,
along with consideration of uncertainties.
The present work set its focus on the preventive part of accident management. Therefore, Relap5, a best
estimate thermal hydraulic system code has been used.
2.2 Description of the VVER-1000
AM for the VVER-1000/V-320 is the main topic of the present work. The following section describes the
VVER-1000. While some information on this NPP-design can be found in open literature, the present work
provides in addition information from project reports, which cannot be optained easily.
The VVER-1000/V-320 is a PWR with a thermal rating of 3000 MW and electrical output of 1000 MW.
The unit under consideration in this analysis is a typical V-320 model with four circulation loops, each
including a main circulation pump and a horizontal steam generator. The steam generators are fed by two
different feed water systems. Each system consists of turbine-driven pumps and piping connecting the feed
water line at four different locations in each steam generator. All elements of the primary side are situated in
a steel-lined, cylindrical, concrete containment building. Configuration schemes with geometric dimensions
and elevations (the value of zero is set to ground level) are shown in Figure 2.2.
In the VVER-1000 primary system, coolant enters into the reactor vessel through four inlet pipes (cold
legs) associated with the four primary loops. The flow then passes into the downcomer between the reactor
vessel and the inner vessel. The flow enters the lower plenum of the reactor vessel and passes through orifices
in the inner vessel and then enters slots in the fuel support structures that lead directly to the fuel assemblies.
The flow passes through the open bundles of the core. The fuel assemblies are in the configuration of a
hexagon with each containing 312 fuel rods. There are 163 fuel assemblies of which 61 have control rods.
After exiting the reactor core the coolant flows into the upper plenum, which contains the shielding block,
and then out to the hot legs of each of the four primary loops in the system.
Hot and cold leg of one loop are attached to the RPV at the same angular position (i.e. on top of each
other), with a distance between inlet and outlet nozzle central axis of 1.8 m. The loops one and four (two
and three) are attached with an azimutal angle of 55 ◦ between each other (i.e. not fully symmetric with 90 ◦
angles).
The following description is mainly taken from Groudev [2002].
2.2.1 Reactor cooling system
The reactor cooling system can be divided in primary and secondary system. The primary system com-
prises the reactor, pressurizer, four loops with steam generators, reactor coolant pump, the secondary system
consists of steam generator, turbine, condenser, deaerator and feed water pumps.
Primary system components
Each loop has a horizontal SG and a shaft-sealed reactor coolant pump. A pressurizer is attached to loop
4. A spray line is attached to the cold leg of loop 2. Nominal primary system pressure is 15.7 MPa. The
hot leg nozzles are located above the cold leg nozzles on the reactor vessel. There is a water seal in the
pressurizer surge line. Low pressurizer level is about at the elevation of the hot legs, and the surge line
nozzle into the pressurizer is at about the elevation of the top of the core. The total primary side water
volume is 337 m3(including the water in the pressurizer). The entire primary geometric volume is 361 m3.
There is a loop seal in the cold leg at the suction of the RCP.
The reactor coolant pumps are controlled leakage pumps with a four-stage seal. Seal injection is provided
between seal number one and seal number two of each pump by the charging system (TK). One part of the
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seal injection flow enters the primary system and the rest returns to the TK system through a seal return line.
Table 2.2 reports key dimension and elevations of several parts of the primary system.
No Parameter Value No Parameter Value
1 CL axis 23.9 m 12 Steam header axis 34.7 m
2 SG tubes top 30.1 m 13 SIT 1 top 29.4 m
3 Loop seal Axis 20.64 m 14 SIT 1 bottom 21.3 m
4 HL axis 25.7 m 15 SIT 3 top 35.7 m
5 RPV bottom 16.9 m 16 SIT 3 bottom 27.6 m
6 RPV top 28.7 m 17 HL length 9.83 m
7 PRZ bottom 22.3 m 18 CL length 28.0 m
8 PRZ top 34.6 m 19 CL internal diameter 0.85 m
9 PRZ Volume 79 m3 20 HL internal diameter 0.85 m
10 SG top 31.9 m 21 PRZ diameter 3 m
11 SG bottom 27.9 m
Table 2.2: The VVER1000 NPP system elevations and main dimensions [Mikhalchuk, 1997]
The pressurizer is the only location within a pressurized water reactor vessel that has a steam/liquid
interface during normal operation. The interface reduces the risk from water hammer and provides a com-
pressible steam (gas) space, which is used to set the absolute pressure of the reactor vessel. The bottom of
the volume is connected hot leg No 4 by the surge line, while the top of the pressurizer has sprays with piping
connected to cold leg No 2 and the charging (makeup) system. This configuration for the spray injection
inherently allows the high pressure in the cold leg to inject into the pressurizer, but the make-up system is
also available to inject water to condense and reduce the steam in the system.
The VVER-1000 typical main coolant pumps are run by electrical motors 6kV AC. The GCN-195M
pump is a vertical, single stage, centrifugal pump. The nominal flow of the MCP at 50 HZ is 5.88 m3/s. The
nominal head is 0.66 MPa. The actual pump capacity for 3 pumps in operation is 3x6.76 m3/s, for 2 pumps
in operation 2x7.33 m3/s, for 1 pump 7.50 m3/s. The pump coast down time in case of loss of power supply
is 232 s.
The steam generators of VVER-1000 type reactors are of horizontal, U-tube, natural circulation type.
The horizontal steam generator represents an important difference between VVER designs and Western
reactor designs. The response of horizontal steam generators can be very different than that of Western
type vertical steam generators due to the larger water mass in horizontal steam generators. This larger
water mass can affect the reactor transient response particularly during secondary side occurrences. The
steam generators include horizontal U-shaped heat exchanger tubes and provide natural separation on the
secondary side without the use of coarse separators
The main components of the steam generators are:
• steam generator vessel;
• heat transfer tubes (horizontal U-tubes) and primary coolant heads;
• feed water nozzle facility;
• emergency feed water nozzle facility;
• a perforated plate;
• moisture separator;
Feed water flows into the steam generator through a pipe 426x24 mm, then through 16 collectors of 80
mm inside diameter which couple to the distribution pipes, see Figures . Each of these distribution pipes have
38 perforated pipes. Some are at the upper steam tubing elevation while another portion is over the perforated
sheet in order to balance the nonuniform steam generation. This is achieved by partial condensation of the
voids in high steam areas. Table 2.3 presents an overview on key figures of the steam generator.
The reactor pressure vessel is the pressure boundary of the reactor core and high-pressure coolant. The
detailed geometry of the vessel is presented in Figure 2.6. The total height of the RPV is 19.1 m, the internal
height of from the lowest point of the lower plenum to the highest point of the upper head is 13.2 m. The
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No Parameter Value No Parameter Value
1 Average tube length 11.1 m 5 SG collector volume 2.4 m3
2 Number of tubes 11000 6 SG collector height 5 m
3 Tube ID 13 mm 7 PS total volume 23.4 m3
4 Tube OD 16 mm 8 PS tubes volume 16.2 m3
Table 2.3: The VVER1000 steam generator elevations and dimensions [Mikhalchuk, 1997]
free volume of the RPV is 110 m3. The coolant enters from the cold legs into the RPV, and passes through
the downcomer into the lower plenum. From there through the reactor core to the upper plenum. The
temperature increase of the fluid core-inlet to core-outlet is equal to 30◦C during nominal operation (core
flow rate 84800 m3/h). The mass of the RPV, core baffle, spacing plate, support plate, the RPV structures
except the active core sums up to 250 tons. In addition, there are 80 tons of fuel and about 25 tons of cladding
material in the active core (source [Mikhalchuk, 1997]). Table 2.4 shows key figures on RPV dimensions.
No Parameter Value No Parameter Value
1 Total internal height 11.76 m 7 Top of hydraulic core 22.36 m
2 RPV top 28.71 m 8 CL axis 23.9 m
3 RPV bottom 16.85 m 9 Top of DC 24.95 m
4 Bottom of hydraulic core 18.29 m 10 HL axis 25.7 m
5 Bottom of active core 18.48 m 11 UP top 26.75 m
6 Top of active core 22.03 m 12 UH top 28.71 m
Table 2.4: The VVER1000 reactor pressure vessel [Mikhalchuk, 1997]
Secondary system
The feed water system (Figure 2.7) supplies water from the condensate storage tank back into the steam gen-
erators through the high pressure heaters (or bypassing them) which controls the steam generator water level
during plant operation. The system consists of two turbine driven feed water pumps (FWP) two auxiliary
electrically driven feed water pumps (AFWP) and ten control valves.
The steam produced in the steam generators is transported to the turbine by the main steam lines (Figure
2.8). It is also used for in-house supply of steam to the turbo-pumps. The main steam lines system includes
the following components:
• 8 SG relief valves;
• 4 steam dump valves to atmosphere BRU-A;
• 4 steam dump valves to the condenser BRU-K
• 4 main steam isolation valves (MSIV);
Key figures regarding the balance of plant are shown in Table 2.5.
2.2.2 Reactor core
The following is taken from Ivanov et al. [2002]. The reactor core of VVER-1000/V320 consists of 163 fuel
assemblies, 61 fuel assemblies have control rods. Figure 2.9 shows the location of assemblies with control
rods. The fuel assemblies of the VVER-1000 are hexagonal in shape and without a shroud. The fuel pins are
arranged on a triangular pitch. Within the control assemblies, there are 18 positions occupied with stainless
steel control rod guide tubes to control the movement of the cluster of control rods that move within them.
The VVER-1000 fuel cycle can be three, four, or even five years. Once in a year the reactor is shut down
for maintenance and a according portion of the core is replaced. The enrichment ranges from 3.3% of U-235
up to 4.4%. Zones of highest enrichment are the outer portions of the core, Table 2.6 shows key figures of
the VVER-1000 reactor core.
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No Description Value Unit
Pressure drops along FW line
1 Hydrostatic pressure head between deaerator and FWP 0.229 MPa
2 Hydrostatic pressure head between FWP and HP Heater 0.126 MPa
3 Hydrostatic pressure head between HP Heater and SG 0.0536 MPa
4 Nominal pressure drop over HPH 0.98 MPa
5 Nominal pressure drop over the HPH bypass 1.1 MPa
6 Nominal pressure drop over the FW line and nozzle facil-
ity
0.981 MPa
Deaerator properties
7 Nominal pressure 0.58 MPa
8 Nominal level 2.52 m
9 Nominal temperature 437.15 K
10 Feedwater flow rate 1944.44 kg/s
10 Inner diameter 3.41 m
11 Deaerator wall thickness 0.16 m
12 Total FW volume 210 m3
13 Nominal volume 185 m3
14 Deaerator elevation (axis) 31.07 m
15 Deaerator vessel length 23.4 m
Table 2.5: Feed water system main technical data [Groudev, 2002]
No Parameter Unit
Core
1 Equivalent diameter of the core m 3.16
2 Flow area of the core m2 4.14
3 Core height in the working state m 3.55
4 Fuel height in cold state m 3.53
Fuel Assembly
5 Geometry Hex.
6 Number of FA in the core # 163
7 FA height m 4.57
8 Maximum width across flats of FA m 0.2351
9 Pitch between fuel assemblies m 0.236
Fuel Rod
10 Number of fuel rods in each FA # 311
11 Fuel rods cladding outer diameter mm 9.1
12 Fuel rods cladding inner diameter mm 7.73
13 Outside diameter of pellet mm 7.57
14 Diameter of central hole in pellet mm 1.5
15 Pitch between fuel rods in FA mm 12.75
16 Helium pressure under fuel rod cladding MPa 2
Spacing grid
17 Number of spacing grid in FA 15
Lower grid
18 Number of circle holes in the grids # 350
19 20 holes with diameter m 0.0063
20 40 holes with diameter (one half should be
considered)
m 0.0063
21 290 holes with equivalent diameter m 0.300144
Reactivity coefficients, hot conditions, BOC
22 Fuel temperature feedback coefficient pcm / K -1.9
continued on next page
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No Parameter Unit
23 Coolant density feedback coefficient pcm / (kg/ m3) 5.02
24 Coolant temperature feedback coefficient pcm / K -12.8
25 Boron reactivity coefficient pcm / ppm -9.4
26 Boron concentration g/kg 1.12
27 Total reactivity of all rods inserted (maximum
worth cluster stuck)
% -6.49
28 Delayed neutron fraction worth (β) % 0.664
Reactivity coefficients EOC
29 Fuel temperature feedback coefficient pcm / K -2.1
30 Coolant density feedback coefficient pcm / (kg/ m3) 31.30
31 Coolant temperature feedback coefficient pcm / K -65.9
32 Boron reactivity coefficient pcm / ppm -9.5
33 Boron concentration g/kg 0.0
34 Total reactivity of all rods inserted (maximum
worth cluster stuck)
% -6.41
35 Delayed neutron fraction worth (β) % 0.585
Table 2.6: The VVER1000 reactor core and fuel assembly parameters
[BNPP1-DB, 1996]
2.2.3 Emergency core cooling system
The following paragraph is taken from Sholly [2001]. The plant safety system concept is, with some ex-
ceptions, a 3x100% redundancy design with three nominally identical trains of equipment for each system.
The high pressure injection (TQ3), low pressure injection (TQ2), and containment spray (TQ1) systems take
suction from a common containment sump, which is contained in an extension of the containment below
the cavity basement. The high high pressure injection system or high pressure boron injection system (TQ4)
takes suction from three tanks of highly borated water (three times 15 m340g/kg of boric acid concentration).
Figure 2.10 shows the pressure vs flow rate curve for the TQ2, TQ3 and TQ4 system.
The HPI system (TQ3) is designed to supply up to 255 m3/h (70 kg/s, at 1.67 MPa) and up to a pressure
of 10.88 MPa (at a flow rate of 25 m3/h, 7 kg/s) The HPI pumps are also used in what is termed "feed and
bleed" cooling, in which the operators depressurize the primary system to a pressure below the HPI injection
capability by opening the PORV (flow rate through the PORV at 18.21 MPa is 50 kg/s), and injecting coolant
with the HPI pumps. The fluid discharged from the PORV results in the barbotage tank including a rupture
disk discharging the coolant into the containment sump. As the coolant is drawn from the sump by the HPI
pumps, it is cooled by the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers before being injected back into the
primary coolant system. Feed and bleed cooling is used upon loss of secondary heat removal capability (loss
of all feed water).
TQ4 and TQ3 are independent systems, but share the same injection points. Both systems inject in the
cold legs of three of the loops, downstream the MCP. In Balakovo3 (the reference plant for this work) the
loops are 1,3 and 4, however, in VVER1000 plants different loops have been chosen.
The low pressure injection system (TQ2) provide emergency coolant makeup in the event of a large pipe
break. The system also can be operated in the RHR mode to remove decay heat from the reactor coolant
system after shutdown. The LPIS can inject up to a PS pressure of 2.5 MPa, and the maximum flow rate
amounts to 763 m3/h (at atmospheric pressure). Residual heat removal is a mode of operating the LPI system
to take the primary system to, and maintain it in, cold shutdown. Initiation of RHR cooling is a series of
operator manual actions taken from the main or emergency control room.
There are four accumulators (YT) pressurized by nitrogen which automatically inject borated water into
the reactor coolant system at a pressure of 5.9 MPa. Three accumulators are needed to reach the intended
safety goal in case of a large LOCA (4x33%). Two accumulators inject into the upper plenum and two
into the down comer of the reactor pressure vessel. Each accumulator has a capacity of 50 m3of water.
Following injection, fast acting electric powered isolation valves close on low level in the accumulators to
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prevent injection of nitrogen gas into the primary system. The accumulators are located in two pairs on
elevation level 27.0m and 36.0m in the containment.
Two accumulators inject into upper plenum, two accumulators into the downcomer. They share the last
part of the lines with two trains of the TQ2 system - train one injects into downcomer and upper plenum,
train two injects into downcomer and upper plenum, while train three injects into hot- and cold leg of loop
one (cold leg injection point between MCP and RPV, hot leg injection point close to the RPV).
The makeup system is part of the chemical and volume control system, which performs a variety of
functions supportive of normal operation. From the standpoint of accident analysis the makeup pumps are
important as regards steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) sequences and also in their role in providing
reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal support functions to maintain RCP seal integrity. The system can be
connected to the TB10 system which is made up of 2 tanks of 200 m3, each containing 40 g/kg (4 wt% or
7000 ppm) boric acid. With all three TB10 system pumps operating, the system can achieve a maximum
flow of 100 m3/h. The high pressure boron injection system or high high pressure injection system (HHPIS)
is capable of injecting up to 19.6 MPa at a flow rate of 6.2 m3/h. It takes suction from three tanks with
highly borated water, with a volume of 15 m3each.
DESIGN
SYSTEM V-187 V-302 V-338 V-320 V-392 V-412
Start up of the 1st unit 1980 1983 1984 1984 Design
stage
Design
stage
PRIMARY CIRCUIT
HPIS 3x100% 3x100% 3x100% 3x100% - 4x100%
LPIS 3x100% 3x100% 3x100% 3x100% - 4x100%
Combined HPIS-LPIS - - - - 4x100% -
Emergency boron in-
jection
+ + + + - +
Emergency gas removal + + + + + +
Number of pressurizer
safety valves (G= 50
kg/s)
3 3 3 3 3 3
Fast boron injection
system
- - - - 4x25% 4x25%
1st step hydroaccumu-
lators
4x33% 4x33% 4x33% 4x33% 4x33% 4x33%
2nd step hydroaccumu-
lators
- - - - 4x25% 4x25%
ECCS tanks with high
boron concentration
(40 kg/s)
1x150m3 3x150m3 3x150m3 3x150m3 - -
ECCS tanks with low
boron concentration
(16 kg/s)
3x585m3 3x585m3 3x750m3 1x630m3 1x500m3 1x500m3
SECONDARY CIRCUIT
Emergency feedwater
system
3x100% 3x100% 3x100% 3x100% - -
Emergency cool-down
system of steam gener-
ators
- - - - 4x100% 4x100%
Passive residual heat re-
moval
- - - - 4x33% 4x33%
Number of SG safety
valves
2 2 2 2 2 2
continued on next page
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DESIGN
SYSTEM V-187 V-302 V-338 V-320 V-392 V-412
Start up of the 1st unit 1980 1983 1984 1984 Design
stage
Design
stage
Fast acting safety
valves on main steam
lines
+ + + + + +
Check valves on main
steam lines
+ + + + - -
Motor operated valves
on main steam lines
+ + + + + +
Fast acting reduction
station for steam re-
lease into the atmo-
sphere (BRU-A)
1 on each
main steam
line
1 on each
main steam
line
1 on each
main steam
line
1 on each
main steam
line
4 on main
steam
header
4 on main
steam
header
Table 2.7: Evolution VVER1000 safety concept
2.2.4 Containment system
The following paragraph is mainly taken from Groudev [2002]. The main element of the VVER-1000/V320
containment (see Figure 2.11 containing the reactor pressure vessel and the primary side consist of a cylinder
(height 38 m, diameter 45 m) with a dome on top. The building material is pre-stressed concrete with a thin
steel liner (8 mm) on the inside. The concrete wall thickness is about 1.2 m for the cylinder and 1.1 m for
the dome. The containment design overpressure is 0.41 MPa, covering the pressure peak after double-ended
guillotine rupture of the main primary loop of 0.85 m diameter.
The bottom of the containment is at +13.7 m above the ground, the bottom of the ECC sump at +7.4 m.
The ECC pumps and different supporting equipment are located in the lower part of the reactor building.
The square building extends also above the containment shell base plate, up to about +40 m protecting large
part of the containment shell with the reactor against external impact and improving the primary system
shielding. There is a narrow gap between the cylindrical shell and the cylindrical inner shaft in the square
building.
The containment is equipped with 3 (200 % backup) active spray systems to reduce pressure after steam
leak from the primary or secondary circuit. Their distributors are rings with spray jets at the top of the dome.
They are connected by vertical lines with the pumps and containment heat removal exchangers located
below the containment which take water from the main recirculation sump. The sump is common for all
three systems and is shared together with the heat exchangers of the containment heat removal system with
the active ECC systems.
2.2.5 Operating conditions
The VVER-1000 nominal operating conditions are 3000 (±60) MW, the nominal flow rate is 84800 (+4000
/-4800) m3/h, the primary side pressure is 15.7 MPa, the temperature at the reactor inlet 289 ◦C, the tem-
perature at the reactor outlet is 320◦C
2.2.6 Overview on the VVER1000 operation in the world
The following description can be found in Misak [2004b]. The VVER-1000 reactors constitute the latest
generation of soviet-designed pressurized water reactors (PWRs). NPP with VVER-1000 reactors, which
are in operation at present, have been developed in four different models. Main characteristics of different
models are described based mainly on the book Denisov and Dragunov [2002].
The designs of earlier models 187, 302 and 338 were started in 1972 and were completed in 1979. The
standard used for their design was the Russian regulatory document OPB-73. These early models have
historically been called the small series because only five units of these models have been constructed.
Originally the design of VVER-1000 small series differs significantly between each other and VVER-1000
15
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No Parameter Unit Comment
1 Power [Mw] 3000
2 Core inlet temperature [deg C] 290
3 Core Dtemperature [deg C] 30
4 Core outlet temperature [deg C] 320
5 Coolant pressure outlet core [Mpa] 15.7 upper plenum
6 One loop flow rate [m3/h] 21200 Core flowrate/4
7 Core flow rate [m3/h] 84800 lower plenum
8 Pump rotation speed [rev/min] 995
9 PRZ pressure [Mpa] 15.7
10 PRZ temperature [deg C] 346
11 Pump flow rate [m3/h] 20000 pump capacity
12 SG exchanged power [Mw] 750
13 SG steam production [kg/s] 408
14 SG pressure [Mpa] 6.27
15 SG steam temperature [deg C] 279
16 FW temperature [deg C] 220
Table 2.8: The VVER1000 nominal operational parameters taken from Mikhalchuk [1997]
V-320 design. The design of VVER-1000 small series model 187 was developed in the early seventies in
accordance with standards of that time, including such issues as insufficient environmental qualification of
equipment belonging to instrumentation and control and electric power supply, as well as separation between
control and safety functions. In addition, the overall system layout provided sometimes an insufficiency in
protection against environmental impact. For example, all emergency feed water pumps were installed in the
turbine hall without real separation. V320 model has been designed and built according to the requirements
set out in the new OPB-82 safety regulations, which attempted at complying with international practices
and safety standards. The concept of defense in depth was realized by general design criteria including
the use of redundancy, diversity, independence and single failure criterion for safety systems. For standard
VVER-1000/V320 units the design differences are not so significant, with exception for Temelin NPP at
which a lot of upgrading measures have been implemented during the construction phase. Several generic
design features for all VVER-1000 reactors remained unchanged for all models, and they are very similar to
Western PWR with few exceptions as follows:
• Reactor pressure vessel has relatively small diameter, with inlet and outlet nozzles located at different
elevations
• Hexagonal fuel assemblies, with triangular fuel rods array
• Fuel rods with relatively small diameter, with Zr+Nb used as a cladding material
• Four loops in the primary circuit, with the horizontal steam generators as a characteristic design feature
• As compared with initial (small series) VVER 1000 designs, evolutionary steps toward V-320 model
in addition to already mentioned improved safety features included mainly:
– Reduced number of control rods
– Utilization of the 3-year fuel campaign
– Fuel assemblies without shroud tubes
– Main circulation loops without isolation valves
– Improved seismic resistance
– Possibility for residual heat removal during maintenance of a circulation loop
– Possibility for operation of the reactor at reduced power.
There is a number of new designs derived from the basic V320 model, mainly upgraded toward better
resistance to severe accidents; these are however not considered further in the present project.
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No COUNTRY PLANT UNIT/MODEL START OF OPERATION
(grid connection)
1 Bulgaria Kozloduy 5/320 1987
2 6/320 1991
3 India Kudankulam 1/412 Under construction
4 2/412 Under construction
5 Iran Bushehr 1/446 Under construction
6 China Tianwan 1/428 Under construction
7 2/428 Under construction
8 Czech Republic Temelin 1/320 2000
9 2/320 2002
10 Russia Balakovo 1/320 1985
11 2/320 1987
12 3/320 1988
13 4/320 1993
14 5/392 Under construction
15
16 Kalinin 1/338 1984
17 2/338 1986
18 3/320 2004 (expected)
19 4/xxxx xxxxx
20
21 Novovoronezh 5/187 1980
22 6/392 Construction licensed
23
24 Volgodonsk 1/320 2001
25 2/320 2004 (expected)
26 Ukraine Khmelnitsky 1/320 1987
27 2/320 2004 (expected)
28 Rovno 3/320 1986
29 4/320 2004 (expected)
30
31 South Ukraine 1/302 1982
32 2/338 1985
33 3/320 1989
34
35 Zaporozhe 1/320 1984
36 2/320 1985
37 3/320 1986
38 4/320 1987
39 5/320 1989
40 6/320 1995
Table 2.9: Overview of VVER1000 reactors in operation and under con-
struction
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Figure 2.2: The VVER1000 V320 main equipment primary side
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Figure 2.3: The VVER1000 steam generator
Figure 2.4: The VVER1000 steam generator - cross section
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Figure 2.5: The VVER1000 steam generator - top view
Figure 2.6: The VVER1000 reactor pressure vessel and core baffle
20
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 2.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE VVER-1000
Figure 2.7: The VVER1000 scheme of deaerator - feed water lines
Figure 2.8: The VVER1000 steam lines
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Figure 2.9: The VVER1000 assemblies with control rods (ten groups)
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Figure 2.10: The VVER1000 pressure vs flow rate diagrams for the active ECCS injection systems
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Figure 2.11: The VVER1000 containment
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2.3 The PSB-VVER Test Facility
An experiment for each of the calculations presented in chapter 3 has been performed at the PSB-VVER
test facility. An extensive description of the facility can be found in [Melikhov et al., 2003a]. The following
description is taken from [D’Auria et al., 2005]. This section presents selected aspects of the PSB facility.
For a comprehensive description of the considerations for the facility design (scaling issue), please refer to
[D’Auria et al., 2005], and [D’Auria et al., 2006].
The PSB-VVER is a full height integral test facility (see Figure 2.12), power and volume are scaled
1:300. The facility has four loops (each one is constituted by a hot leg, a steam generator, a loop seal, a
main circulation pump and a cold leg); a pressurizer, connected via the surge line to the hot leg of loop 4;
the ECCS is provided by an active pump, that simulates high and low pressure injection systems, and four
hydro-accumulators. All system components are insulated from the environment with glass wool to limit the
heat losses. Figure 2.13 reports the scheme of the PSB facility.
The main parts of the VVER vessel are reproduced in the facility by separate pipes: one for the down-
comer, one for the core model and upper plenum, and one for the core bypass. A horizontal pipe connects the
downcomer to the lower plenum. Another bypass links the downcomer to the upper plenum (Figure 2.14).
The core model contains 168 Fuel Rod Simulators with an uniform power profile and a central unheated
rod. The active bundle is of electrical type and has a hexagonal cross section. For the project, the maximum
core power was limited to 1.5 MW (the right value would be 10 MW). This led to a distortion during the
steady state operation. To account for the lower power, the pump speed was reduced. Following a scram,
the power has been kept at a higher level to supply the right (scaled) amount of energy to the primary side
fluid. Also the bypass section is heated over the same elevation range of the core, to simulate the heating that
water receives in the channels, within the reactor core, in which the coolant flows from the lower plenum to
the upper plenum, bypassing the assemblies. Figure 2.14 shows the PSB core simulator.
The primary side of the steam generator consists of a hot and a cold collector and of 34 tubes coiled in 10
complete turns with 51 mm difference from inlet and outlet height. The length of one tube is the same like
the one of the reference plant (Figure 2.15 shows the simulation of the SG). The distributor of feed water is a
ring with several holes placed above the steam generator tubes. Separators are completely absent. The four
steam generators are connected to a common steam header via a “small power” steam line. A “full power”
steam line was in place, but not used, since the full (scaled) power core was not available for the project.
A comparison between VVER1000 NPP and PSB-VVER test facility main data is presented in Table
2.10.
Measurement points: Figure 2.16 show measurement points of temperatures and differential pressures
on the RPV simulator. Mass flow measurements are also provided, based on pressure differences (therefore
only valid during single phase, or mainly single phase regimes). The core simulator is instrumented with
a large number of thermocouples (see Figure 2.17 and 2.18). Thermocouples and connected wires are led
within the electrical heated rods, as can be seen in Figure 2.19, so that they do not constitute any distortion to
the flow. An additional paramter that is provided to the analyst is the mass inventory of the facility, and the
break flow rate. Both are based on the measurement of the discharge flow, which is collected in a tank. Table
2.11 gives the typical measurement range of selected parameters, and the associated measurement error.
Selected PSB issues - MCP: The PSB facility has four scaled pumps. Several separate effect characteri-
zation tests have been performed to provide the pump characteristics to the analysts. Coast down times of
the NPP pumps (232 s) are simulated by the pump control program. The pumps have two separate cooling
cycles, one forced, and one natural circulation cycle. This poses a problem for
Selected PSB issues - heat losses: the heat losses of the PSB facility constitute one of the main distortions
to the real plant. The overall surface to volume ratio is orders of magnitute higher at the facility than at the
plant. While heat losses at the plant are neglectible (in fact, for the NPP simulations the boundary conditions
of the containment surfaces of heat structures have been set to isolated), at the PSB facility they cannot be
neglected. The heat losses along the loops are balanced by higher core power (compared to the known decay
heat power curve of the plant). Pressurizer heaters are kept in operation to balance pressurizer heat losses,
while the water level in the pressurizer is sufficiently high.
The main uncertainty regarding the heat losses comes from the PSB main coolant pump. The pumps
are cooled also when they are not in operation. While the heat losses from the forced circulation cycle
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eventually is known (even if the measurement errors are huge), nothing is recorded about the heat losses
from the natural circulation cooling cycle. EREC experience is that the heat losses range between 2 kW and
15 kW for each pump, depending on the flow regime in the corresponding loop (so in the worst case 60 kW
in total, compared to a core power of typically in the range of 300-500 kW after the scram). This was one of
the main difficulties during the post-test analysis.
Name VVER-1000 PSB-VVER Scale Factor
Number of loops 4 4 -
Heat losses, [%] 0.063 1.8 -
Heating power, [MW] 3000 10 1:300
Primary circuit volume, [ m3] 370 1.23 1:300
Primary circuit pressure, [MPa] 15.7 15.7 1:1
Secondary circuit pressure, [MPa] 6.3 6.3 1:1
Coolant temperature, [◦C ] 290/320 290/320 1:1
Core length, [m] 3.53 3.53 1:1
Number of fuel rods 50856 169 1:300
Core volume, [ m3] 14.8 4.9 · 10−2 1:302
Upper plenum volume, [ m3] 61.2 20.0 · 10−2 1:306
Down-comer volume, [ m3] 34.0 11.0 · 10−2 1:309
Hot legs volume, [ m3] 22.8 8.0 · 10−2 1:285
Cold legs volume, [ m3] 60.0 24.0 · 10−2 1:250
Number of steam generators 4 4 -
Heat exchanging surface, [ m2] 6115 18.2 1:336
Water volume in SG primary circuit,
[ m3]
21.0 6.8 · 10−2 1:309
PRZ volume, [ m3] 79 26.3 · 10−2 1:300
Number of hydro accumulators 4 4 -
Number of pumps 4 4 -
Volume of hydro accumulators, [ m3] 240 80 · 10−2 1:300
Water volume in ACCU, [ m3] 200 66.6 · 10−2 1:300
Table 2.10: PSB-VVER and VVER-1000 comparison
Parameter Unit Value Error
UP pressure MPa 15.8 ±0.05
UP outlet fluid temp ◦C 310 ±3.0
DC inlet fluid temp ◦C 277 ±3.0
Core power kW 1520 ±15
Core bypass power kW 15.1 ±0.4
PRZ lvl m 6.67 ±0.3
Acc pressure MPa 5.9 ±0.03
Acc lvl m 4.88 ±0.07
SG pressure MPa 6.29 ±0.05
SG lvl m 1.70 ±0.08
SG FW ◦C 216 ±3.0
SG AFW ◦C 20 ±3.0
Table 2.11: PSB selected measurements (nom. value) and associated errors
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Figure 2.12: PSB-VVER NPP simulator
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Figure 2.13: PSB - general scheme
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Figure 2.14: PSB core simulator
Figure 2.15: PSB SG simulator
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Figure 2.16: PSB - RPV model measurement points
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Figure 2.17: PSB - core simulator measurement points (1/2)
Figure 2.18: PSB - core simulator measurement points (2/2)
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Figure 2.19: PSB - instrumented fuel rod simulator
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2.4 Methods and Tools
2.4.1 Relap5
Introduction
The main tool that was used for NPP analysis was Relap5. The code version was Relap5 mod 3.3ef. The
following section provides an overview on the capabilities and models used in Relap5. The code comes with
extensive documentation - eight volumes and one annex. The first volume [ISL, 2003] gives an overview on
models and structure of the code. The Relap5 computer code is a light water reactor transient analysis code
developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for use in rule making, licensing audit cal-
culations, evaluation of operator guidelines, and as a basis for a nuclear plant analyzer. Specific applications
of this capability have included simulations of transients in LWR systems, such as loss of coolant, antici-
pated transients without scram (ATWS), and operational transients such as loss of feed water, loss of off site
power, station blackout, and turbine trip. RELAP5 is a highly generic code that, in addition to calculating
the behavior of a reactor coolant system during a transient, can be used for simulation of a wide variety of
hydraulic and thermal transients in both nuclear and nonnuclear systems involving mixtures of steam, water,
noncondensable, and solute. Relap5 is structured in components. A driver component has the task of calling
the sub-components accordingly. There are three physical sub-components, the Hydro-dynamic component,
the component on heat-structures, and the neutron (point) kinetics model. One component determines the
state of the boundary volumes and the imposed conditions, one component determines the time step, and
two components work on the logics, to model the control system of the NPP, called trips and control.
The RELAP code series started in 1966 with the release of the code RELAPSE (Reactor Leak and Power
Safety Excursion). Several versions of RELAP have been released. In 1985 the first release of the Relap5
code series was available. Now the latest code version is Relap5 mod 3.3. Several other projects branched of
the Relap5 project - Relap5-3D, a commercial closed-source code, providing the possibility of 3 dimensional
arrangement of the control volumes, Relap5/SCDAP, another commercial, closed source project which, apart
from a complete rewriting of the code adds the possibility to simulate core melt phenomena within Relap5,
or trace, which provides a graphical user interface for the input preparation. The code Relap5 is no longer
under active development, only code fixes are released from time to time.
Notwithstanding the fact that Relap5 is no longer actively developed, it is widely used and well tested.
Relap5 has been customized for a large number of computer hardware architectures and different FORTRAN
compilers (FORTRAN 77), and its applicability has been extended from light water reactors to CANDU and
VVER as well. The following sections provides just a very brief summary of the Relap5 manuals, for more
details please refer to [ISL, 2003], [ISL, 2006a], [ISL, 2006b], [ISL, 2006c], [ISL, 2006d], [ISL et al., 2006],
[ISL, 2006e], [ISL, 2006f].
Physics in Relap5
Relap5, as thermal hydraulic system code, is based on the equation for mass, momentum and energy con-
servation of fluids to calculate the flow in the piping system. Eight dependent variables are evaluated for
each time step, using eight field equations. The other quantities of interest are expressed as functions of this
eight variables using equations of state. The field equations cannot cover the general situation. To calcu-
late the energy and momentum transfer between the phases, the fluid and the wall, the friction between the
phases, the friction between fluid and wall so called constitutive models are used. This means that criteria
are defined to determine flow and heat transfer conditions, and to use for the above mentioned phenomena a
correlation which suits the actual conditions.
Several additional models are used, like a simple model to calculate the reactor power. The section
provides a brief overview on each of the three types of equations, i.e. hydrodynamic model or field equations,
which are on the basis of the numerical scheme. The model is followed by the state equations, which are used
to derive all other quantities of interest based on the outcome of the field equations, and, only as overview,
the most relevant constitutive equations.
Hydrodynamic model - field equations
The relations for mass, momentum and energy conservation and the jump conditions be found in text books
on fluid mechanics like [Truckenbrodt, 1968] or targeted to two phase flow, [Bergles et al., 1981]. The latter
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one derives a general balance equation from the theorem of Gauss, which may be specialized for mass,
momentum and energy conservation.
The generalized balance equation can be written in integral form as
2∑
k=1
d
dt
∫
Vk(t)
ρkψkdV =
2∑
k=1
(
−
∫
Sk(t)
ρkψkvk · nkdS −
∫
S(t)k
Jψ · ndS +
∫
Vk(t)
ρkφkdV
) (2.1)
the general balance equation can be transformed from integral to differential form
2∑
k=1
(
∂
∂t
(ρψ) +∇ · (ρψv) +∇ · Jk − ρkφk
)
(2.2)
The generalized balance equation basically states that the total change in an arbitrary volume V is equal
to the integral of in- and out flow of a quantity through the surface S of the volume, the “diffusion” on the
surface, and the integral of contribution of sources and sinks within the volume. The index k = 1, 2 specifies
different phases. With different values for ψ, J and φ one can derive mass, momentum, angular momentum
and energy balance equation (see Table 2.12).
Balance ψk Jk φk
Mass 1 0 0
Momentum vk −Tk F
Energy uk + (1/2)v
2
k qk −Tk · vk F · vk
Table 2.12: Quantities for general balance equation
Each of the equation is associated with one “jump-condition”, which describes the transfer of the asso-
ciated quantity between the phases.
The Relap5 hydrodynamic model resolves eight field equations for eight dependent variables (listed
below, (2.3)).
P (x, t) ,
Ug (x, t) , Uf (x, t) ,
αg (x, t) ,
vg (x, t) , vf (x, t) ,
Xn (x, t) ,
ρb (x, t)
(2.3)
Basic field equations Basic field equations are mass, momentum and energy conservation equation. They
alone are not sufficient to find a unique solution to the problem. In addition, information which describes the
change between the phases is needed. These equations are termed “closure equations” or “jump conditions”.
• Mass continuity (three equations, since the mass of fluid, non-condensibles and boron is conserved
separately).
• Momentum conservation equation (one equation)
• Energy conservation equation (one equation)
• Closure equations - phase change conditions (3 equations - exchange of mass, momentum and energy)
Sums up to eight equations for eight variables. The field equations as used in Relap5 and their discretiza-
tion are not presented here, but can be found in [ISL, 2003].
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State equations
Five of the eight variables of the section “field equation” are used as independent state variables, the pressure
P , the void fraction αg , vapor and liquid specific internal energy Ug and Uf , and the fraction of non-
condensible gases Xn.
The pressure, the specific internal energies and the void fraction allows to derive the major part of the
quantities of interest from steam tables. Other quantities, like the sound speed, are calculated using standard
formula. For more details please refer to [ISL, 2003] and [ISL, 2006c].
Relap5 supports a certain number of different fluids (e.g. among others H2, He, freon, blood) although
as default h2o and d2o is supported.
Constitutive models - closure equations
Energy and momentum transfer between the phases and between fluid and wall is an input which is still
missing in the field equations. Relap uses a number of correlations for this calculation, depending on the
flow regime. For different flow regime maps are used, one for horizontal flow, one for vertical, one for high
mixing and one for ECC mixer.
The most common flow patterns for horizontal and vertical two phase flow, and their description, can be
found in [Bergles et al., 1981]. The most common flow patterns for a vertical pipe with upward co-current
flow, are shown in figure 2.20. The shown flow patterns are air-water (1) independent bubbles, (2) packed
bubbles, (3) slug flow, (4) churn flow, (5) annular flow. Diameter of the pipe shown in the Figure is 32 mm.
The most common flow is the bubbly flow. Bubbles keep their spherical shape up to a size of 1 mm,
beyond 1 mm they are of variable shape. Roumy divides bubbly flow is divided in two flow patterns,
independent bubbles (1) and packed bubbles (2). With increasing void fraction slug flow (3) is formed.
Slug flow is composed of a series of gas plugs. Usually, the head of a gas plug is blunt, while the end is
flat. The liquid film surrounding the gas plug moves downward in respect to the tube wall. With further
increasing void fraction the gas plugs grow longer and longer, and a void center starts to form chaotically.
This transition flow regime is called churn flow (4). If a central gas core is developed, the flow is called
annular flow (5).
Figure 2.20: Upward co-current flow in a vertical pipe ([Roumy, 1969])
A similar situation is observed when a pipe is heated, see Figure 2.21. Only that the flow patterns evolve
further from dispersed annular flow, where a central gas core loaded with liquid droplets moves faster than
the film on the wall, to whispy annular flow, where the liquid droplets gather into clouds within the central
gas core. If the wall temperature is high enough to evaporate also the liquid film, the droplets constitute a
mist flow.
Figure 2.21 shows the a liquid-vapor flow through a heated pipe. Liquid enters the pipe at constant flow
rate and temperature, while the wall heat flux is increasing from left to right. With increasing heat flux the
appearance of vapor comes closer and closer to the entrance of the channel. The local boiling length is
the length of the pipe where bubbles are generated at the wall, and condensed in the liquid core. Vapor is
produced by two mechanism - nucleate boiling on the wall, and direct vaporization on the interfaces in the
flow.
The wall heat flux can be high enough to transgress beyond annular flow, to evaporate completely the
liquid mist on the wall. If this happens and the heat flux stays constant, the wall temperature rises very
quickly and can exceed the melting temperature of the wall. This phenomenon is called dry-out, burnout,
boiling crisis or critical heat flux.
35
2.4. METHODS AND TOOLS CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
Figure 2.21: Convective boiling in a heated channel ([Hewitt and Hall-Taylor, 1970])
horizontal flow regimes can be found in more detail in [Bergles et al., 1981]. Flow regimes are usually
used together with flow maps, i.e. conditions which determine which flow regime can be found depending
on certain parameters. Relap uses four flow-regime maps: one for horizontal flow, one for vertical flow, one
for high mixing volumes (e.g. pumps) and one for the ECC - Mixer component. The last component has
not been used throughout this work, but the other flow regime maps are presented. The flow regime map
for horizontal flow consists of bubbly, slug, annular mist, dispersed and horizontal stratified flow (see Figure
2.22). The parameters which determines the flow regime are based on the relative velocity between the
two phases and the void fraction. The horizontal flow regime map is used for volumes with an inclination
between 0 and 45 degrees. For volumes with an inclination between 45 and 90 degrees the vertical flow
regime map (see Figure 2.23) is used. The map consists of bubbly, slug, annular-mist, and dispersed (droplet
or mist) flows in the pre-CHF regime; inverted annular, inverted slug and dispersed (droplet or mist) flows in
post-dryout; and vertically stratified for sufficiently low-mixture velocity ([ISL, 2006c]). A third The flow
regime map for high mixing volumes is used, but not shown here since the corresponding Relap5 components
have not been used.
similar to the flow regime maps Relap5 determines a heat transfer mode for the wall to fluid heat transfer.
Figure 2.24 displays the logical flow chart, based on which the correlation for the heat transfer mode is
chosen. Pcrit in the diagram denotes the critical pressure, Xn the mass quality of non condensible gases,
Xe the equilibrium quality, αg the (gas) void fraction, Tw the wall temperature, Tspt the steam saturation
pressure based on total pressure, Tspp the steam saturation pressure based on steam partial pressure, Tf the
liquid temperature, CHF the critical heat flux, q′′ the heat flux, q′′FB the film boiling heat flux, q′′TB
transition boiling heat flux, Geom - type of hydraulic cell, 1Φ single phase.
The modes are
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Figure 2.22: Flow regimes for horizontal flow
• Mode 0 Convection to noncondensable-steam-water mixture or superheated liquid
• Mode 1 Convection at supercritical pressure or superheat wall with negative heat flux due to super-
heated gas
• Mode 2 Single-phase liquid convection at subcritical pressure, subcooled wall and low void fraction
• Mode 3 Subcooled nucleate boiling
• Mode 4 Saturated nucleate boiling
• Mode 5 Subcooled transition boiling
• Mode 6 Saturated transition boiling
• Mode 7 Subcooled film boiling
• Mode 8 Saturated film boiling
• Mode 9 Single-phase vapor or supercritical two-phase convection
• Mode 10 Condensation when void is less than one
• Mode 11 Condensation when void is one
• Mode 12 Single-phase liquid convection at subcritical pressure, subcooled wall and low void fraction,
uses Petukhov-Gnielinski and Swanson-Catton correlations.
Based on the flow map and heat transfer mode a (empirical) correlation is selected calculate the energy
and momentum transfer between the phases. Based on the large number of flow regimes and, as result, the
large quantity of possibilities for energy and momentum transfer, a vast number of correlations has been
implemented in Relap5. All of them are described in the first and forth volume of the Relap5 manual, [ISL,
2003] and [ISL, 2006c]. Only to give an idea, a table providing an overview on the used correlations is
presented in Table 2.13.
Structure heat transfer model
Apart from the hydraulic system Relap5 calculates also the heat transfer in metal structures or in the fuel
rods. The model is based on the heat conduction equation (2.4) and (2.5) in differential form. In both
equations, k denotes the thermal conductivity, s the surface, S an internal heat source, t the time, T the
temperature, V the volume, x the space coordinates, and ρ∗ the volumetric heat capacity (ρ · c).
∫
V
ρ∗(T,x)
d
dt
T (x, t)dV =
∫
S
k(T,x)∇T (x, t) · ds+
∫
V
SdV (2.4)
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Figure 2.23: Flow regimes for vertical flow
ρ∗
d
dt
T = k ·∆T + S (2.5)
The equations are integrated using a finite difference scheme. Material properties are stored in tabular
form in the code for standard materials (carbon steel, stainless steel, UO2, zirconium etc), but can also be
defined by the user.
One substantial simplification is that the heat transfer is in structures is only considered to happen in the
radial direction, not along the axis. Only the one-dimensional heat transfer equation is considered.
Since this assumption inserts a significant distortion in case of large break loss of coolant accidents,
where in the real plant the colder part of the reactor might provide a heat sink for the hotter part and thereby
mitigate the accident, for this specific boundary conditions the Relap5 user may enable a 2-D heat transfer
calculation.
Phase separation and related process models
Relap5 field equations allow for unequal temperatures and unequal velocities of the two phases (UTUV).
Nevertheless, for most circumstances Relap5 assumes that the two phases are homogenously mixed in each
control volume, which means that usually there is no notion of a level in a control volume. But during
stagnant or low flow conditions gravity can cause a separation of the two phases, in these situations a clear
interface between the phases is present, and the lumped parameter approach can introduces significant errors
. Such situations are called stratified flow in Relap5. The following paragraph describes the handling of
stratified flow in horizontal and vertical pipes, which is coded as one of the possible flow regimes in the
horizontal (see Figure 2.22) and vertical (see Figure 2.23) flow map. Then the special process that handle
counter current flow limitation (steam on top of water, inhibiting flow, typically at the upper tie plate),
entrainment/pullthrough of steam during small break LOCA under stratified conditions, and level tracking
for a slow moving water front in vertical pipes.
Stratified flow in vertical pipes The vertical stratified flow models are used if two requirements are met.
The first requirement is that the average mixture velocity vm (2.6) is below
1
2 of the Taylor bubble rise
velocity vTB (2.7):
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Mode Heat transfer phenomena Correlations
0 Noncondensable steam-water or su-
perheated water
Kays, Dittus-Boelter, ESDU, Shah, Churchill-Chu,
McAdams, Elenbaas, Petukhov-Kirillov, Swanson-
Catton
1 Supercritical or single-phase liquid Same as mode 0
2 Single-phase liquid or subcooled
wall with voidg < 0.1
Same as mode 0
3 Subcooled nucleate boiling Chen
4 Saturated nucleate boiling Same as mode 3
5 Subcooled transition boiling Chen-Sundaram-Ozkaynak
6 Saturated transition boiling same as 5
7 Subcooled film boiling Bromley, Sun-Gonzales-Ten, and mode 0 Correlations
8 Saturated film boiling Same as mode 7
9 Supercritical two-phase or single
phase gas
Same as mode 0
10 Filmwise condensation Nusselt, Shah, Colburn-Hougen
11 Condensation in steam Same as mode 10
12 Single-phase liquid or subcooled
wall with voidg < 0.1
Same as mode 0
3,4
(hor.bund.)
Nucleate boiling Forster-Zuber, Polley-Ralston-Grant, ESDU
Table 2.13: Relap wall to fluid heat transfer correlations
vm =
Gm
ρm
Gm = αgρg|vg|+ αfρf |vf |
ρm = αgρg + αfρf
(2.6)
and
vTB = 0.35
√
gD (ρf − ρg)
ρf
(2.7)
with
ρf , ρg density of liquid and steam phase
vf , vg velocity of liquid and steam
αg, αf void fraction and one minus void fraction
g acceleration of gravity
D pipe diameter
The second requirement regards the axial void fraction distribution. Each triple of vertical volumes (see
Figure 2.25) is checked. The void fractions of the volumes are compared against each other, and, simplified,
it is ensured that there is a sufficiently large change in void fraction from top to bottom.
Should both requirements be met, the correlations for vertically stratified flow are chosen for the closure
equations, like the heat transfer coefficients between the phases, the wall and interfacial drag, interfacial
friction etc. However, still no level inside volume K of Figure 2.25 is calculated. If a level of a slowly
moving water front should be calculated, the mixture level tracking model has to be activated (described
later in this section). The vertical stratified flow model is turned on by default (i.e. will be used if the
requirements are fulfilled), but can be turned of by the user for each control volume.
Stratified flow in horizontal pipes Relap5 uses its models for horizontal stratified flow based on the
relative velocity of the phases, and the mixture mass flux, see Figure 2.22. The mixture mass fluxGm has to
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be below 2500 kg
sm2
, while the relative phase velocity |vg − vf | has to be below
1
2 of the critical velocity, the
velocity above which waves on the horizontal interface will begin to grow:
vcrit =
1
2
√
(ρf − ρg) gαgA
ggD sin θ
(1− cos θ) (2.8)
with
A the area of the pipe
θ angle as shown in Figure 2.25
Should the requirements for stratified horizontal flow be met, the corresponding correlations to calculate
the interfacial heat transfer coefficients and interfacial drag are used for the closure equations.
Horizontal stratification entrainment/pullthrough model The assumption that the two phases are ho-
mogeneously mixed can introduce errors in situations as shown in Figure 2.26. Consider the lower example
of Figure 2.26 - Relap5 standard model would assume mixture of the phases, so disregardless of the level in
the volume always steam and liquid would be discharged. To have a more realistic modelling of e.g. a small
break, Relap5 offers the possibility to enable the horzontal stratification entrainment/pullthrough model in
each junction connected to a horizontal pipe. The user has to specify the orientation of the junction (up-
wards, downwards, horizontal). The model is only applied if enabled by the user, and if the flow conditions
in the control volume corripsond to horizontally stratified flow. The model considers the presence of a level,
compares the position of the level to the position of the break (i.e. steam flow if the junction is connected
to the steam volume of the pipe, water flow if the junction is connected to the water volume). For example,
if the junction is connected on the bottom of the pipe and the model is enabled, liquid will be drained by
the junction until the level approaches the junction position and vapor will be pulled through with liquid.
Likewise, if the junction is connected to the top, vapor would be drained from the pipe, and eventually liquid
would be entrained, provided the level is high enough. Without the model, a mixture of liquid and vapor
would be drained regardless of the position of the level.
However, no use of the model has been made in the present work. A more detailed explanation of the
model can be found in [ISL, 2003].
Counter current flow limitation model Mainly during small break loss of coolant accident in a PWR or
VVER a special case of phase separation, which seems paradox at first, can occur. It may happen at a certain
point (depending on the boundary conditions like availability of safety systems) that steam is produced in
the reactor and the level in the reactor pressure vessel decreases. Safety injection systems injecting into the
upper plenum, or condensation of steam in the steam generators and backflow in the core could eventually
occur (reflux condensation). However, there is the possiblity that the water will not reach the core, but will
be kept at the upper tie plate by the outgoing steam. So in fact, a “opposite” separation of steam and water,
water on top of steam, could exist. This phenomenon, water on top of steam, occurred during the Three Mile
Island accident, where a pressurizer full of liquid led the plant operator to conclude that the core is covered
with liquid and to switch of the emergency injection.
Relap5, by default, does not consider counter current flow limitation (CCFL). If the user expects CCFL
to happen, he may switch on the CCFL model in the appropriate junction.
If CCFL occurs or not is depending on the ratio between upward flowing steam and downward flowing
water. If the model has been enabled by the user, Relap5 uses equation (2.14) to detect if the model should
be applied or not:
Hf = jf
√
ρf
gw (ρf − ρg)
(2.9)
Hg = jg
√
ρg
gw (ρf − ρg)
(2.10)
jf = αfvf , jg = αgvg (2.11)
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w = D1−βj L
β (2.12)
L =
√
σ
g(ρf − ρg)
(2.13)
√
Hg +m
√
Hf = c (2.14)
with
Hf ,Hg dimensionless liquid and steam flux
jf , jg liquid/vapor superficial velocity
L Laplace capillary constant
σ surface tension
ρf , ρg density of liquid and steam phase
vf , vg velocity of liquid and steam
αg, αf void fraction and one minus void fraction
g acceleration of gravity
Dj pipe hydraulic diameter
c,m user input parameters, default 1,1
β model parameter, see text
The form for the CCFL check (2.9 - 2.14) has been proposed by Bankoff. Depending on the parameter β,
which can be input by the user, (2.14) takes on Wallis form (β = 0) or Kutatetadze (β = 1), or any form in
between. The user should choose depending on the geometry. Equation (2.14) describes the border between
occurrence and non-occurrence of CCFL (see Figure 2.27). If CCFL is detected in a junction, and the model
is enabled, a modified momentum equation is used to account for the reduced flow. For details more please
refer to [ISL, 2003].
Mixture level tracking model If the analyst expects that in a vertical pipe a liquid level will be formed
(steam on top of liquid, clearly separated) which he would like to model accurately, a course nodalisation of
the problem will introduce errors (see e.g. [Muellner et al., 2008]). Relap5 default model works with average
void fractions, so, assuming a stack of volumes, control volumes below the volume containing the interface
will be treated correctly (mainly liquid), volumes above will be treated correctly (mainly vapor), but the
volume which contains the interface will assume a mixture of the two phases and work with an average void
fraction - see Figure 2.27. The user has two possibilities - one, to refine the nodalisation such that the error
introduced by averaging will be small, second, switch on the Relap5 mixture level tracking model.
The model has to be turned on in the vertical control volumes were it should be used. During input pro-
cessing the code recognizes connected vertical control volumes which have the model enabled as “stacks”.
Several stacks can be formed of one vertical structure to model the occurrence of multiple levels.
The model consists of five parts:
1. Detection of the mixture level appearance
2. Calculation of mixture level parameters (such as position and velocity of the level, void fraction above
and below the level)
3. Movement of the mixture level from volume to volume
4. Modification of the mass and energy equations of Relap5 according to the position of the mixture level
5. Modification of the heat transfer calculation according to the position of the mixture level
For a more detailed description of the model please refer to [ISL, 2006c].
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Neutron kinetics
Relap5 uses a comparably simply model to calculate the reactor power. Spacial effects are not considered,
homogeneous conditions over the reactor core are assumed (point kinetics or 0D kinetics model). The only
independent variable is time. This assumption indicates also the limits of the model. Transients, which lead
to a different conditions in different parts of the core cannot be modeled adequately. The model considers
both, power from immediate fission, and power from decay of fission products. Several options are provided
to evaluate the decay power (ANS Standard 5.1-1973, ANS Standard 5.1-1979).
The point kinetics equations that are used are presented below (2.15). t denotes the time, φ the neutron
flux, Ci the number of delayed neutron precursors of group i, β the effective delayed neutron fraction, Λ
the prompt neutron generation time, ρ the reactivity, fi the fraction of delayed neutrons of group i, λi the
decay constant of group i, S the source, ψ the fission rate, Σf the macroscopic fission cross-section, Pf the
immediate fission power and Qf the immediate fission energy per fission. A Runge-Kutta method is used to
integrate the set of ODE (2.15).
d
dt
φ(t) =
(ρ(t)− β)φ(t)
Λ
+
Nd∑
i=1
λiCi(t) + S
d
dt
Ci(t) =
βfi
Λ
φ(t)− λiCi(t) i = 1, . . . , Nd
ψ(t) = Σfφ(t)
Pf (t) = Qfψ(t)
(2.15)
Relap5 considers the reactivity feedback from the fuel temperature (doppler effect), the moderator tem-
perature and density, and the boron concentration. The user can assume that the total feed back can calculated
as sum of separate feed back contributions of each of the above mentioned variables (separable feed back
model), or can enter a multi dimensional look up table. The separable feed back model is a good approxi-
mation if criticality of the reactor is to be expected at only one point of state (e.g. full power). If one expects
recriticality (e.g. at a lower temperature), the tabular feed back model should be used.
Critical flow
Models for special processes are implemented in Relap5, e.g. a special model for horizontal stratification,
entrainment and pull-through, a model to calculate the k-loss coefficients assuming abrupt area changes,
a model to mitigate a numerical error that can cause pressure spikes when a water front passes a node
boundary - the water packing model, a model for counter current flow limiting (e.g. to model steam flow
from the reactor preventing water flow from entering the core region), and other models. For the scope of
this work only the correlations modeling critical flow will be described in more detail.
One speaks of critical (or choked) flow if the conditions downstream of the pipe do not affect the flow
velocity. Figures 2.28 and 2.29 from [ISL, 2006c] show the situation for subcooled critical flow. Consider a
converging-diverging nozzle as shown in Figure 2.28. Flow will happen if the downstream pressure is lower
than the upstream pressure. The pressure at the throat Pt will with decrease with decreasing downstream
pressure until it reaches saturation pressure. At this point evaporation will happen at the throat, and the
flow will pass from one phase to two phase flow. The presence also of only a small fraction of steam in
the fluid will decrease the speed of sound dramatically, while the velocity of the fluid cannot change due to
conservation of mass. The velocity of the fluid upstream of the throat will be below the sound speed, but the
velocity downstream, in the two-phase region, will be above sound speed (supersonic flow). If this happens,
signals may not propagate upstream to the throat, and the flow is choked (see (a) in Figure 2.29). Figures (b)
and (c) in 2.29 show the situation when the upstream pressure decreases.
Choked or critical flow is very important in the context of the present work, since all discharge of valves
and break flows from primary or secondary circuit, as well as primary to secondary leaks in the initial phase
of the transient are choked flows.
Relap5 offers two models to choose from. The “original” Relap5 model has been developed by Ransom
and Trapp, see [Trapp and Ransom, 1982]. Lately a decision has been taken to change the default model,
which is now the Henry-Fauske critical flow model (see [Henry and Fauske, 1971]). The user has the
possibility to force the use of the “original” Relap5 model, Ransom-Trapp.
A detailed explanation of both models can be found in [ISL, 2006c]. A short overview on both models
follows shortly.
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Ransom and Trapp model Ransom and Trapp [Trapp and Ransom, 1982] are using mass, momentum
and energy conservation equation for a two phase fluid to develop a choking criteria. Independent variables
are space and time (t, x), dependent variables are the void fraction αg , the density ρ, and vapor- and liquid
velocities vg and vf .
The energy conservation equation is written in terms of entropy. Ransom and Trapp first developed a
non-homogeneous, non-equilibrium model. Comparison with experiments suggested that the model might
be simplified by assuming thermal equilibrium, which has been done for the implementation of the model in
the code Relap5.
Mass conservation
∂
∂t
(αgρg + αfρf ) +
∂
∂x
(αgρgvg + αfρfvf ) = 0
Momentum conservation
αgρg
(
∂
∂t
vg + vg
∂
∂x
vg
)
+ αg
∂
∂x
P+
Cαgαfρ
(
∂
∂t
vg + vfdndxvg −
∂
∂t
vf − vg
∂
∂x
vf
)
= 0
αfρf
(
∂
∂t
vf + vf
∂
∂x
vf
)
+ αf
∂
∂x
P+
Cαfαgρ
(
∂
∂t
vf + vgdndxvf −
∂
∂t
vg − vf
∂
∂x
vg
)
= 0
Energy conservation
∂
∂t
(αgρgSg + αfρfSf ) +
∂
∂x
(αgρgSgvg + αfρfSfvf ) = 0 (2.16)
with
αg vapor fraction
αf liquid fraction
ρg vapor density
ρf liquid density
vg vapor velocity
vf liquid velocity
C virtual mass coefficient
ρ mixture density
Sg specific energy of vapor
Sf specific energy of liquid
The equations can be cast in the form of (2.17) which is similar to the whitham equationU = (αg, ρ, vg, vf ),
A, B and C four by four matrices:
A(U)
∂
∂t
U +B(U)
∂
∂x
U + C(U) = 0 (2.17)
According to [Whitham, 1974] one can derive the propagation velocities of the system (2.17) by solving
the “characteristic polynomial” (2.18):
Aλ−B = 0 (2.18)
The polynomial (2.18) is of forth order. The real part of the roots give the velocity of signal propagation.
From this, one can derive a criteria for the case that no signal can propagate upstream to the throat (see [ISL,
2006c] for details):
Mv +D ·Mr = ±1 (2.19)
with
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Mv =
v
a
Mr =
vg − vf
a
v = fracαgρgvg + αfρfvfρ
a = aHE
√(
Cρ2 + ρ (αgρf + αfρg)
Cρ2 + ρgρf
)
aHE = homogeneous equilibrium sound speed
(2.20)
aHE =
V dP
s
dT√
X · TERMg + (1−X) · TERMl
TERMg =
(
Cpg
Tg
+ Vg
dP s
dT
(
κg
dP s
dT
− 2βg
))
TERMf =
(
Cpf
Tf
+ Vf
dP s
dT
(
κf
dP s
dT
− 2βf
))
dP s
dT
=
hg − hf
T s(Vg − Vf ) Clausius-Clapeyron-Equation
(2.21)
with
V specific volume
P s saturation pressure
X mass quality of steam
Cpg saturated vapor specific heat
Cpf saturate liquid specific heat
κg isothermal compressibility for vapor
κf isothermal compressibility for liquid
βg isopiestic coefficient for thermal expansion for vapor
βf isopiestic coefficient for thermal expansion for liquid
E.g. [Brennen, 2005] shows how to derrive the homogeneous equilibrium sound speed (2.21).
One can see that (2.19) the flow is choked, if the Mach number is equal to unity. This is consistent with
the considerations at the beginning of the section. The Ransom Trapp model offers the user the possibility
to insert discharge coefficients, which are multiplied in the implementation of the model with the area of the
junction, where the model is applied. Three different discharge coefficients may be entered, they may range
from 0.0 to 2.0, one for subcooled, one for two-phase, and one for superheated critical flow.
Henry Fauske model The so called “Henry-Fauske” model was proposed first by R. E. Henry and H. K.
Fauske in 1971, [Henry and Fauske, 1971]. The approach is different from the one of Ransom and Trapp
shown above. Although the Ransom Trapp model is newer than Henry Fauske, Relap5 switched the default
model from Ransom Trapp to a slightly modified Henry Fauske model starting from version mod 3.3 . The
reason is that the modified Henry Fauske model handles the presence of non-condensible gases and shows
in general better agreement with experimental data.
The approach to the Henry-Fauske model is different from the Ransom-Trapp approach and shortly
outlined below.
Consider the same configuration as in Figure 2.28. Considering one-component, two-phase flow, and
neglecting wall shear forces, the momentum equation and mass flow rate at the throat respectively can be
approximated by
−AdP = d (m˙v + uv + m˙l + ul)
G =
dP
du
G−1t = −
du
dP
=
d (xuv + (1− x)ul)
dP
(2.22)
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with
A area of the nozzle [L2]
m˙ mass flow [M T−1]
u mixture velocity [L T−1]
ul liquid velocity
uv vapor velocity
x quality [-]
P pressure [MLT−2L−2]
G mass flux [MT−1L−2]
Gt mass flux at the throat
the critical flow is the maximum flow in respect to the throat pressure, so that the condition for critical
flow is
dGc
dP
|t = 0 (2.23)
From equations (2.22) and (2.23) the following critical mass flux for an isentropic homogeneous mixture
can be derived:
G2c =
(
x
∂
∂P
vv + (1− x)
∂
∂P
vl + (vv + vl)
∂
∂P
x
)
−1
(2.24)
with
v specific volume [L3M−1]
vl specific volume liquid
vv specific volume vapor
In a certain sense this corresponds to mass flux at sound speed
c2 =
dP
dρ
=
∂P
∂v
dv
dρ
=
dP
dv
1
ρ2
with v =
1
ρ
G2sound =
∂P
∂v
and with v = xvv + (1− x)vl
G−2 =
∂
∂P
(xvv + (1− x)vl)
(2.25)
To evaluate (2.24) one has to find an estimate of vv , vl, x,
∂vv
∂P
, ∂vl
∂P
, and ∂x
∂P
. The Henry-Fauske model
assumes that the velocity of the phases are equal, that little or no mass transfer occurs between the phases,
and the no heat is transfered between the phases. Calculation of the components (see [ISL, 2006c] for details)
yields:
G2c =

x0vv
ηP
+ (vv − vl,0)

 (1− x0)N
sv,eq − sl,eq
dsl,eq
dP
−
x0Cp,v
(
1
η
− 1
γ
)
Pt (sv,0 − sl,0)




−1
t
(2.26)
The critical flow from (2.26) has similarities to the homogeneous equilibrium model flow rate (2.21).
The major difference is the presence of a non-equilibrium factor N which stems from the contribution of
dx
dP
|t. It basically determines the amount of flashing at the throat. Henry and Fauske compared their model
with experiments, and set the N to be
N =
xeq,t
Cne
with Cne = 0.14 being the non-equilibrium constant (2.27)
However, setting the non-equilibrium constant to 0.14 gives only for certain L/D ratios good results.
In the Relap5 implementation of the model the user has the possibility to supply this parameter. While the
influence for subcooled blow down is minimal, for qualities in the stagnation volume above 20% the contri-
bution becomes visible. The original plan, to implement a correlation which would set the non-equilibrium
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constant according to the geometry of the break, has not been put into effect. Instead, the user has to choose
the constant, best by comparing the simulation of a certain break geometry against separate effect tests. The
constant Cne can take on every positive value. A value near to zero causes the model to be close to the
homogeneous equilibrium model, while a large value corresponds to the homogeneous frozen model.
In the frame of the present work the Henry Fauske model with the default parameter of 0.14 has been
adopted, since separate effect tests have not been available.
A second constant can be input by the user, an overall discharge coefficient. The discharge coefficient is
effective during all phases of the blow down. For the present work, the default value of 1.0 has been adopted.
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Figure 2.24: Wall to fluid heat transfer mode
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cc
Figure 2.25: Relap5 vertical stratified flow (left), meaning of angle θ in (2.8) (right)
Figure 2.26: Two possible configurations for the horizontal stratification entrainment/pullthrough model
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Figure 2.27: CCFL model used if (Hf ,Hg) in accessible region (left), interface liquid/steam with/without
mixture level tracking model (right)
Figure 2.28: Converging-diverging nozzle
Figure 2.29: Subcooled choking process
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2.4.2 Aspects of UMAE
Only a short overview, taken from [NEA/CSNI, 2005], on the uncertainty method based on accuracy extrap-
olation (UMAE), can be presented here. The method has been developed at the University of Pisa. It was
first published [D’Auria et al., 1995] in 1995.
Calculating uncertainty bands to thermal hydraulic is an topic which is under active development in the
nuclear field. One IAEA Tecdoc [IAEA, 2007] is in preparation on the topic. The basic idea of the UMAE
method (see Figure 2.30 is that the uncertainty of a thermal hydraulic system code calculation is composed
of
• Uncertainties due to the modeling of physical phenomena in the code
• Statistical uncertainty, depending on the complexity of the problem
• Uncertainty due to different level of skills and experience of the code user
• Uncertainty due to different approaches in developing a nodalisation
Figure 2.30: UMAE flowchart
basically, the uncertainty can be splitted in two parts: user dependent, and model-depended. To control
the user dependent contribution to the uncertainty, the UMAE requires that the user fulfills certain minimum
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standards, and follows a strict nodalisation qualification procedure. The model-depended part is derived
by accuracy extrapolation, but for the purpose of the work presented here the “nodalisation qualification
procedure” is of main interest.
Figure 2.31: Nodalisation qualification procedure
Figure 2.31 shows the flow chart for the nodalisation qualification process. The following description is
taken from Appendix B from [NEA/CSNI, 2005];
The first requirement is that the user of a TH-SYS code works with a “frozen” version of the code, and
that he does not change any models or parameters other than the parameters foreseen by the developers.
The goal of the procedure is to qualify the code-nodalisation-user combination, to guarantee a pre set
degree of quality of the calculation results.
A major issue in the use of mathematical model is constituted by the model capability to reproduce the
plant or facility behavior under steady state and transient conditions. These aspects constitute two main
checks that must be passed in the qualification process. The first of them is related to the realization of a
schematization of the reference plant; the second one is related to the capability to reproduce the transient
analysis to derive the needed information.
The check about the nodalisation is necessary to take into account the effect of many different sources
of approximations:
• Data of the reference plant available to the user are typically non exhaustive to reproduce a perfect
schematization of the reference plant;
• The user derives, from the available data, an approximated schematization of the plant reducing the
detail level of the plant representation;
• The code capability for reproducing the hardware, the plant systems and actuation logic of the systems
again reduces the schematization detail level.
The reasons for the checks about the capability to perform the transient analysis derive from the following
statements:
• The code options must be adequate;
• The schematization solutions must be adequate;
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• Some systems simulations can be tested only in the simulation of the transient (e.g. ECCS that is not
involved in the normal plant operation);
• The “code-nodalisation” system capability to reproduce relevant TH phenomena expected in the tran-
sient must be tested.
A procedure has been set-up including the necessary checks for these different aspects and the criteria
adopted to produce a judgment about acceptability of the code analysis results.
The goal of the procedure is to develop and obtain a qualified nodalisation considering the comparison
with hardware data, BIC and time trends of relevant quantities. A procedure has been developed and applied
in which a “´steady state” and a “transient” level of qualification are distinguished. Criteria for selecting
relevant quantities are mentioned in the following discussion. A scheme of the procedure can be seen in
Figure 2.31. The two checks are represented by the two steps “f” and “j”. If the two checks are not fulfilled
(paths “g” and “k”) the nodalisation must be improved (step “c”).
Step “a” An internationally recognized code version (“frozen” code) must be available. The consistency
of the installation of the code on the computer must be checked. No special deficiencies should have been
detected in predicting the phenomena to be considered.
The step is also related to the information that is available by the user manual and by the guidelines
for the use of the code. This type of information takes into account the specific limits and assumptions of
the code (specific of the code adopted for the analysis) and some directives about the way to realize best
nodalisations.
From a generic point of view the following statements should be considered:
• Homogeneous nodalisation;
• Strict observation of the user guidelines;
• Standard use of the code options.
Step “b” User experience and developers recommendations are useful to set up procedures to be applied
for a better nodalisation. These special procedures are related to the specific code adopted for the analysis.
An example is constituted by the “slice” nodalisation adopted with the Relap5 code to improve the capability
of the code in the simulation of the phase of transient involving the natural circulation phenomena.
Step “c” The nodalisation realization depends on several aspects: available data, user capability and ex-
perience and code capability. Data must be qualified and this implies data should derive from:
• Qualified facility (if the analysis is performed for a facility);
• Qualified test design;
• Qualified test data.
The data base for the realization of the nodalisation should be derived from official document and trace-
ability of each reference should be maintained. However three different types of data sources can be identi-
fied:
• Qualified data from official sources;
• Data deriving from non-official sources. This type of data can be derived from similar plant data or
other qualified nodalisation for the same type of plant. The use of these data can introduce potential
errors and the effect on the calculation results must be carefully evaluated;
• Data assumed by the user. These types of data constitute assumptions of the user (based on of the
experience or on similitude with other similar plants) and their use should be avoided. Any special
assumptions adopted by the user or special solutions in the nodalisation must be recorded and docu-
mented.
The nodalisation must reproduce all the relevant parts of the reference plant including geometrical and
materials fidelity and reproduction of systems and related logics.
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Step “d” The ´steady state¡ qualification level step includes different checks: one is related to the evalua-
tion of the geometrical data and of numerical values implemented in the nodalisation; the other one is related
to the capability of the nodalisation to reproduce the steady state qualified conditions. The first check should
be performed by a user different from the user has carried out the nodalisation. In the second check a ´steady
state¡ calculation is performed. This activity depends on the different code peculiarities. As an example, for
the RELAP, the steady state calculation is constituted by a ´null transient¡ calculation (´null transient¡ means
that the ´transient¡ option is selected in a calculation with any variations of the relevant parameters).
Step “e” The relevant geometrical values and the relevant thermal-hydraulic parameters of the steady state
conditions are identified. The selected geometrical values and the selected relevant parameters are derived
from the nodalisation and from the steady state calculation for a comparison with the hardware values and
the experimental parameters, respectively.
Step “f” Experimental and calculated geometrical values and steady state parameters are compared in
order to satisfy acceptability criteria. The following considerations apply:
• Experimental data are typically available with an error band that must be considered in the comparison
with the calculated values and parameters. No error is made if the calculated value is inside the
experimental uncertainty bands;
• The convergence of the steady state calculation must be checked.
Step “g” If one or more than one of the checks in step “f” is not fulfilled a review of the nodalisation (step
“c”) must be performed. This process can request more detailed data, improvement in the solution of the
schematization, different user choices.
Step “h” This step constitutes the “On Transient” level qualification. This activity is necessary to demon-
strate the capability of the nodalisation to reproduce the relevant thermal-hydraulic phenomena expected in
the transient. This step also makes possible to verify the correctness of some systems operating only during
transient events. Two different situations may be identified:
• The nodalisation is constituted by the schematization of a facility (in this case the code calculation is
used for Code Assessment). It is necessary to prove the capability of the code and of the nodalisa-
tion scheme during the transient analysis: the code options selected by the user, the schematization
solutions and the logic of some systems (i.e. ECCS) are involved during this check. Typically many
experimental results are available from the facility and, at least, one similar test can be adopted for the
´On Transient¡ level qualification.
• The object of the code calculation is constituted by the analysis of a transient in a NPP. In this case it is
necessary to check the nodalisation capability to reproduce the expected thermal-hydraulic phenomena
occurring in the transient, the selected code options, the solutions adopted by the user for the plant
schematization and the logic of the system not involved in the steady state calculation and called into
operation during the transient.
As in general no data exist for transients or tests performed in the NPP, the qualification of the nodali-
sation is obtained through the use of the experimental tests performed in facilities and through the so-called
“Kv-scaled” calculation. The “Kv-scaled” calculation consists in using the realized NPP nodalisation for
the calculation of the same type of transient performed in a facility. The NPP nodalisation is prepared for
a “Kv-scaled” calculation by properly scaling the boundary and initial conditions adopted in the facility. It
generally means that power, mass flow rates and ECCS capacity are scaled adopting as scaling factor the
ratio between the volumes of the facility and the volume of the schematized NPP. The capability of the
nodalisation to reproduce the same transient evolution and the relevant thermal-hydraulic phenomena is the
needed request for the ´On Transient¡ qualification level.
Step “i” In this step the relevant thermal hydraulic phenomena and parameters are selected to perform the
comparison between calculated and experimental results. The selection of the phenomena derives from the
following sources:
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• Experimental data analysis;
• CSNI phenomena identification;
• Use of RTA (relevant thermal aspects).
Step “j” Checks from the qualitative and quantitative point of view are performed to evaluate the accept-
ability of the calculation on the “transient level”. For the qualitative evaluation the following aspects are
involved:
• Visual observation: visual comparisons are performed between experimental and calculated relevant
parameters time trends;
• Resulting Time Sequence of Events: it means that the list of the calculated significant events and the
calculated timing of the events is compared with the experimental events
• Use of the phenomena specified in the CSNI validation matrix that are valid for any kind of transients
(see Table B-2). The relevant phenomena suitable for code assessment, the relevance in the selected
facility and the phenomena that are well defined in the selected test can be derived. A judgment can
be express taking into account the characteristics of the facility, the test peculiarities, and the code
results;
Use of the Phenomenological Windows (PhW), Key Phenomena and Relevant Thermal-hydraulic As-
pects (RTA). Each test scenario (measured or calculated) should be divided into phenomenological windows
(i.e., time spans in which a unique relevant physical process mainly occurs and a limited set of parameters
controls the scenario). In each PhW, key phenomena and RTA must be identified. Key phenomena are
attributed to a class of experiments. The lists prepared and agreed to by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)/CSNI are used in the process (Refs. B6 and B7). RTAs are defined
for a single transient and are characterized by numerical values of significant parameters:
• Single Valued Parameters, SVP (e.g., minimum level in the core);
• Nondimensional Parameters, NDP (e.g., Froude numbering the hot leg at the beginning of reflux
condensation);
• Time Sequence of Events, TSE (e.g., time when dryout occurs);
• Integral Parameters, IPA (e.g., integral or average value of break flow rate during subcooled blow-
down).
Around 20 RTAs, characterized by more than 40 values of significant parameters, must be selected for
the qualitative evaluation of a database. Key phenomena and RTAs are used for the following purposes:
• to judge the relevance to scaling and the quality of a test facility (key phenomena);
• to judge the relevance to scaling and the quality of a test design (key phenomena);
• to judge the relevance of an experimental data- base (key phenomena and RTAs);
• to judge the calculation performance (RTAs);
• to assess the success of a similarity study and of the nodalisation qualification process (RTAs);
• to assess the similarity of different experimental databases (RTAs).
The qualitative analysis is based on five subjective judgment marks, which are applied both to the matrix
of phenomena and to the list of RTAs: It essentially derives from a visual observation of the experimental
and the predicted trends.
• The code predicts qualitatively and quantitatively the parameter (Excellent - the calculation falls within
the experimental data uncertainty band).
• The code predicts qualitatively, but not quantitatively the parameter (Reasonable - the calculation
shows only correct behavior and trends).
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• The code does not predict the parameter, but the reason is understood and predictable (Minimal -
the calculation does not lie within the experimental data uncertainty band and at times does not have
correct trends).
• The code does not predict the parameter and the reason is not understood (Unqualified - calculations
do not show the correct trend and behavior, and reasons are unknown and unpredictable).
• Not applicable ( - ).
A first classification about the calculation quality results from this analysis. A successful application of
the qualitative process constitutes a prerequisite to the application of the quantitative analysis.
If the aforementioned steps are acceptable, the accuracy of code calculations can be quantified utilizing
the Fast Fourier Transform Based Method (FFTBM). This tool produces a couple of values in the frequency
domain from each comparison between calculated and measured time trends: 1) the so-called “average ac-
curacy” and 2) the “weighted frequency”. The transformation from time to the frequency domain avoids the
dependence of the error from the transient duration. Weight factors are attributed to each time trend to make
possible the summing up of the error and the achievement of a unique threshold for accepting a calculation.
A quantitative accuracy evaluation must be carried out following demonstration that the calculation is qual-
itatively acceptable. The same time trends selected for the qualitative analysis are utilized as input to the
FFTBM. Acceptability criteria have been set-up and a full description of the FFTBM is given in the next
section.
Step “k” This path is actuated if one or more than one check (qualitative and/or quantitative) is not ful-
filled. The nodalisation is improved by changing some schematization solutions, some code options or
increasing the level of detail eventually using new data. Every time the nodalisation is modified, a new
process shall be performed through the loop “c-d-e-f-h-i-j”.
Step “l” This is the last step of the procedure. The obtained nodalisation is called, in the UMAE (Uncer-
tainty Methodology based on Accuracy Extrapolation) nomenclature, Analytical Simulation Model (ASM).
This consists of a qualified plant (or facility) nodalisation running on a qualified code by a qualified user.
The ASM can be used to predict plant scenario characterized by the same Phenomenological Windows and
Key Phenomena of the assigned transient. It should be noted that a modification of the nodalisation (i.e.
necessary to better reproduce the experimental results) requests a new qualification process both “at steady
state” and “on transient” level.
2.4.3 FFTBM
Several approaches have been proposed to quantify the accuracy of a given code calculation Ambrosini
et al. [1990], Riebold [1987], Pochard and Porracchia [1986]. Even though these methods were able to give
some information about the accuracy, they were not considered satisfactory because they involved some
empiricism and were lacking of a precise mathematical meaning. Besides, engineering subjective judgment
at various levels is deeply inside proposed methods.
Generally, the starting point of each method is an error function, by means of which the accuracy is
evaluated. Some requirements were fixed which an objective error function should satisfy:
1. at any time of the transient this function should remember the previous history;
2. engineering judgment should be avoided or reduced;
3. the mathematical formulation should be simple;
4. the function should be non-dimensional;
5. it should be independent upon the transient duration;
6. compensating errors should be taken into account (or pointed out);
7. its values should be normalized.
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The simplest formulation about the accuracy of a given code calculation, with reference to the experi-
mental measured trend, is obtained by the difference function
DF (t) = Fcalc(t)− Fexp(t) (2.28)
The information contained in this time dependent function, continuously varying, should be condensed
to give a limited number of values which could be taken as indexes for quantifying accuracy. This is allowed
because the complete set of instantaneous values of DF (t) is not necessary to draw an overall judgment
about accuracy.
Integral approaches satisfy this requirement, since they produce a single value on the basis of the in-
stantaneous trend of a given function of time. On the other hand, searching for functions expressing all the
information through a single value, some interesting details could be lost. Therefore, it would be prefer-
able to define methodologies leading to more than one value in order to characterize the code calculation
accuracy.
Information that comes from the time trend of a certain parameter, be it a physical or a derivated one,
may be not sufficient for a deep comprehension of the concerned phenomenon; in such a case, it may be
useful to study the same phenomenon from other points of view, free of its time dependence. In this con-
text, the complete behavior of a system in periodic regime conditions (periodic conditions due to instability
phenomena are explicitly excluded) can be shown by the harmonic response function that describes it in the
frequency domain.
Furthermore, the harmonic analysis of a phenomenon can point out the presence of perturbations other-
wise hidden in the time domain.
Algorithm development
It is well known that the Fourier transform is essentially a powerful problem solving technique. Its impor-
tance is based on the fundamental property that one can analyze any relationship from completely different
viewpoints, with no lack of information with respect to the original one. The Fourier transform can translate
a given time function g(t), in a corresponding complex function defined, in the frequency domain, by the
relationship:
g˜(ω) =
∫
∞
−∞
g(t) exp (2piiωt) dt (2.29)
Afterward, it is assumed that the experimental and calculated trends to which the Fourier transform
is applied verify the analytical conditions required by its application theory; i.e., it is assumed that they
are continuous (or generally continuous)1 in the considered time intervals with their first derivatives, and
absolutely integrable in the interval (−∞,∞) 2 Brigham [1974]. This last requirement can be easily satisfied
in our case, since the addressed functions assume values different from zero only in the interval (0, T ).
Therefore:
g˜(ω) =
∫ T
0
g(t) exp (2piiωt) dt (2.30)
The Fourier integral (2.30) is not suitable for machine computation, because an infinity of samples of
g(t) is required. Thus, it is necessary to truncate the sampled function g(t) so that only a finite number of
points are considered, or in other words, the discrete Fourier transform is evaluated. Truncation introduces
a modification of the original Fourier transform (the Fourier transform of the truncated g(t) has a rippling);
this effect can be reduced choosing the length of the truncation function as long as possible.
When using functions sampled in digital form, the FFT can be used. The FFT is an algorithm that
can compute more rapidly the discrete Fourier transform. To apply the FFT algorithm, functions must be
identified in digital form by a number of values which is a power of 2. Thus, if the number of points defining
the function in the time domain is:
N = 2m+ 1 (2.31)
1i.e. discontinuous only in a finite number of points. The existence of the Fourier Transform is guaranteed if g(t) is summable
according to Lebesgue on the real axis
2i.e.
∫
∞
−∞
|g(t)|dt ≤ ∞
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the algorithm gives the transformed function defined in the frequency domain by 2m+1 values correspond-
ing to the frequencies
fn =
n
T
, (n = 0, 1, ..., 2m) (2.32)
in which T is the time duration of the sampled signal.
Taking into account the fact that the adopted subroutine packages evaluate the FFT normalized to the
time duration T, from (2.30) and (2.31) it can be seen that |g˜(0)| represents the mean value of the function
g(t) in the interval (0,T), while |g˜(fi)| represents the amplitude of the i-th term of the Fourier polynomial
expansion for the function g(t).
Generally, the Fourier transform is a complex quantity described by the following relationship:
g˜(f) = <(f) + i=(f) = |g˜(f)| exp (iq(f)) (2.33)
where: Re(f) is the real component of the Fourier transform; Im(f) is the imaginary component of the
Fourier transform |g˜(f)| is the amplitude or Fourier spectrum of g(t). q(f) is the phase angle or phase
spectrum of Fourier transform.
It is well known that:
|g˜(f)| =
√
2<(f) + 2i=(f) (2.34)
Θ(f) = tan−1
=(f)
<(f)
(2.35)
The method developed to quantify the accuracy of code calculations is based on the amplitude of the
FFT of the experimental signal and of the difference between this one and the calculated trend. In particular,
with reference to the error function DF (t), defined by the (2.28) method defines two values characterizing
each calculation:
a dimensionless average amplitude
AA =
∑2
n=0 |∆F˜ (fn)|∑2
n=0 |F˜exp(fn)|
(2.36)
a weighted frequency
WF =
∑2∞
n=0 |∆F˜ (fn)| · fn∑2∞
n=0 |∆F˜ (fn)|
(2.37)
The AA factor can be considered a sort of "average fractional error" of the addressed calculation; the
weighted frequency WF gives an idea of the frequencies related with the inaccuracy3.
The accuracy of a code calculation can be evaluated through these values, by representing the discrepan-
cies of the addressed calculation with respect to the experimental data with a point in the WF-AA plane. The
most significant information is given by AA, which represents the relative magnitude of these discrepancies;
WF supplies a different information allowing to better identify the character of accuracy. In fact, depending
on the transient and on the parameter considered, low frequency errors can be more important than high
frequency ones, or vice versa.
Trying to give an overall picture of the accuracy of a given calculation, it is required to combine the
information obtained for the single parameters into average indexes of performance.
This is obtained by defining the following quantities:
(AA)tot =
NP ar∑
n=0
(AA)i(wf )i, (WF )tot =
NP ar∑
n=0
(WF )i(wf )i (2.38)
with
NP ar∑
n=0
(wf)i = 1 (2.39)
3In fact, it really represents the barycentre of the amplitude spectrum of Fourier transform of the difference function DF (t);
therefore, it evaluates the kind of error of the addressed calculation (which can be more or less relevant depending on the characteristics
of the analyzed transient)
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where: Nvar is the number of parameters selected (to which the method has been applied) (wf)i are
weighting factors introduced for each parameter, to take into account their importance from the viewpoint of
safety analyses.
This introduces some degree of engineering judgment that has been fixed by a proper and unique def-
inition of the weighting factors, necessary to account for the different relevance, from the point of view of
safety and reliability of the measurement, of the various addressed quantities.
implementation
In the following, the FFT method application will be dealt with from an operative point of view. To apply the
methodology described in the previous section, after selecting the parameters to be analyzed, it is necessary
to choose the following parameters:
• number of points
• sampling frequency
• cut frequency.
All these items are related each other, nevertheless they will be treated in separate sub-sections, in order
to allow a better comprehension of their requirements.
Sampling frequency In order to evaluate the discrete Fourier transform, it is necessary, first of all, the
sampling of signals to be analyzed. The choice of the sampling frequency depends on transient, kind of
parameter trend to be investigated (i.e. pressure, flow rate, clad temperature, etc.); obviously, the fulfillment
of the sampling theorem4 is required to avoid distortion of sampled signals due to aliasing occurrence5 occurs
until the frequency sampling is increased to
T =
1
2fc
(2.40)
where fc is the highest frequency component of Fourier transform characterizing the spectrum of the
continuous function g(t).
Therefore, experimental data acquisition should be characterized by sampling frequency greater than
2fc
6; similar frequencies of acquisition should have the corresponding calculated trends. Of course, com-
pared analysis of these data requires that the lowest value of fc (between the experimental and calculated
one) should be taken as limiting value. A typical value of fc related to parameters of interest in thermal hy-
draulic transients is 1 Hz; specifically, break flow rates or pressure drops measurements can include higher
values.
Number of points Since the FFT algorithm requires that functions are identified by a number of values,
equally spaced, which is a power of 2, an interpolation is necessary to satisfy this requirement. On the other
hand, the comparison of experimental and calculated signals, and the evaluation of their difference function
DF(t), imposes that they have the same time scale.
Furthermore, after selecting the number of points N (see (2.31)), the maximum frequency of transformed
functions by the FFT, is given by
fmax =
2m
Td
=
fc
2
(2.41)
where Td Td is the transient time duration, fc is the sampling frequency.
Then, the number of points is strictly associated with the adopted sampling frequencies; it is meaningless
to choose a number of points corresponding to a frequency7 greater than the fmax achievable using a certain
4Sampling Theorem: if the Fourier transform of a continuous function g(t) is zero for all frequencies greater than a certain frequency
fc, than g(t) can be uniquely determined from the knowledge of its sampled values
5If the sample interval T is too large, the equidistant impulses of δ˜(f) (i.e. the Fourier transform of the sampling function δ(t)
become more closely spaced, and their convolution with the frequency function of continuous signals g˜(f) results in an overlapping
waveform
6Normally 3-5 times fc is used
7Beyond fc/2 the sampling theorem doesn’t hold, and we have no further information about these frequencies
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fc. On the other hand, during the interpolation step, some information could be lost choosing a too low
number of points. Last, it is worthwhile to remember that the increase of the number of points involves the
growth of the array dimensions utilized by the program package set up for the full method application.
Besides, the interpolation introduces an additional effect on signals, i.e. each interpolation, using a linear
method, adds a slope. It has been verified that this effect is negligible, because it causes the addition of some
spurious frequencies in the original signal spectrum, having values greater than the typical frequencies of
thermal hydraulic parameters. On the other hand, most thermal hydraulic quantities are characterized by low
frequencies, then high frequency errors (therefore, these spurious contributions too) can be totally avoided
considering proper filtering techniques.
Cut frequency To filter any spurious contribution, a cut frequency has been introduced. This cut frequency
characterizes the frequency upper value which has to be considered in evaluating the AA and WF factors, as
defined by (2.36) and (2.37).
Typical thermal hydraulic parameter trends (for different kinds of transients) have been analyzed Bovalini
et al. [1992], aiming at defining an unique suitable value of cut frequency, in such a way to avoid partial loss
of information.
A cut frequency value of 1 Hz is generally suitable to analyze trends of thermal hydraulics parameters;
only flow rates and densities require cut frequency values up to 2 Hz, as a consequence of their higher
frequencies, to avoid loss of information in accuracy evaluation.
Choice of the weights In order to give an overall picture of the accuracy of the addressed calculation, the
FFT method accounts for the accuracy evaluated for each parameter, and defining some weighting factors
(wf )i, global indexes of code performance are evaluated (see (2.38) and (2.44)). The need of (wf )i defi-
nition derives from the fact that the addressed parameters are characterized among other things by different
importance and reliability of measurement. Thus, each (wf )i takes into account of:
"experimental accuracy": experimental measures of thermal hydraulic parameters are characterized by a
more or less sensible uncertainty due to:
• intrinsic characteristics of the instrumentation
• assumptions formulated in getting the measurement
• unavoidable discrepancies existing between experimental measures and the code calculated ones (mean
values evaluated in cross-sections, volume centers, or across junctions, etc.);
“safety relevance”: particular importance is given to the accuracy quantification of calculations con-
cerned with those parameters (e.g. clad temperature, from which PCT values are derived) which are relevant
for safety and design.
Last, a further contribution is included in the weighting factors definition; this is a component aiming at
accounting for the physical correlations governing most of the thermal hydraulic quantities. Taking as refer-
ence parameter the primary pressure (its measurement can be considered highly reliable), a normalization of
the AA values calculated for other parameters with respect to the AA value calculated for the primary side
pressure is carried out. In other words, the following factor has been defined (for the generic j-th parameter):
(Wnorm) =
AApr
AAj
(2.42)
where (AA)pr is the average amplitude calculated for the primary side pressure (AA)j is the average am-
plitude calculated for the j-th parameter. So doing, the weighting factor for the generic j-th parameter, is
defined as:
(wf )j =
(Wexp)j · (Wsaf )j · (Wnorm)j∑Nvar
j=1 (Wexp)j · (Wsaf )j · (Wnorm)j
(2.43)
Nvar∑
j=1
(wf )j = 1 (2.44)
where Nvar is the number of parameters to which the method is applied (Wexp)j is the contribution related
to the experimental accuracy (Wsaf )j is the contribution expressing the safety relevance of the parameter.
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(Wexp)j and (Wsaf )j values have to be assigned using engineering judgment, starting from measuring
and safety related considerations. Such an evaluation of a suitable set of weights (see Tab. 1) to be utilized
for typical thermalhydraulic quantities has been performed Bovalini et al. [1992]. Some criticism could be
raised because engineering judgment is required in weights assignment, but actually, this appears the only
practicable way to define the relative importance of the parameters selected to evaluate the accuracy of a code
calculation. These weights must remain the same for any comparison between code results and experimental
data concerning a same class of transient. Recently, an application of the FFT method to the quantification
of the accuracy for containment system codes (based on ISP 35, NUPEC) has been carried out Leonardi
et al. [1994]. For this application, different considerations were necessary in setting up a suitable set of
weights, taking into account design features and safety concerns related to the containment. On the other
hand, once chosen a set of weights with the above described criteria, any variation of some weight involves
a homogeneous change of all the calculations analyzed, above all if a sufficiently high number of parameters
has been selected for the accuracy evaluation. Obviously, this affects only global accuracy evaluation of a
code calculation; no concern is related to the single parameters accuracy.
FFT package
In the first phase of the activities concerned with the definition of the method, some FORTRAN programs
were written in order to perform in an independent way the basic steps of the method. This allowed to better
focus the attention on the consistency of the obtained results, further adjusting and improving of the utilized
algorithm, and obviously, the validation of each module. On the other hand, during this developmental
phase, limited applications (in terms of number of code calculations and parameters analyzed) of the method
were carried out, not making necessary the availability of an automatic tool.
Encouraging results achieved by various analysis, related to a wide application range of the FFT based
method Leonardi et al. [1994], and the occurrence of the large application related to ISP 27 code calculations
promoted something like an "assembling" of these programs. This activity was completed during the visiting
period at the CEN-FAR, whenever it resulted in the complete development of new modules, allowing a
complete use of the method and the execution of various kinds of analysis in a totally automatic way. In
practice, an unique source program has been built, managing in the mean time experimental and several
calculated data files for the extraction of the variables to be analyzed, application of the FFT method up to
getting the evaluation of AA and WF quantities (see (2.36) and (2.37)). The results obtained for the single
parameters are then processed by another small program in order to get global code accuracy (see (2.38)).
The program has a modular structure, consisting of a main program supervising the execution of the dif-
ferent tasks, performed by single subroutines, thus allowing the implementation of further modules without
main changes in the program. In fact, being available such an automatic tool and from the experience gath-
ered by previous applications, further options were included in the FFT package, increasing its versatility
and applicability.
The source program has been coded in FORTRAN 77 standard. Up to date, it has been utilized on IBM
3090 (VM/CMS) mainframe and on CRAY (UNICOS) supercomputer; the advantage of such machines is
associated with the huge amount of data to be processed for each analysis, especially in the case of many
code calculations (normally many variables are included in a same data file).
Recently, considering the memory and computing speed performances of current personal computers,
a version of the FFT package suitable for such microcomputers has been set up; moreover, running the
program on a personal computer implies relatively (a little) slower performances, surely acceptable, taking
into account that no data transfer is necessary and that all the results can be immediately processed by
means of standard available software. This version has been built compiling the source program utilizing the
Microsoft FORTRAN Compiler 5.1. Furthermore, obviously, this allowed a significant reduction of the fees
related to the program running, being also optional the use of a workstation to perform these analysis.
As above mentioned, some new features have been introduced in the program, increasing its flexibility
and applicability. The program capabilities can be summarized as follows:
• research and extraction of the addressed variable from data files, allowing various data format (ISP
27, X-Y blocks, X-Y generic from digitizer devices, see App. B);
• conversion of current data units in SI units, or more generally possibility of manipulate data (optional);
• analysis of several time windows in a same execution, where each time window can identify whatever
phase in the transient;
60
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 2.4. METHODS AND TOOLS
• time shifting of data trends to analyze separately the effects of delayed or anticipated code predictions
concerning some particular phenomena or systems interventions (optional);
• interpolation of data points to a power of 2 number of points, coherent with sampling frequency and
minimum analysis frequency
• FFT evaluation of the signals to be processed;
• evaluation of the AA and WF quantities (see (2.36) and (2.37));
• output files generation, including information to be processed by standard software in order to trace
any desired graphic concerning data curves, error curves, interpolated curves, FFT signals transforms,
FFT data spectra, AA-WF data (optional).
After the application of the method to the selected variables, global code accuracy for the analyzed
code calculations is carried out by a second program, also running in Windows environment, automatically
determining AAtot and WFtot values in all the previously considered time windows. Obviously, this last
step must be performed after the analysis of all the variables, then it is not automatically executed after the
FFT analysis. Nevertheless, it is easy to build a shell of commands automatically launching the program for
the selected variables and finally calculating the global values.
Applications of the FFTBM can be found e.g. in [Muellner et al., 2005b].
Parameter Exp Wsaf Wnorm
Primary pressure 1.0 1.0 1.0
Secondary pressure 1.0 0.6 1.1
Pressure drops 0.7 0.7 0.5
Mass inventories 0.8 0.9 0.9
Flow rates 0.5 0.8 0.5
Fluid temperatures 0.8 0.8 2.4
Clad temperatures 0.9 1.0 1.2
Collapsed levels 0.8 0.9 0.6
Core power 0.8 0.8 0.5
Table 2.14: Selected weighting factor components for typical thermal hydraulic parameters
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Chapter 3
VVER-1000 NPP calculations
This chapter describes the behavior of a VVER 1000 following a SBLOCA, a SBO or a PRISE transient.
Each of the calculations corresponds to a PSB-VVER test - more precisely they should be called VVER 1000
NPP calculation corresponding to test one, two, etc. Correspondance between test and calculation means
that the initial and boundary conditions adopted at the facility are also assumed for the NPP calculation (in
the right scale).
Generally for each of the tests multiple failures of safety systems are assumed (Table 3.28 shows an
overview of the assumed boundary- and initial conditions for each of the calculations, which are the also
the BIC for the PSB experiments). Figure 3.1 shows a graphical representation on the different classes of
experiments and their connection. Test 3, PORV stuck open, is categorized in the Figure as SB-LOCA,
because the stuck open pressurizer relief valve constitutes a small break, and also as characterization test
because this accident happened at the NPP Zaporoshye, and therefore gave the possibility to compare the
experimental and calculated data with the data from the plant (different set of plant data are available, which
show differences between each other - so just the qualitative behavior was recognized as reliable). The
qualitative comparison was satisfactory.
In general all boundary- and initial conditions assume an initiating event, multiple failure of safety sys-
tems, and an AM-Strategy. Goal of the calculations is to affirm the effectiveness of the adopted AM-Strategy
- which means, that the reactor can be lead to a long term coolable configuration.
Two cases are different: test three (and NPP calculation three) models an actual accident that took place
at Zaporoshye NPP - the PORV was tested during hot shut-down conditions, and failed to close. Test ten
(and NPP calculation ten) aims to characterize the natural circulation behavior of the VVER 1000. Boundary
conditions for natural circulation regime are imposed initially. Then the primary side mass is drained in steps,
until dryout in the core is detected. Following dryout, the primary side is refilled in steps.
The sections of this chapter describe the connection of NPP calculations and PSB experiments, the nodal-
isation that has been adopted for the VVER calculations, and then the results of the calculations grouped by
initiating events.
3.1 Connection to PSB
This section describes how the NPP calculations are tied to the PSB-VVER experiments.
The NPP calculations presented in this work have been utilized as last step in a chain of calculations and
experiments in the EC funded project “Accident Management in VVER 1000”, see D’Auria et al. [2006].
Among the goals of the project was to a) verify that the TH-SYS codes Relap5 and Cathare2 are suitable for
simulation of accident management strategies in VVER1000, and b) test the effectiveness of the strategies
(keeping in mind that the experimental facility PSB will not show the same response as the plant, although
well scaled).
The steps that have been performed in the project are:
1. Drawing up of the preliminary PSB-Test matrix
2. Confirmation of the relevance of the planned tests for accident management by pre-test plant calcula-
tions with Relap5 and Cathare2
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Figure 3.1: PSB test matrix and VVER calculations. Red - additional assumed failures, green - AM strategy.
3. Confirmation of the relevance of the planned tests for code validation (challenging to the codes) by
preliminary pre-test facility calculations
4. Drawing up of the final PSB-Test matrix
5. Execution of final pre-test facility calculations with Relap5 and Cathare2
6. Execution of the experiments at the PSB facility
7. Execution of post-test facility calculations with Relap5 and Cathare2
8. Execution of post-test NPP calculation with Relap5 and Cathare2
The main focus of the present work are the calculations of step eight of the project, i.e. they reflect the
lessons learned from code-experiment comparisons. Nevertheless, four examples for post-test analyses are
presented here. The author performed in total 5 post-test analysis with Relap5, and two with Cathare2 in
the frame of the project out of the 12 experiments plus 3 single variant tests. The Cathare2 calculation are
not presented here, because Cathare2 is outside the scope of the present work. One Relap5 calculation is
also not presented, because errors in the analysis, that have been discovered after the performed work, cast
doubts on the results. For more information, please refer to the final project report D’Auria et al. [2006].
3.1.1 Description of the PSB-VVER nodalisation
The Relap5 input deck adopted for simulating the PSB-VVER facility behaviour is a detailed nodalization
carried out with a “sliced” approach. This nodalization scheme is suitable for a better code response, es-
pecially in natural circulation and/or during low flow rate regimes. The data used in order to realize the
nodalization are taken from [Melikhov et al., 2003a], [Elkin, 2003], [Melikhov, 2003], [Melikhov et al.,
2003b], [Melikhov et al., 2003c], [Melikhov et al., 2003d]. The general noding scheme can be seen in
Figure 3.2, the PRZ nodalization is shown in Figure 3.3.
All four loops are modeled separately; each loop includes a hot leg, a steam generator, a pump, a loop
seal and a cold leg. The pressurizer is connected to the hot leg of loop No.4 via the surge line; the relief
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valve (PORV) is modeled on top of the PRZ and at the bottom PRZ heaters are simulated. The RPV flow
paths have been modeled separately, as they are in the facility, by three pipes: one for the down-comer, one
for the core region, and one for the core bypass. The lower part of the downcomer is duplicated to simulate
as well as possible the inner and the outer part of the element. To avoid stagnation flow in the upper part of
the downcomer and of the upper plenum, small volumes are added in parallel of the main parts. The active
core is represented by a single active structure with uniform power distribution subdivided in ten parts. The
heated zone of the core bypass is simulated by imposed heat flux. The Emergency Core Cooling System
is simulated by time dependent volumes and time dependent junctions. The four SIT are simulated by four
accumulator components and are connected in pairs to the down-comer and to the upper plenum via their
discharge line. In this line the orifice, installed in the facility to regulate the amount of water delivered to
the RPV, is simulated. To take into account the heat losses in the facility, a Heat Transfer Coefficient based
on EREC data [Elkin, 2003] has been inserted in the Relap5 nodalization using a general table (HTC vs.
Temperature). The external temperature has been assumed to be 25 ◦C constant.
The SG primary side is schematized with 17 horizontal tubes that simulate the 34 tubes of the facility
(these data are referred to a single SG). The SG secondary side has four different zones that are identified
and simulated by four vertical pipes, representing the down-comer, the hot and cold collector and the tube
region. The four pipes are connected to each other by cross flow junctions, to permit horizontal flow through
the four regions. The feed water in the facility has one injection point, represented by a time dependent
volume and a time dependent junction; the time dependent junction ensures the prescribed mass flow rate.
All the FW passes through a branch that has flow area equal to the area of all the holes and simulates the
ring distributor. A branch and a pipe represent the free space over the feed water ring and are connected to
the so-called “small steam line”. In the upper part of each SG; a motor valve represents the BRU-A valve
and in each steam line the main steam isolation valve is simulated by a trip valve. The four steam lines of
the four SG are connected to the common steam header, that finally discharges to another time dependent
volume, which stands for the steam condenser. An other trip valve placed at the end of the common steam
header simulates the turbine stop valve.
Comment on code models The primary and secondary system of the facility has been mainly modeled
with Relap5 pipe and branch components. The pump component has been used for main coolant pumps,
ECCS flow rate is an imposed boundary condition (depending on the pressure). For the accumulators, the
Relap5 accumulator component has been used. The pressurizer component has not been used. Pressurizer
relief and safety valves have been modeled using the Relap5 motorvalve component.
Structures have been modeled using the Relap5 heat structure component.
The general policy for user dependend modeling choices has been to use default values, wherever possi-
ble. This means for volumes that
• the thermal front tracking model is disabled;
• the mixture level model (as mentioned in section 2.4.1) is disabled;
• the water packing scheme is used for the model (to soften unphysical pressure spikes, which may be
caused by the numerics when the water-steam interphase passes a control volume boundary);
• the vertical stratification model is used (also dependent on parameters of the flow like void fraction
and flow velocity, see section 2.4.1.;
• the pipe interface friction model will be used (other possibility the bundle interface friction model will
be used);
• wall friction effects are to be calculated;
• the nonequilibrium model and not the equilibrium model is used.
For junctions, this means that
• the jet junction model is disabled;
• the CCFL model, as described in section 2.4.1, will not be applied;
• the horizontal stratification entrainment/pullthrough model, as described in section 2.4.1, will not be
applied;
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• the choked flow model will be applied (general policy is to use Henry-Fauske choked flow model);1
• abrupt area change model is switched off by default, which means that energy loss coefficients as
supplied in the input are used by the code;
• homogenous or non-homogeneous model (different velocities for liquid and steam), where the default
is non-homogeneous;
• possibility to specify weather momentum flux between volumes should be calculated, default is yes.
The following exceptions from the general rule have been made and the following modelling decisions
should be mentioned separately:
Momentum flux in hot- and cold collector To model the abrupt change in flow direction when the fluid
passes from hot- or cold collector to the U-tubes, momentum flux in hot- and cold collector is not considered
in the calculation (the option is set to 2, which means momentum flux is considered in the “to” volume, but
not in the “from” volume, in the junctions which are connecting the SG hot- and cold header volumes with
the SG U-tubes.
Horizontal stratified flow model disabled in SG U-tube coils The U-tube-coil of the PSB-VVER facility,
which should model the SG U-tubes of the VVER 1000, has an elevation change of roughly 30 cm. In total,
36 coils are installed, and two coils are represented by one Relap5 pipe component (which has an elevation
change). To avoid that Relap5 is calculating vertically stratified flow in this component (which would not
represent the actual situation) the vertically stratified flow models have been switched off.
Calculation of critical heat flux Relap5 offers several possibilities to calculate the critical heat flux. The
Groenveld lookup-table based method has been chosen.
Reflood model Relap5 models heat transfer in heat structures one dimensional. This might be adequate
in most cases, but gives too conservative results for fuel and cladding temperatures in case of dryout and
reflood. The user has therefore the possibility to activate in selected structures the “reflood model”, which
re-meshes the heat structure (refines the mesh) and considers two dimensional heat transfer (radially and
axially). The downside is that the model has been developed and qualified for a narrow range of parameters
only (pressure less than 1MPa and mass fluxes less than 200 kg/(s m2)). The use of the reflood model for
the core simulator has been set to “automatic”, which means that it is used for pressures less than 1.2 MPa
and void fractions of more than 0.9. In the calculations presented in this work these conditions have never
been met.
Heat losses of the pump The modeling of the heat losses of the facility do not really constitute a choice on
the code models, but are important for the simulation and therefore mentioned at this place. One important
contribution to the facility heat losses comes from the heat losses along the loops, which are simulated by
supplying a Table of heat transfer coefficients vs temperature as input (on the boundary to the environment of
outer simulated heat structures of the facility). The second important contribution comes from the heat losses
of the main circulation pumps. The pumps of the facility must be cooled, have two cooling circuits (one
driven by forced circulation, another one by natural circulation). The heat losses by the pumps depend on one
hand on the flow regime in the main coolant loops, on the other hand on the operation of the cooling system of
the pumps. In practice, the heat losses of the pumps have been supplied together with the experimental results
(mass flow through the cooling system, inlet and outlet temperature), and have been applied as boundary
conditions in the Relap5 calculation. Heat losses range from 2 kW to 18 kW per pump (which is large
compared to the core power).
Further options and code results will be discussed at the appropriate place.
1See section 2.4.1). Henry Fauske is the default model in Relap5 mod 3.3. Relap5 mod 3.2 was using Ransom Trapp critical flow
model, in this case the critical flow model in all junctions could be changed to Henry Fauske by activating a switch in card one. Henry
Fauske requires a discharge coefficient and a thermal equilibrium coefficient. Those two numbers should be determined by experiments
for a given break geometry. Since separate effect tests on the break geometry used for this work were absent, the default values (1.0 for
the discharge coefficient, and 0.14 for the thermal equilibrium coefficient).
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Figure 3.2: Relap5 nodalization of the PSB-VVER facility, general scheme
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Figure 3.3: Relap5 nodalization scheme of the PSB-VVER - RPV
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3.1.2 Post test analysis 12 - 0.7% CL break
The test 12 specifications and scenario can be found in detail in Andrioutschenko [2004] and Elkin et al.
[2004]. Initial event is a break of the cold leg (break size 0.7% of CL). All HPIS are assumed to fail. As
accident management measure the operator initiates cooldown of the primary side via secondary with a
cooldown rate of 30K/h, and after the cladding temperature reaches more than 300◦C , but not earlier than
1800s into the transient, the operator uses makeup and HHPIS TQ(123)4 to supply coolant to the primary
side.
The experiment aims to achieve the following objectives:
• obtaining experimental data for validation of thermal-hydraulic system codes which are used for
VVER NPP safety analyses;
• providing support for the verification of the accident management strategies in Balakovo Unit 3 NPP;
• identification and/or verification of the thermal-hydraulic phenomena included in validation matrix for
SB-LOCA; Liesh and Reocreux [1995]
Configuration of the PSB-VVER facility
Please refer to table 3.1 for the configuration of the facility. A more detailed description on the configuration
of the facility and the initial and boundary conditions can be found in Elkin et al. [2004] and Elkin [2004b].
Equipment Connection status
Pressurizer Connected to loop #2
Core by-pass 2 diaphragms with 2 orifices of diameter 7 mm are installed at inlet and
outlet of core by-pass
ECCS hydroaccumu-
lators
ACC #1 and #3 are connected to the outlet plenum, ACC #2 and #4 are
connected to the inlet chamber
Make-up system of
primary side and sys-
tem TQ14
Both systems are modeled by one make-up system of a primary side.
Work of a make-up
system is not mod-
eled in a steady state
The system is connected to cold leg of all loops on an output from steam
generators
Steam generators Under steady state all SGs are connected to each other by steam header. The
pressure is adjusted by one steam dumping valve RA06S01
Feed water heater On. SG level under steady-state conditions is maintained by supply of feed
water with a temperature of ≈ 218 ◦C
ADS simulation sys-
tem
ADS are connected to each SG. In each ADS line, throttle channel - di-
ameter 12.1 mm and L=50 mm is installed. Actuation set points are
7.16/6.28 MPa
Leak simulation sys-
tem
Break is located in the cold leg in loop #4 between MCP and DC entrance
and oriented upward. Leak channel: Ø4 mm, L = 40 mm.
Simulation system
of primary side
cooldown by mean
of ADS
For simulation of primary side cooldown by means of ADS with a rate 30◦C
/h a throttle with a diameter 2 mm and a length 20 mm is installed in the
common ADS line.
UP warming-up line Under steady state the line is open. The warming-up of the UP top part is
stopped about 2 min before opening break line.
Warming-up line of
break line
Under steady state the line is open. The warming-up of the break line is
stopped about 1 min before opening break line.
Table 3.1: Test facility configuration, taken from Elkin et al. [2004]
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Description of the experiment
Please refer to table 3.2 for an overview of the imposed events. A more detailed description of the initial
and boundary conditions, as well as the experimental results can be found in Elkin et al. [2004] and Elkin
[2004b]. The following description of the experiment as taken mainly from Elkin et al. [2004].
The transient as a whole may be divided into four main stages:
Ph1 blow down of sub-cooled coolant (0-300 s);
Ph2 primary side pressure stabilization at the secondary circuit rate and the first initial heating of the core
model (300-717 s);
Ph3 decreasing the primary coolant mass under saturated coolant discharge and second core heat up (717-
2914 s);
Ph4 primary side refilling after the primary side make up system actuation and primary side cooldown
under the alternation of saturated and subcooled coolant discharge (2914-10014 s).
Phase 1 The Experiment was started by opening the break valve. A sharp decrease in PS pressure was
observed. The PRZ level started to decrease. At 45 s PRZ level was lower than 2.32 m (according to the
transducer YP01L02) and the PRZ heaters were turned off.
At 41 s the primary side pressure was lower than 13.7 MPa and the scram was simulated. Ten seconds
after the scram the turbine shut valve simulator was closed, and the feed water temperature was changed from
220 ◦C to 150 ◦C. After the start of the turbine stop valve simulator closure the pressure in the secondary side
increased. The SGs pressure increase stopped at 130 s, and the set values for the BRU-A valves simulation
were not reached.
At 52 s the saturation margin became less than 10 ◦C . With a delay of 15s the coast-down of the MCPs
started and continued up to 299 s.
After the coolant reached the saturation point and began to boil the stage of phase separation in the
primary side started. At 111s a level was formed in UP, at 124s the levels started forming in hot legs and SG
collectors.
Phase 2 At 300s the primary side pressure decreased to the secondary side pressure. The primary circuit
pressure decrease stopped at this point. Between 300s and 717s the primary side pressure stabilized at the
secondary side pressure level. At 561s the SGs hot collector voided (cold collectors voided by 370s), which
led to the break down of the natural circulation in the primary side. Following hot collectors the hot legs of
all four loops voided completely at 582s and a rapid decrease of the UP level could be seen a second time. At
700s the level decreased to the upper part of the core and at 710 s the cladding heat-up in the upper plenum
of the test facility began.
Phase 3 At 729s the core simulator heat-up stopped due to the loop seals clearance in loop-2 and partially
in loop-1. The loop seal of the loop-2 was cleared completely at 777s. From 729s the break flow changed
from liquid to two phase. This can be seen from the pressure change in the primary side. From this moment
on energy was no longer removed by the secondary side - at 731s the primary side pressure dropped beneath
the secondary side pressure and the heat transfer was reversed (SS supplied heat to the PS). At 755s the DC
level decreased to the cold legs and continued decreasing slowly up to 900s. Thus from 760s on saturated
coolant was flowing out of the leakage. At 1187s the primary circuit pressure decreased to 5.9 MPa and
starting at 1193s the water from ECCS accumulators was fed to the primary circuit. Between 990s and 2742s
the coolant mass decreased in DC and UP. The level was constant in the core model and in the circulating
loops until 2742 s.
At 1800 s the simulation of the operator action “cool down of the PS via SS with a cool down rate of
30K/h” was simulated by opening the isolation valve of the new installed cool down system. The complete
opening of isolation valve was at 1811s. The primary and secondary side was not affected by this measure.
At 1928 s primary side make-up system actuated spuriously for 43 s and water from this system was entered
in the primary side.
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Phase 4 The upper plenum was completely voided at 2741s. Immediately after the core level began to
drop. At 2816s the upper part of the fuel rod simulator uncovered and a second heat up began. At 2914s
the set point for the second operator action was reached (the cladding temperature reached 302 ◦C ), and the
make up and TQ(1,2,3)4 system was taken into operation. The make-up system cold water supply into the
primary side led to acceleration of the primary pressure decrease rate and resulted in water flow rate increase
from ACCs. The total water flow rate coming from the passive ECCS and make-up system exceeded the
coolant flow rate discharged from the leakage and therefore at 2922s the refilling of the downcomer and core
regions began. At 3456s it reached the cold legs.
Between 3456s and 10014s there was a slow pressure and primary side temperature decrease. The
coolant flow rate discharged from the break was comparable to the coolant flow rate coming from ACCs and
make up system which led to the level stabilization in the reactor model and circulating loops. This state was
kept until 10014s.
EVENT pre-set actual
Leak opening 0 s 0 s
SCRAM signal UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 1 s UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 1.4 s
PRZ heaters switched
off
PRZ level = 4.21 m PRZ level = 4.18 m
Turbine valve simu-
lation closure begins
UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 11 s UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 11 s
SG SS isolated - Tur-
bine valve simulation
closure ends
69.6 s
Transition to the
AFW
UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 10 s UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 15 s
MCP coast-down on-
set
Difference between saturation tem-
perature (UP pressure) and HL tem-
perature < 10◦C + 15 s
Difference between saturation tem-
perature (UP pressure) and HL tem-
perature < 10 ◦C + 15.1 s
Start of ACC 1 oper-
ation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa + 11 s
Start of ACC 2 oper-
ation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa + 6 s
Start of ACC 3 oper-
ation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa + 13 s
Start of ACC 4 oper-
ation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa + 8 s
Primary side cool-
down procedure
1800 s 1801 s
Make up systems in-
jection start
Core cladding temperature = 300◦C
and τ > 1800 s
Core cladding temperature = 302◦C
and =2914 s
Table 3.2: Imposed sequence of main events for PSB Test 12, CL-0.7-11, taken from Elkin et al. [2004]
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Calculation - Primary Pressure
The primary pressure generally is well predicted. A comparison between the experimental and calculated
pressure trend can be found in Figure 3.4
First phase, 0 s-300 s: in the first phase the calculated results stay within a band of 5% of the experimental
data. In the
second phase (300 s - 717 s) , the pressure seems to be slightly overpredicted by the calculation. In both,
the calculation and the experiment the primary side pressure rests on the secondary side pressure. While
the difference between primary and secondary side is about 1 bar in the experiment, the calculation predicts
about 2 bars. In addition, the secondary side pressure is overpredicted by about one bar. So this sums up to
a difference in primary pressure of about 3 bar for the second phase. The
third phase 717 s - 2914 s shows a difference in the time, when the break flow changes from liquid to
two phase flow. In the experiment, this happens at 727 s, while the calculation predicts 840 s. From this
time on, the depressurization rate changes - the primary pressure drops again. Since this happens about 100 s
earlier in the experiment than in the calculation, the calculated trend is shifted, compared to the experimental
one. From 800 s up to about 2000 s the primary pressure shows some steps, or oscillations. The reason for
this steps is the use of the Relap5 reflood model outside its recommended pressure boundaries ISL [2006a]
in combination with water injection in the core from the loop seals or the accumulators. The second AM
measure (injection with make-up and TQ(123)4) is calculated to start at 2020s, while in fact it started at
about 2920 s. This also gives rise to some distortions in the PS pressure during the third phase. In the
fourth phase (2914 s - 10014 s) calculated and experimental pressure trends converge, but for different
reason. while in the experiment the reduction in pressure is governed by the fact that the cold water from
the make-up systems cools the primary fluid, in the calculation the secondary pressure decrease reaches the
primary pressure, and from there on the secondary side reduces the primary side pressure.
Calculation - Secondary Pressure
The secondary side pressure generally is rather well predicted up to the point when the cool down system
is opened (to simulate the 30K/h primary via secondary side cool down). Although a number of attempts
had been made, it was not possible to reproduce the secondary side pressure accurately after 1800s. The
secondary side pressure trend, both the calculated and the experimental, is reported in Figure 3.5.
The first phase 0 s - 300 s is very well predicted (the calculated trend lies within a band of ±2% of the
experimental results. In the
second phase, 300 s - 717 s calculated secondary side pressure stays with about one bar difference on top
of the experimental results. Taking into account that the absolute value of the SS pressure at this phase is
about 70 bars, one can say that the result is rather accurate. In the
third phase, 717 s - 2914 s the experimental curve shows a continuous descent with a small jump at 1800
s of about 0.5 bars, when the new installed cool down system is taken into operation. The Relap5 calculation
predicts a slower depressurisation rate from 727 s to 1800 s, a faster depressurization rate later on, so that
overall the calculated secondary side pressure trend stays reasonably close to the experimental results. The
calculated results of the
fourth phase 2914 s - 10014 s continue to predict a faster depressurization rate up to about 6000 s, than
the experimental curve catches up. At the end of the experiment the calculated results are about 5 bars below
the experimental ones.
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Calculation - Temperatures
The fluid temperatures are reasonably well predicted, refer to Figures 3.6 and 3.7. The comparison between
calculated results and experimental ones for the cladding temperatures shows good agreement for the bottom
(Figure 3.12 and middle level (Figure 3.11 of the core (because the temperature at these levels actually
follows the fluid temperature). The upper level of the core, which two times is in dry-out conditions in this
experiment, shows a difference (Figure 3.10): the first dry-out in the experiment starts at about 710 s and is
quenched by the loop seal clearing. The calculation predicts a dry-out and loop seal clearing at about 810 s,
so reasonably close. The second dry out however, is predicted for 2040 s, while the experiment shows the
second dryout at 2810 s. Two reasons could be identified:
• this calculation doesn’t consider the spurious injection of the make-up system, at about 1800 s for
about one minute.
• the heat losses for the pumps in this calculation are set, after their coast down, to 6 kW each. This
value might not be accurate.
Calculation - Break mass flow rate and primary side mass
The experimental and calculated mass flow through the break show an excellent agreement (Figure 3.9).
Nevertheless, the total primary side mass shows some disagreement after the subcooled blow down phase
(Figure 3.8). The experimental loss of primary side mass seems to be smaller than the calculated one, and
this despite the fact that the calculated results for the break flow as well as the accumulator levels are in good
agreement with the experimental data. The faster decrease of primary side mass could be one reason why
the code predicts the second dryout earlier than it is seen in the experiment. It should also be mentioned that
the experimental value has about ±30% error for this quantity.
Calculation - Pressure drops
All pressure drops between different points of the primary circuit are compared in figures. All of the com-
parisons, with different extent, suffer of the limitation connected to the fact that the pressure taps are not
coincident with the center of the volumes of the nodalization. Pressure drops in the loops are reasonably
well predicted by the code: notwithstanding the code predicts the occurrence of loop seal clearing in one
loop, as in the experiment, this loop is not the correct one. This confirms the difficulty, already emphasized
in previous analyses, see D’Auria et al. [1999] and D’Auria et al. [2003], in correctly predicting a critical
phenomenon like loop seal clearing. The distribution of pressure drops in the initial steady state, both direct
and reverse (in this last case calculated data can not be qualified), are responsible for the misprediction of
loop seal clearing phenomena. This is a well known limitation, resulting from several code applications
to SBLOCA analyses, that does not affect the code capability in predicting the overall transient scenario
D’Auria et al. [1999] and D’Auria et al. [2003].
Possible improvements
After an extensive analysis it was possible to pin-point three key-issues. By changing the primary side heat-
losses, simulating the spurious injection of feed water and removing the option “reflood” a number of aspects
could be caught more precisely.
• Reflood option and related trips removed
• Heat losses of the pumps increased from 6kW to 15kW each after coast-down (18kW each before).
• Spurious activation of make-up for 43 s after 1928 s
Primary Pressure
Please compare the to figures, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.15. While in the “base” calculation (Figure 3.4) the
primary pressure shows almost a step like behavior from 700 s-2100 s, the “improved” calculation (Figure
3.15) shows a smooth decrease in the PS pressure, like in the experiment - only shifted, because the uncovery
of the break and the connected decrease in pressure occurs about 100 s later in the calculation. In the long
term the prediction for the primary side pressure is worse than in the base calculation. This fact must be
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attributed to the heat losses of the pumps. To increase the heat losses after coast down was a decision based
on experience when participating at experiments at EREC. For the initial phase of the experiment it is a
valid assumption. For the later phase, obviously, 15kW overestimate the real heat losses, and so the primary
side calculated pressure for the “improved” calculation drops below the experimental one, while the “base”
calculation prediction is rather accurate. This discussion emphasizes the importance of the heat losses of the
pumps. The heat losses of the pumps cannot be derived, because they depend on the way how the cooling
systems of the pumps are operated. They must be a boundary condition, and precise knowledge of this
quantity could help to improve the analysis.
Secondary Pressure
The secondary side pressure prediction for the first 1800 s is very accurate (Please compare the “improved”
calculation, Figure 3.16 with the “base” calculation, Figure 3.5). The increased heat losses for the pumps
are responsible for this result (as was verified in a independent sensitivity analysis, were only one parameter
was modified). The “base” as well as the “improved” calculation fail to predict accurately the behavior
of SG-pressure once the 30K/h cool down system is actuated. Several attempts were made to improve the
results, including a sensitivity analysis on the break diameter, a sensitivity analysis on the loss coefficients
of the break line, a sensitivity analysis on the secondary side heat losses, but without any real improvement.
Temperatures
The temperature trends of the cladding temperature are now without oscillations beginning from 700 s up to
2000 s, please compare e.g. the cladding temperature at the bottom of the heater rod bundle, Figure 3.12 for
the base calculation and Figure 3.19 for the improved one. A sensitivity study could show that the Relap5
“reflood” option is responsible for the oscillations.
The second interesting observation can be seen at the top level clad temperatures, Figure 3.10 (the base
calculation) and 3.18 (the improved calculation). The first dry out is smaller, which is well in the uncertainty
connected with calculations of that kind, but still occurs at the same time, about 800 s into the transient. The
second dry out now occurs about 300 s later. Separate sensitivity analyses (changing only one parameter at
the time) demonstrated that about 100 s can be attributed to the spurious feed water injection, 200 s can be
attributed to the increased heat losses of the pumps.
With now a difference of 500 s between calculation and experiment the calculation shows an accuracy
which can be expected for phenomena hard to predict like small dry-outs.
Qualitative accuracy
The qualitative accuracy evaluation here discussed is based upon a systematic procedure consisting in the
identification of phenomena (CSNI list) and of RTA. It essentially derives from a visual observation of the
experimental and predicted trends.
The related results are reported in Table 3.4, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, where the information are related
to the reference calculations performed using Relap5 codes.
A positive overall qualitative judgment is achieved if ’U’ is not present; in addition, the parameters char-
acterizing the RTA (i.e., SVP = Single Valued Parameter, TSE = parameter belonging to the Time Sequence
of Events, IPA= Integral Parameter and NDP = Non Dimensional Parameter) give an idea of the amount of
the discrepancy.
In the present case the following conclusions can be reached:
1. no ’U’ mark is present;
2. all RTA of the experiment are present in the calculated data
3. the accuracy evaluation by adopting RTA and Key Phenomena, supports the conclusion that the cal-
culation is qualitatively correct.
Quantitative accuracy
The positive conclusion of the qualitative accuracy evaluation, makes it possible addressing the quantitative
accuracy evaluation. To this aim a special methodology, developed at University of Pisa, has been adopted.
The methodology is based upon the use of the Fast Fourier Transform (see Bovalini et al. [1992] and D’Auria
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et al. [1996]). The results of the application of the method are given in 3.7, where again the information are
related to Relap5 reference calculation. The conclusions from the quantitative accuracy evaluation analysis
are as follows:
1. the achieved results are well below the acceptability threshold, particularly in relation to the overall
accuracy (AA = 0.23 compared with the acceptability limit of 0.4), while the primary system pressure
accuracy is just in the limit (AA = 0.10 compared with the acceptability limit of 0.1);
2. the achieved results appear comparable in both code calculations. Definitely, the documented ref-
erence calculation is acceptable from the code assessment point of view; i.e. the code is positively
assessed in relation to its capabilities to predict this kind of transient.
EVENT EXP (s)
R5 base (s)
R5 improved
Leakage opening 0 0 0
YC01P17=13.7 MPa 42.2 37 37
Start closing of steam discharge
valve RA06S01
53 47 47
Start of MCPs coast-down (YD01-
04R11)
68.5 60 60
Stopping of SGs steam discharge
(full closing of RA06S01 valve)
70.6 67 67
Complete switching off of MCP 299 300 300
Start of the first bundle heat up 710 780 800
Pressure in the primary side is lower
than in the secondary one:
731 850 830
Pressure in the primary side 5.9
MPa
1187 1160 1360
Coolant reached saturation at the
core inlet
1283 1000 1200
Start of cooldown procedure (open-
ing of RA15S01)
1801 1800 1800
Start of the second bundle heat up 2816 1950 2280
Start of operation of primary side
make-up system
2914 1960 2300
Stop of experiment/calculation 10014 10000 10000
Table 3.3: Comparison experiment/ Relap5 calculation test 12, base and improved
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Phenomena Psb Facility
Experiment CL-0.7-12
Relap5
Natural circulation in one-phase flow o + R
Natural circulation in two-phase flow o + R
Reflux condenser mode and CCFL - - -
Asymmetric loop behavior o + R
Leak flow o o E
Phase separation without mixture level for-
mation
+ - -
Mixture level and entrainment in SG sec-
ondary side
+ + R
Mixture level and entrainment in the core + + R
Stratification in horizontal pipes - - -
Emergency core cooling mixing and con-
densation
- - -
Loop seal clearing o o R
Pool formation in upper plenum - CCFL o o R
Core wide void and flow distribution + + R
Heat transfer in covered core o o E
Heat transfer in partially uncovered core o o R
Heat transfer in SG primary side - - -
Heat transfer in SG secondary side - - -
Pressurizer thermal hydraulics o o E
Surge line hydraulics (CCFL choking) o - -
One and two phase pump behavior - - -
Structural heat and heat losses + + R
Non condensable gas effect on leak flow - - -
Phase separation in T-junctions - - -
Separator behavior - - -
Thermalhydraulic nuclear feedback - - -
Boron mixing and transport - - -
Facility vs. phe-
nomenon
Phenomenon vs. test Phenomenon vs calcu-
lation
o suitable for code as-
sessment
o experimentally well
defined
E Excellent
+ limited suitability + occurring but not well
char.
R Reasonable
- not suitable - not occurring or not
measured
M Minimal
U Unqualified
- Not applicable
Table 3.4: Judgement of code calculation performance on the basis of phenomena included in the CSNI
matrix, test 12
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UNIT EXP CALC R5 Judg. R5
RTA: Pressurizer emptying
TSE emptying time* s 65 70 E
scram time s 44 37 E
RTA: Steam generators secondary side behavior
TSE main steam line valve closure s 51 48 E
difference between PS and SS MPa 6.71 6.68 E
SVP SG level m
· at the end of subcooled blow-
down
2.3,2.25 2.4,2.25 E,E
2.35, 2.35 2.4,2.45 E,E
· when PS pressure equals SS
pressure
2.3,2.25 2.4,2.45 E,E
2.35,2.35 2.4,2.25 E,E
. when MAKEUP starts 2.25,2.25 2.25,2.25 E,E
2.25,2.25 2.25,2.25
SVP SG pressure MPa
· at the end of subcooled
blowdown
7.1 7.0 E
· when PS pressure equals
SS pressure
7.1 7.0 E
· when MAKEUP starts 5.22 5.33 E
RTA: Subcooled blowdown
TSE upper plenum in sat. conditions s 110 130 E
break two phase flow s 720 820 R
IPA break flow up to 30 s kg 42 39 E
RTA: First dryout occurrence
TSE time of dry out s 710 800 E
range of dry out occurrence at
various core levels
s 709-738 800 - 810 E
peak cladding temperature K 310 295 E
average linear power kW/m 0.38 0.34 E
maximum linear power kW/m 0.38 0.34 E
core power / primary mass kW/kg 0.65 0.7 E
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 41 34 R
RTA: Rewet by loop seal clearing
time of loop seal clearing s 710 810 R
Loop #1 Loop #1 & #2 R
TSE range of rewet occurrence s 728 803 E
time when rewet is completed s 733 810 E
Table 3.5: Relap5 - judgement of code calculations on the basis of RTA (part 1), test 12
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UNIT EXP CALC R5 Judg. R5
RTA: Saturated blowdown
TSE PS pressure equal to SS pres-
sure
s 720 830 E
IPA integrated flow from 400 to
1000 s
kg 350 370 E
RTA: Mass distribution in primary side
TSE time of minimum mass occur-
rence
s 3000 2350 M
SVP minimum primary side mass kg 241 204 R
av. linear power at min. mass kW/m 0.33 0.28 R
minimum mass/ITF volume kg/m3 109 92 R
RTA: Accumulators behavior
TSE accumulators injection starts s 1200 1370 E
IPA total mass delivered by accu-
mulators
kg 49 60 R
NDP minimum primary mass/initial
primary mass
% 22 27 R
primary mass/initial accumula-
tor mass
% 133 128 R
RTA: Final dryout occurrence
TSE time of dry out s 2820 2270 M
range of dry out occurrence at
various core levels
s 2820-2960 2270-2330 M
peak cladding temperature ◦C 320 308 R
SVP average linear power kW/m 0.33 0.28 R
rate of rod temperature increase K/s 0.55 1.033 M
core power / primary mass kW/kg 0.94 0.83 R
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 22 27 E
RTA: Make-up intervention
TSE Make-up start s 2910 2300 M
range of rewet occurrence s 2910 - 3030 2300 - 2380 M
final rewetting s 3030 2380 M
IPA integrated flow from start to end
of rewet
kg 11 7 R
NDP primary mass/initial mass % 22 27 R
Table 3.6: Relap5 - judgement of code calculations on the basis of RTA (part 2), test 12
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Parameter AA WF
0 PRZ pressure 0.0827 0.012
1 SG1 pressure 0.1692 0.020
2 SG4 pressure 0.1709 0.021
3 ACC1 pressure 0.1039 0.007
4 ACC4 pressure 0.1149 0.008
5 Core inlet temperature 0.1393 0.019
6 Core outlet temperature 0.0612 0.013
7 Upper head fluid temperature 0.0977 0.014
8 Integral break flow 0.1842 0.070
9 Active eccs integral flow rate 0.1478 0.021
10 ACC1 level 0.1341 0.015
11 ACC4 level 0.1134 0.015
12 Heater rod bottom 0.0977 0.030
13 Heater rod middle 0.0897 0.030
14 Heater rod top 0.2991 0.025
15 Primary side mass 0.2982 0.040
16 Core power 0.3570 0.053
17 DP core 1.2876 0.042
18 DP loop seal 0.7147 0.015
19 DP across DC and UH bypass 0.8604 0.042
20 DP sg1 inlet and top 0.9682 0.053
21 DP SG4 inlet and top 1.1984 0.048
TOTAL 0.2041 0.023
Table 3.7: Post test 12 results, base, the accuracy evaluation following the FFTBM
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Figure 3.4: Post test 12 results, base, primary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.5: Post test 12 results, base, secondary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.6: Post test 12 results, base, core inlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.7: Post test 12 results, base, core outlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.8: Post test 12 results, base, primary mass, short and long term
84
CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS 3.1. CONNECTION TO PSB
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
M
a
s
s
 [
k
g
]
Time [s]
Integral break flow (short term)
MassBr (exp)
cntrlvar28 (calc)
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
M
a
s
s
 [
k
g
]
Time [s]
Integral break flow
MassBr (exp)
cntrlvar28 (calc)
Figure 3.9: Post test 12 results, base, integral flow rate through the break, short and long term
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Figure 3.10: Post test 12 results, base, heater rod cladding temperature top, short and long term
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Figure 3.11: Post test 12 results, base, heater rod cladding temperature middle, short and long term
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Figure 3.12: Post test 12 results, base, heater rod cladding temperature bottom, short and long term
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Figure 3.13: Post test 12 results, base, integral eccs flow rate
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Figure 3.14: Post test 12 results, base, pressure in accumulator 1
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Figure 3.15: Post test 12 results, improved, primary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.16: Post test 12 results, improved, secondary side pressure, short and long term
91
3.1. CONNECTION TO PSB CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 5
 5.5
 6
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
P
re
s
s
u
re
 [
M
p
a
]
Time [s]
Pressure accumulator 1
TH01P01 (exp)
p140010000 (calc)
Figure 3.17: Post test 12 results, improved, pressure in accumulator 1
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Figure 3.18: Post test 12 results, improved, heater rod cladding temperature top, short and long term
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Figure 3.19: Post test 12 results, improved, heater rod cladding temperature bottom, short and long term
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3.1.3 Post test analysis 11 - 0.7% CL break
Full title of the Test is “SB-LOCA 0.7% with failure of HPIS cool-down through secondary circuit and HPIS
train in affected loop” The section presents the post test analysis of the SB-LOCA experiment CL-0.7-12
(cold leg), the 11th of the TM. The test simulates a small break in cold leg (0.7% equivalent break area in the
plant) with failure of HPIS and LPIS and use of normal operation systems of water supply to primary side.
Description of the experiment The test 11 specifications and scenario can be found in detail in Andri-
outschenko [2004] and Elkin [2004a]. Initial event is a break of the cold leg (break size 0.7% of CL). Failure
of all HPIS, cooldown through secondary circuit, recovery of one HPIS train in affected loop is assumed.
Please refer to table 3.8 for the configuration of the facility.
Equipment Connection status
Pressurizer Connected to loop #2
Core by-pass 2 diaphragms with 2 orifices of diameter 7 mm are installed at inlet and
outlet of core by-pass
ECCS hydroaccumu-
lators
ACC #1 and #3 are connected to the outlet plenum, ACC #2 and #4 are
connected to the inlet chamber
Make-up system of
primary side and sys-
tem TQ14
Both systems are modeled by one make-up system of a primary side.
Work of a make-up
system is not mod-
eled in a steady state
The system is connected to cold leg of all loops on an output from steam
generators
Steam generators Under steady state all SGs are connected to each other by steam header. The
pressure is adjusted by one steam dumping valve RA06S01
Feed water heater On. SG level under steady-state conditions is maintained by supply of feed
water with a temperature of ≈ 218 ◦C
ADS simulation sys-
tem
ADS are connected to each SG. In each ADS line, throttle channel - diam-
eter 12.1 mm and L=50 mm is installed. Actuation set points are 7.16/6.28
MPa
Leak simulation sys-
tem
Break is located in the cold leg in loop #4 between MCP and DC entrance
and oriented upward. Leak channel: Ø4 mm, L = 40 mm.
Simulation system
of primary side
cooldown by mean
of ADS
For simulation of primary side cooldown by means of ADS with a rate 30
◦/h a throttle with a diameter 2 mm and a length 20 mm is installed in the
common ADS line.
UP warming-up line Under steady state the line is open. The warming-up of the UP top part is
stopped about 2 min before opening break line.
Warming-up line of
break line
Under steady state the line is open. The warming-up of the break line is
stopped about 1 min before opening break line.
Table 3.8: Test 11 facility configuration, taken from Elkin [2004a]
Description of the experiment Please refer to table 3.9 for an overview over the imposed events. Table
3.10 presents the main events during the experiment. The following description of the experiment as taken
mainly from Elkin [2004a].
The transient as a whole may be divided into four main stages:
Ph1 blowdown of subcooled coolant (0-300 s);
Ph2 primary side pressure stays at secondary side pressure and the first initial heating of the core model
(300-717 s);
Ph3 decreasing the primary coolant mass under saturated coolant discharge and second core heat up (717-
2914 s);
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Ph4 primary side refilling after the primary side make up system actuation and primary side cooldown
under the alternation of saturated and subcooled coolant discharge (2914- 10014 s).
Phase 1 The experiment was started by opening the break valve. A sharp decrease in PS pressure was
observed. The PRZ level started to decrease. At 45 s PRZ level was lower than 2.32 m (according to the
transducer YP01L02) and the PRZ heaters were turned of.
At 41 s the primary side pressure was lower than 13.7 MPa and the scram was simulated - the program for
core and core by-pass electric power decrease was started. At 1200 s the core simulator power had decreased
to 202 kW. The core simulator power was kept at this level until the end of the experiment. Ten seconds after
the scram the turbine shut valve simulator was closed, and the feed water temperature was changed from
220 ◦C to 150◦C . After the start of RA06S01 valve closure the pressure increased in the secondary side in
the SGs SG-1, SG-3 and SG-4. In SG-2 the pressure started to increase earlier due to the hot coolant inflow
from pressurizer at the SG inlet. As a result of core power reduction the primary side temperature at the SG
inlet lowered and due to the decrease of temperature decrease between the primary and the secondary sides
the SGs pressure increase stopped at 130 s, and the set values for the BRU-A valves simulation were not
reached.
Due to the pressure decrease the PRZ coolant started to boil and was completely moved to the hot leg of
loop #2. It may be deduced by the temperature changes at SG and UP inlet that almost the whole coolant
coming from pressurizer moved towards SG. At first relatively cold water reached the SG from surge line (2
sec), then the hotter fluid coming from the pressurizer (3 sec). Due to hot fluid from PRZ at the inlet of SG-2
the temperature started to increase and at 52 sec the saturation margin became less than 10 ◦C . 15s later, at
67s, the coast-down of the MCPs started continued up to 299 s.
After the coolant reached the saturation point and began to boil the stage of phase’s separation in the
primary side started. At 111s a level was formed in UP, at 124s the levels started forming in hot legs and SG
collectors. In the hot leg and collector of loop #2 connected to PRZ the levels were forming earlier than in
other SGs at 82s and 84s correspondingly.
At 249s the upper plenum level decreased to hot legs mark and continued to decrease slowly until 580 s.
The UP head (above the upper grate) was completely dry at 246s, which was caused by the lower temperature
of the coolant (292◦C in the UP head and 308◦C at hot legs level). Simultaneously with UP voiding the levels
decreased in SG collectors, in hot and cold legs.
Phase 2 At 300s the primary side pressure decreased to the secondary side pressure. The primary circuit
pressure decrease stopped at this point. Between 300s and 717s the primary side pressure stabilized at the
secondary side pressure level. At 561s the SGs hot collector voided (cold collectors voided by 370s), which
led to the break down of the natural circulation in the primary side. Following hot collectors the hot legs of
all four loops voided completely at 582s and a rapid decrease of the UP level could be seen a second time.
At 700s the level decreased to the upper part of the core and at 710th s the cladding heat-up in the upper
plenum of the test facility began.
Phase 3 At 729s the test facility heat-up stopped due to the loop seals clearance in loop-2 and partially in
loop-1. The loop seal of the loop-2 was cleared completely at 777s. From 729s the break flow changed from
liquid to two phase. This can be seen from the pressure change in the primary side. From this moment on
energy was no longer removed by the secondary side - at 731s the primary side pressure dropped beneath
the secondary side pressure and the heat transfer was reversed (SS supplied heat to the PS). At 755s the DC
level decreased to the cold legs and continued decreasing slowly up to 900s. Thus from 760s on saturated
coolant was flowing out of the leakage. Between 990s and 2742s the coolant mass decreased in DC and UP.
The level was constant in the core model and in the circulating loops until 2742 s. At 1187s the primary
circuit pressure decreased to 5.9 MPa and starting at 1193s the water from ECCS accumulators was fed to
the primary circuit.
At 1800s the simulation of the operator action “cool down of the PS via SS with a cool down rate of
30K/h” was simulated by opening the isolation valve of the installed cool down system. The complete
opening of isolation valve was at 1811s. The primary and secondary side was not affected by this measure.
At 1928s primary side make-up system actuated spuriously for 43s. Water from this system was entered in
primary side during 43s.
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Phase 4 The upper plenum was completely voided at 2741s. Immedeatly after the core level began to
drop. At 2816s the upper part of the fuel rod simulator uncovered and a second heat up began. At 2914s the
set point for the second operator action was reachted (the cladding temperature reached 302 ◦C ), and the
make up and TQ(1,2,3)4 system was taken into operation. The make-up system cold water supply into the
primary side led to acceleration of the primary pressure decrease rate and resulted in water flow rate increase
from ACCs. The total water flow rate coming from the passive ECCS and make-up system exceeded the
coolant flow rate discharged from the leakage and therefore at 2922s the refilling of the downcomer and
core regions began. At 3456s it reached the cold legs. From this moment up to the end of the experiment
there was alternating discharge of saturated and unsaturated coolant into the leakage. As a result the rate
of the primary pressure decrease slowed down again and there appeared pressure pulsation in the primary
side and pulsation of other parameters caused by the status change of the coolant discharged from the break.
Between 3456s and 10014s there was a slow pressure and primary side temperature decrease. The coolant
flow rate discharged from the break was comparable to the coolant flow rate coming from ACCs and make
up system which led to the level stabilization in the reactor model and circulating loops. This state was kept
until 10014s.
EVENT pre-set actual
Leak opening 0 s 0 s
SCRAM signal UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 1 s UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 2 s
PRZ heaters
switched off
PRZ level = 4.21 m PRZ level = 4.17 m
Turbine valve
simulation
closure begins
UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 11 s UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 11 s
SG SS isolated
- Turbine valve
simulation clo-
sure ends
71 s
Transition to
the AFW
UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 11 s UP pressure < 13.7 MPa + 11 s
MCP coast-
down onset
Difference between saturation tem-
perature (UP pressure) and HL tem-
perature < 10 ◦C + 15 s
Difference between saturation tem-
perature (UP pressure) and HL tem-
perature < 10 ◦C + 15 s
Start of ACC 1
operation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa + 1 s
Start of ACC 2
operation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa - 5 s
Start of ACC 3
operation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa - 3 s
Start of ACC 4
operation
UP pressure < 5.9 MPa UP pressure < 5.9 MPa - 7 s
Primary side
cool-down
procedure
1800 s 1801 s
Start of HPIS
operation
Core cladding temperature = 350◦C
and τ > 1800 s
Core cladding temperature = 338◦C
and τ > 3018 s
Start of HPIS
operation
UP pressure = 2.43 MPa UP pressure = 2.45 MPa
Table 3.9: Imposed sequence of main events for PSB Test 11, CL-0.7-12, taken from Elkin et al. [2004]
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EVENT Time (s)
Leakage opening (opening isolation valve XL10S01) 0
YC01P17=13.7 MPa 41.2
Switching off PRZ heater 45
Start of power reduction on FRS bundle and core by-pass 45.9
Start closing of steam discharge valve RA06S01 52.1
Ts(YC01P17) - YA02T04 < 10 ◦C 52
Start of MCPs coast-down (YD01-04R11) 67.1
Stopping of SGs steam discharge (full closing of RA06S01 valve) 69.6
Complete closing of feed water valves to SG
- RL01S06,- RL02S06 167, 380
- RL03S06, - RL04S06 176, 316
Coolant reaching of saturation in hot legs at SG inlet
- in loop #1, #2 124,84
- in loop #3, #4 123,127
Complete switching off of MCP 299
Coolant reaching of saturation in cold legs at SG outlet:
- in loop #1, #2 308, 287
- in loop #3, #4 314, 320
Start of the first bundle heat up 710
Pressure in the primary side is lower than in the secondary one:
- in SG -1, -2 731, 730
- in SG -3, -4 721, 731
Pressure in the primary side 5.9 MPa 1187
Start of Acc operation:
-TH01B01,-TH02B01 1198, 1193
-TH03B01, -TH04B01 1200, 1195
Coolant reached saturation at the core inlet 1283
Start of cooldown procedure (opening of RA15S01) 1801
Start of the second bundle heat up 2816
Start of operation of primary side make-up system
-RL16F01, -RL17F01 2914, 2914
-RL18F01, -RL19F01 2914, 2914
Stop of experiment 10014
Table 3.10: Sequence of the principal events in the experiment 11 [Elkin, 2004a]
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Calculation results
Primary Pressure
The primary side pressure trend is generally very well predicted. It can be seen in Figure 3.20. The overall
non-dimensional error for the pressure trend, which was calculated using the FFTBM, is 0.09, which is a
good result (see Table 3.11). The acceptability limit of the University of Pisa for a qualified nodalisation is
0.1.
In the first phase, about 0 to 300s, the primary pressure trend is very well predicted. The next phase, 300s-
800s, in which the upper plenum and the loops are in saturation, the primary pressure rests on the secondary
pressure. The pressure in this phase is slightly overpredicted. The end of the subcooled blowdown, which
is marked by again a decrease in the PS pressure, is predicted to be at about 800s, while the experiment
shows that this event takes place about after 720s. The next phase, 800s-2300s, shows about the same
depressurization rate as the experiment. At about 2300s the second-dryout occurs in the calculation and some
parts of the ECCS are recovered. This is one of the main differences between calculation and experiment -
in the experiment this event occurs at about 3000s. A difference of 700s is just within the acceptability range
for a transient like this - one has to consider that local phenomena like comparably small dry-outs are very
difficult to predict, and that this is certainly an aspect of test 11 which is very challenging for the code. The
last phase, from accident management to the end of the experiment, shows qualitatively the same behavior.
Cold water form the recovered ECCS systems cools the primary side inventory and causes a visible drop in
the primary side pressure - which in turns enhances ECCS intervention.
Secondary side temperatures
The secondary side pressure trend for SG1 is reported in Figure 3.21. The non-dimensional error of the
FFTBM analysis is reported for SG1 and SG4 in Table 3.11. The pressure trend from 0s - 700s is well
predicted. The end of the subcooled blowdown is calculated to be 800s, while in the experiment it turned
out to be at 720s. This is the reason why the SS pressure trend starts to drop later in the calculation than
in the experiment. Up to 1800s the rate of the SS pressure decrease is slightly underpredicted. At 1800s
the SS cool down system, designed to realize a cool down rate of 30K/h, is taken into operation by opening
the correlated valve. Although a big effort was made the catch this event with the calculation, there is still a
visible distortion. From 1800s the cool down rate predicted by the calculation is bigger than the experimental
one.
Temperatures
The fluid temperatures are reasonably well predicted, see Figure 3.22 for the core inlet temperature and
Figure 3.23 for the core outlet temperature. The disagreements in the fluid temperature between calculation
and experiment can mainly be explained by the differences in the pressure. The trend of the clad temperature
at several elevations is reported in Figure 3.28 (bottom), Figure 3.27 (middle) and Figure 3.26 (top). While
the middle and bottom range follow closely the fluid temperature, the top range shows a dry-out at 730s in
the experiment and 800s in the calculation. This is a good agreement between calculation and experiment.
The second dry-out occurs earlier in the calculation than in the experiment (at about 2300s in the calculation,
3000s in the experiment). This is a minimal agreement between calculation and experiment, and shows the
fact that local small dry-out phenomena are very challenging for the code and difficult to predict. Figure
3.26 shows the temperature for the two top nodes of the heater rods for the relap calculation. Please note
that the dry-out occurs after the accumulator intervention, and that the accumulators quench the dry-out in
the top-node. So the second dry-out occurs in the first node after the top node.
Break mass flow rate and primary side mass
The experimental and calculated mass flow through the break are in excellent agreement during all phases
of the experiment (see Figure 3.25).
Pressure drops
All pressure drops between different points of the primary circuit are compared in figures. All of the com-
parisons, with different extent, suffer of the limitation connected to the fact that the pressure taps are not
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coincident with the center of the volumes of the nodalization. Pressure drops in the loops are reasonably
well predicted by the code: notwithstanding the code predicts the occurrence of loop seal clearing in one
loop, as in the experiment, this loop is not the correct one. This confirms the difficulty, already emphasized
in previous analyses, see D’Auria et al. [1999] and D’Auria et al. [2003], in correctly predicting a critical
phenomenon like loop seal clearing. The distribution of pressure drops in the initial steady state, both direct
and reverse (in this last case calculated data can not be qualified), are responsible for the misprediction of
loop seal clearing phenomena. This is a well known limitation, resulting from several code applications
to SBLOCA analyses, that does not affect the code capability in predicting the overall transient scenario
D’Auria et al. [1999] and D’Auria et al. [2003].
Conclusions The primary pressure follows very close the experimental one. Even the secondary pressure
is in good agreement with experimental data at the beginning of the transient. Regarding the cladding tem-
perature, relap calculation shows a good agreement with the experimental data for the first dryout occurrence
- the second dryout is predicted to happen earlier. The reason might be that the mass flow through the break
for two phase flow is overpredicted (see also the mass inventory). It has also to be noted that the heat losses
of the PSB facility, especially the heat losses of the MCP, are not precisely known and may introduce a
source of error. Nevertheless, the prediction is close enough to the experiment to achieve a FFTBM-Score
within the acceptability limit, which means that the calculation can be considered as qualified calculation.
Parameter AA WF
0 PRZ pressure 0.0903 0.030
1 SG1 pressure 0.2495 0.048
2 SG4 pressure 0.2546 0.048
3 ACC1 pressure 0.1514 0.034
4 ACC4 pressure 0.1651 0.035
5 Core inlet temperature 0.0896 0.034
6 Core outlet temperature 0.0833 0.039
7 Upper head fluid temperature 0.1360 0.026
8 Integral break flow 0.2648 0.166
9 Active eccs integral flow rate 0.3971 0.041
10 ACC1 level 0.2330 0.043
11 ACC4 level 0.2472 0.060
12 Heater rod bottom 0.1300 0.050
13 Heater rod middle 0.1256 0.052
14 Heater rod top 0.3597 0.039
15 Primary side mass 0.1923 0.093
16 Core power 0.3615 0.121
17 DP core 1.5532 0.082
18 DP loop seal 0.6970 0.031
19 DP across DC and UH bypass 2.3407 0.054
20 DP sg1 inlet and top 0.8209 0.086
21 DP SG4 inlet and top 0.8888 0.069
TOTAL 0.26 0.049
Table 3.11: Post test 11 results, accuracy evaluation following the FFTBM
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EVENT EXP (s)
R5 base (s)
Leakage opening 0 0
YC01P17=13.7 MPa 42.2 37
Start closing of steam discharge valve RA06S01 53 47
Start of MCPs coast-down (YD01-04R11) 68.5 60
Stopping of SGs steam discharge (full closing of RA06S01 valve) 70.6 67
Complete switching off of MCP 300.4 300
Start of the first bundle heat up 703 780
Pressure in the primary side is lower than in the secondary one: 725 850
Pressure in the primary side 5.9 MPa 1188 1160
Coolant reached saturation at the core inlet 1220 1245
Start of cooldown procedure (opening of RA15S01) 1801 1800
Start of the second bundle heat up 2805 2150
Start of operation of primary side HPIS system 3018 2300
Stop of experiment/calculation 4780 5000
Table 3.12: Relap5 comparison experiment/calculation, test 11
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Figure 3.20: Post test 11 results, primary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.21: Post test 11 results, secondary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.22: Post test 11 results, core inlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.23: Post test 11 results, core outlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.24: Post test 11 results, primary mass, short and long term
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Figure 3.25: Post test 11 results, integral flow rate through the break, short and long term
107
3.1. CONNECTION TO PSB CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
 280
 290
 300
 310
 320
 330
 340
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
T
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
 [
d
e
g
 C
]
Time [s]
Heater rod top level (short term)
YC01T25 (exp)
httemp118401013 (calc)
 200
 220
 240
 260
 280
 300
 320
 340
 360
 0  1000  2000  3000  4000  5000
T
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
 [
d
e
g
 C
]
Time [s]
Heater rod top level
YC01T25 (exp)
httemp118401013 (calc)
httemp118400913 (calc)
Figure 3.26: Post test 11 results, heater rod cladding temperature top, short and long term
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Figure 3.27: Post test 11 results, heater rod cladding temperature middle, short and long term
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Figure 3.28: Post test 11 results, heater rod cladding temperature bottom, short and long term
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Figure 3.29: Post test 11 results, integral eccs flow rate
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Figure 3.30: Post test 11 results, pressure in accumulator 1
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UNIT EXP CALC R5 Judg. R5
RTA: Pressurizer emptying
TSE emptying time* s 64.5 70 E
scram time s 46 37 E
IPA integrated flow from Surge Line
(from 0 up to emptying)
kg - - -
RTA: Steam generators secondary side behavior
TSE main steam line valve closure s 70.6 52 M
feed water valve closure s - - -
difference between PS and SS MPa 2.3 2.0 E
pressure at 100 s
SVP SG level m
· at the end of subcooled blow-
down
2.25,2.30 2.29,2.41 R,R
2.31,2.38 2.41,2.46 R,R
· when PS pressure equals SS
pressure
2.32,2.27 2.29,2.41 R,R
2.32,2.37 2.41,2.46 R,R
when HPIS starts 2.29,2.27 2.35,2.33 E,E
2.27,2.24 2.27,2.27 E,E
SVP SG pressure MPa
· at the end of subcooled
blowdown
6.84,6.85 7.1,7.1 E,E
6.84,6.85 7.1,7.1 E,E
· when PS pressure equals
SS pressure
7.1,7.1 7.1,7.1 E,E
7.15 7.1 7.1,7.1 E,E
· when HPIS starts 5.14,5.15 5.5,5.5 R,R
5.19,5.15 5.5,5.5 R,R
RTA: Subcooled blowdown
TSE upper plenum in sat. conditions s 140 130 E
break two phase flow s 758 820 E
IPA break flow up to 30 s kg 48 41 R
RTA: First dryout occurrence (+)
TSE time of dry out s 703 798 R
range of dry out occurrence at
various core levels
s 703-712 798-804 E
peak cladding temperature ◦C 314 295 R
SVP average linear power kW/m 0.39 0.38 E
core power / primary mass kW/kg 0.65 0.76 R
IPA integral of dry out at 2/3 of core
height
◦C s 2480 - -
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 40 33 R
RTA: Rewet by loop seal clearing
time of loop seal clearing s 717 800 R
Loop #2 Loop #1 R
TSE range of rewet occurrence s - - -
time when rewet is completed s - - -
Table 3.13: Test 11 - judgement of code calculations on the basis of RTA (part 1)
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UNIT EXP CALC R5 Judg. R5
RTA: Saturated blowdown
TSE PS pressure equal to SS pres-
sure
s 725 825 R
IPA integrated flow from 400 to
1000 s
kg 277 315 R
RTA: Mass distribution in primary side
TSE time of minimum mass occur-
rence
s 3000 2315 M
SVP minimum primary side mass kg 230 195 R
av. linear power at min. mass kW/m 0.34 0.32 E
minimum mass/ITF volume kg/m3 191 158 R
RTA: Accumulators behavior
TSE accumulators injection starts s 1180 1360 R
IPA total mass delivered by accu-
mulators
kg 71 152 M
NDP minimum primary mass/initial
primary mass
% 50 84 M
primary mass/initial accumula-
tor mass
% 133 132 E
RTA: Final dryout occurrence
TSE time of dry out s 2802 2110 M
range of dry out occurrence at
various core levels
s 2802-3000 2110-2350 R
peak cladding temperature ◦C 336 352 E
SVP average linear power kW/m 0.34 0.34 E
maximum linear power kW/m - - -
rate of rod temperature increase K/s 0.35 0.5 R
core power / primary mass kW/kg 0.82 1.0 R
IPA integral of dry out at 2/3 of core
height
◦C s - -
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 28 22 R
RTA: HPIS intervention
TSE HPIS start s 3000 2315 M
range of rewet occurrence 3040 - 3047 2325 - 2350 M
final rewetting s 3040 2350 M
IPA integrated flow from start to end
of rewet
kg 5.5 6.7 R
NDP primary mass/initial mass % 25 22 E
Table 3.14: Test 11 - judgement of code calculations on the basis of RTA (part 2)
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3.1.4 Post test analysis 7 - SBO with with operator actions
Full title of the Test is “SBO with operator actions on SS depressurization for FW supply” Experiment 7
specifications can be found in detail in [Elkin et al., 2005c]. The experiment is the 7th of the TM, simulating
a SBO. It is assumed that the operator is able to attach an external supply of feed water to SG1 after the upper
plenum temperature exceeds 350◦C . In the experiment the flow rate of 67g/s of feed water is sufficient to
slowly cool down the primary circuit, although primary side pressure remains at a high level.
Description of the experiment The test 7 specifications and scenario can be found in detail in Elkin et al.
[2005c] and Elkin et al. [2005d]. Initial event is a SBO, which means a loss of all off-site and on-site power.
After the initial event natural circulation together with the cycling BRU-A valves is capable to remove the
residual heat, until the SGs are boiled dry. Approximately at this moment the temperature in the PS starts
to rise. This in turn causes the PRZ level to rise, and the PS pressure to increase. The PS pressure increase
becomes severe once the pressurizer is solid. The PORV valve starts to cycle.
When the UP fluid temperature reaches a value of 350◦C (about 10000 s from the beginning of the
transient), the operator succeeds in connecting an external source of feed water to the feed water line: he
closes all four MSIV and depressurizes SG1 and SG4. When the pressure in SG1 drops below 1MPa, the
mobile pumps are able to furnish feed water with a flow rate of 67 g/s into SG1. The procedure is successful
- the primary side pressure increase can be stopped, and the UP fluid temperature starts to decrease. At
15000 s after the beginning of the transient the experiment is terminated.
Configuration of the PSB-VVER facility Please refer to table 3.15 for the configuration of the facility. A
more detailed description on the configuration of the facility and the initial and boundary conditions can be
found in Elkin et al. [2005c] and Elkin et al. [2005d].
Equipment Connection status
Pressurizer Connected to loop #2
Core by-pass 2 throttle with 2 orifices of diameter 7 mm are installed at inlet and outlet of
core by-pass
ECCS hydroaccumu-
lators
Not used
HPIS&LPIS Not used
Steam generators Steam dump of all SG is connected to one steam collector during steady
state. Steam discharge and valve RA06S01
Feed water heater On. SG level under steady-state conditions is maintained by supply of feed
water with a temperature of ≈ 220 ◦C
ADS simulation sys-
tem
ADS are connected to each SG. In each ADS line, throttle channel (L/d=10)
diameter 12.1 mm in diameter. Actuation set points are 7.16/6.28 MPa
PRZ relief valve sim-
ulation system
System is located in the PRZ. Actuation set points are 18.14/16.67. Leak
channel: 3 mm diameter, L = 20 mm.
UP warming-up line Under steady state the line is open. The warming-up of the UP top part is
stopped about 2 min before the SBO.
Table 3.15: Test facility configuration, taken from Elkin et al. [2005d]
Description of the experiment Please refer to table 3.16 for an overview over the imposed events. A more
detailed description of the initial and boundary conditions, as well as the experimental results can be found
in Elkin et al. [2005c] and Elkin et al. [2005d]. Table 3.17 presents the main events during the experiment.
The following description of the experiment is taken mainly from Elkin et al. [2005d].
The following description is mainly following [Elkin et al., 2005c]:
The transient may be divided into three main stages:
• evaporation of SGs by opening of ADS valves (0 - 5146 s);
• depressurization of primary side by opening PRZ relief valve (5146 - 10014 s);
• accident management procedure for primary side cooldown (10014 - 15016 s).
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The experiment was started issuing a scram-signal (the core simulator power was decreased to 300 kW
and further it was practically constant till the end of experiment) and by closing the feed water and steam
dump valves. The MCP coast-down began at the 0 s and continued until 232 s, the PRZ heaters where set to
12 kW and kept constant at that value to compensate for the PRZ heat losses.
Since the steam flow rate was reduced faster than the feed water flow rate, the SG level was increasing
in the first 15 s, as was the SG pressure.
By 200 s the secondary pressure reached the value of 7.16 MPa and the ADS valves were the first time
actuated. They were effective in reducing the SS pressure, and at a pressure of 6.28 MPa they were closed
again. They cycled until 7833 s. With every cycle the SG inventory was decreased. The SG level trend
shows a step function.
As a result of the evaporation of water of the secondary side and the reduction of the SG level the
heat transfer surface primary-secondary was reduced, and therefore the efficiency of the SGs. The coolant
temperature at SGs primary side outlet started to increase. By 5146 s the primary pressure was at 15.4 MPa
- after that the primary pressure started to increase. By 6315 s the primary pressure reached the value of
18.14 MPa and PRZ relief valve was opened, succeeding in reducing the ps pressure, was closed, and kept
on cycling from that time on.
At 10014 s the cladding temperatures increased to 350◦C and the AM procedure was initiated. It started
with the closure of the FASIVs in SG2 and SG3. At 10029 s, after the MSIVs were closed, the ADS in SG-1
and SG-4 were fully opened. The decreasing of the secondary pressure in SG-1 and SG-4 continued until it
reached the value of 1 MPa and at 10282 s; this was the signal for the opening of isolation valve RL01S06
(simulating the operator intervention - start the primary side cooldown through ADS of SG-1). Water was
supplied into SG-1 with flow rate of 67 g/s.
The cold water supplied into the SG-1 led to a decrease in primary pressure. From this moment and up
to the end of the experiment there was the decreasing of the PRZ level due to primary side cooldown. The
level of SG1 started to increase. Between 10282 s and 15016 s slow pressure and primary side temperature
decrease could be observed. At the 15016 s the primary side pressure was at 14.3 MPa and the coolant
temperature 320◦C - the experiment was terminated.
The result of the calculation with the code Relap5 are presented. Table 3.3 shows the time of occurrence
of important events, comparing the experimental data with the Relap5 results.
Relap5 results The results of the calculation are summarized in Figures 3.31 to 3.38 and in Table 3.18,
which reports the timing of main events.
Conclusion The analysis shows that the code is capable of reproducing the most important phenomena
of the test. However, due to uncertainties in the boundary conditions (heat losses which cannot be exactly
given), the code run shows significant differences in the timing. From a formal point of view, the calculation
would fail to pass as “qualified calculation” according to the standards of the University of Pisa, because
the primary side pressure FFTBM results are above the threshold of 0.1. But one should keep in mind that
the FFTBM has been developed and tested mainly for LOCA calculations; the high value of 0.37 for the
primary pressure trend derives mainly from the discrepancies during the cycling of the PRZ safety valve
simulator. In the experiment the valve opens and closes eight times, while the calculation predicts eleven
cycles. Judging from the primary pressure trend, this difference is owed to the fact that the primary pressure
in the experiment drops with every opening of the valve to 16 MPa, while in the calculation only the first
opening shows a drop to 16 MPa, for all following openings the PP stays closer to the closure set-point.
Therefore, the time to reach again the opening set point is lower in the calculation then in the experiment.
From a qualitative point of view, this is an acceptable difference; the overall behaviour is well caught - the
start of primary pressure increase and the primary temperature trends (which is the set point for the operator
action) agrees reasonably well.
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EVENT pre-set actual
Start blackout 0 s 0 s
Beginning of RA06S01 closing 0 s 0 s
Finishing of RA06S01 closing 16 s
Beginning of RL01-04S07 closing 0 s 0 s
Finishing RL01S07 closing 6 s
Finishing RL02S07 closing 11 s
Finishing RL03S07 closing 15 s
Finishing RL04S07 closing 7 s
Start of PCS program of the electric
power reduction at core and core
by-pass
0 s 0 s
MCP coast down onset 0 s 0 s
Stop PRZ heaters power change 0 s 0 s
Cycling of ADS valves pressure set
point
Cyclng of the PRZ valve pressure set
point
Closure of the MSIV in SG2 and
SG3
YC01Tmax=350◦C YC01T09=350◦C
Finishing of RA08S01 closing TMSIV + 16s
Finishing of TA09S01 closing TMSIV + 10s
Opening of BRU-A in SG1 and
SG4
TMSIV + 15s TMSIV+15s
Finishing of RA11S01 opening TMSIV + 19 s
Finishing of RA14S01 opening TMSIV + 20 s
Water supply from external source
into SG1 with flow rate of 67g/s
YB01P01 = 1
MPa
YB01P01 = 1
MPa
Table 3.16: Imposed sequence of main events for PSB Test 7
EVENT Time (s)
Start of SBO 0
Stop of PRZ heater change 0
Start of closing steam discharge valve RA06S01 0
Start of MCPs coast down 0
Start of core and core by-pass power reduction 5.6
Complete closing of feed water valves
RL01S06 6
RL02S06 11
RL03S06 15
RL04S06 7
Stopping of SG steam discharge (full closing of RA06S01 valve) 16
Beginning of ADS cycling 200
Complete switch off of MCPs 232
Start of primary pressure increase 5146
Begin of PRZ relief valve cycling 6315
Closure of MSIV in SG2 and SG3 (YC01T09=350◦C ) 10014
Opening of ADS in SG1 and SG4 10029
Water supply into SG1, G=67g/s, YB01P01=1MPa 10282
Stop of experiment 15016
Table 3.17: Sequence of the principal events in test 7 taken from Elkin et al. [2005c]
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EVENT EXP (s)
R5 (s)
Start of station blackout 0 0
Stop of PRZ heater change 0 0
Start of closing steam discharge valve RA06S01 0 0
Start of MCPs coast down 0 0
Start of core and core by-pass power reduction 5.6 0
Complete closing of feed water valves
RL01S06 6 5
RL02S06 11 10
RL03S06 15 15
RL04S06 7 5
Stopping of SG steam discharge (full closing of RA06S01 valve) 16 21
Beginning of ADS cycling 200 114
Complete switch off of MCPs 232 232
Start of primary pressure increase 5146 5123
Beginning of PRZ relief valve cylcing 6315 6726
Closure of MSIV in SG2 and SG3 (YC01T09=350◦C ) 10014 10439
Opening of ADS in SG1 and SG4 10029 10445
Water supply into SG1, G=67g/s, YB01P01=1MPa 10282 10541
Stop of experiment/calculation 15016 15000
Table 3.18: Post test 7 comparison experiment/calculation
Parameter AA WF ωi
1 PRZ pressure 0.37 0.011 0.070
2 SG1 pressure 0.54 0.010 0.046
3 SG2 pressure 0.65 0.016 0.046
4 SG4 pressure 0.53 0.010 0.046
5 core inlet temperature 0.14 0.014 0.107
6 core outlet temperature 0.11 0.013 0.107
7 upper head fluid temperature 0.34 0.013 0.107
8 heater rod bottom 0.16 0.019 0.075
9 heater rod middle 0.17 0.018 0.075
10 heater rod top 0.16 0.021 0.075
11 core power 0.18 0.027 0.022
12 DP core 0.20 0.011 0.017
13 DP loop seal 0.63 0.003 0.017
14 DP across DC and UH bypass 0.20 0.007 0.017
15 DP SG1 inlet and top 0.16 0.013 0.017
16 DP SG4 inlet and top 0.17 0.020 0.017
17 DP UP and core outlet 0.18 0.004 0.017
18 SG1 level 0.18 0.027 0.030
19 SG2 level 0.11 0.022 0.030
20 SG4 level 0.18 0.016 0.030
21 PRZ level 0.34 0.010 0.030
TOTAL 0.26 0.015
Table 3.19: Post test 7 results, the accuracy evaluation following the FFTBM
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Figure 3.31: Post test 7 results, primary side pressure
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Figure 3.32: Post test 7 results, SG1 pressure
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Figure 3.33: Post test 7 results, SG2 pressure
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Figure 3.34: Post test 7 results, core inlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.35: Post test 7 results, core outlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.36: Post test 7 results, level SG1, short and long term
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Figure 3.37: Post test 7 results, loop 1 mass flow rate, short and long term
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Figure 3.38: Post test 7 results, loop 2 mass flow rate, short and long term
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3.1.5 Post test analysis 1 - LOFW with operator actions
The experiment is the 1th of the TM, simulating a total LOFW. It is assumed that the operator is able to
attach an external supply of feed water to SG1 and SG4 after the upper plenum temperature exceeds 350◦C .
In the experiment the flow rate of 33 g/s of feed water is furnished into each of the two SG, and is sufficient
to slowly cool down the primary circuit. The primary side pressure decreases at first slowly - then, after the
PRZ heaters are switched off on PRZ low level signal, the PS depressurization rate increases.
Description of the experiment The test 1 specifications and scenario can be found in detail in Elkin et al.
[2005a] and Elkin et al. [2005b]. Initial event is a LOFW, which means a loss of all sources of feed water
(main, auxillary and emergency feed water). Together with the feed water pumps the TSV is closed. The
MCP trip occurs on low level in the SG, and the reactor scram is simulated after three out of four pumps
are tripped. Natural circulation together with the cycling BRU-A valves is soon ineffective in removing the
residual heat. Average PS temperature and in turn the PRZ level start to increase. When the PRZ is full and
the PS is solid, PS pressure increases fast. The PORV valve starts to cycle.
When the UP fluid temperature reaches a value of 350◦C (about 11300 s from the beginning of the
transient), the operator succeeds in connecting an external source of feed water to the feed water line: he
closes all four MSIV and depressurizes SG1 and SG4. When the pressure in the SG drops below 1MPa,
the mobile pumps are able to furnish feed water with a flow rate of 33 g/s into each of SG1 and SG4. The
procedure is successful - the primary side pressure increase can be stopped, and the UP fluid temperature
starts to decrease. At 21760 s after the beginning of the transient the experiment is terminated.
Configuration of the PSB-VVER facility Please refer to table 3.20 for the configuration of the facility. A
more detailed description on the configuration of the facility and the initial and boundary conditions can be
found in Elkin et al. [2005a] and Elkin et al. [2005b].
Equipment Connection status
Pressurizer Connected to loop #2
Core by-pass 2 diaphragms with 2 orifices of diameter 7 mm are installed at inlet and
outlet of core by-pass
ECCS hydroaccumu-
lators
ACC #1 and #3 are connected to the outlet plenum, ACC #2 and #4 are
connected to the inlet chamber
HPIS&LPIS Two lines of LPIS are connected to the hot and cold legs of loops #1, #3 and
#4
Steam generators Under steady state all SG are connected to each other by the steam header.
The pressure is adjusted by one steam dumping valve
Feed water heater On. SG level under steady-state conditions is maintained by supply of feed
water with a temperature of ≈ 216 ◦C
ADS simulation sys-
tem
ADS are connected to each SG. In each ADS line, throttle channel L=50mm,
diameter 12.1 mm . Actuation set points are 7.16/6.28 MPa
Pressurizer spray The injection water is supplied from the feed water header Actuation set
points are 16.08/15.98 MPa
PRZ relief valve sim-
ulation system
System is located in the PRZ. Actuation set points are 18.14/16.67. Leak
channel: 3 mm diameter, L = 20 mm.
Line for UP
warming-up
Under steady state the line is open. The warming-up of the UP top part is
stopped about 2 min before the start of the test.
Table 3.20: Test 1 facility configuration, taken from Elkin et al. [2005b]
Please refer to table 3.21 for an overview of the imposed events. A more detailed description of the
initial and boundary conditions, as well as the experimental results can be found in Elkin et al. [2005a] and
Elkin et al. [2005b]. Table 3.22 presents the main events during the experiment. The following description
of the experiment is taken mainly from Elkin et al. [2005b].
The transient may be divided into five main stages:
• primary pressure increase (0-71s);
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• warming-up of the primary side coolant and water evaporation from SGs in the secondary side (ADS
operation) (71-6146 s)
• warming-up of the primary side coolant and periodical coolant discharge from the primary side through
PRZ relief valve;
• primary side cool down through ADS of SG-1 and SG-4 with PRZ electric heater being switched on
(11600-17524 s);
• primary side cool down through ADS of SG-1 and SG-4 with PRZ power being switched off (17524-
21769 s).
The experiment was started with the signals generated simultaneously by PCS to close isolation valves
of feed water supply in SG (RL01-04S06) and to close the control valve of the steam dumping from SGs
(RA06S01).
First phase 0 - 71 s
Steam dumping and feed water supply were totally stopped by 15 s and 12 s accordingly. After starting
the closure of the corresponding valves and as a result of the balance between the quantity of steam dis-
charged and water supply, it was observed a SG level increase lasting till 25 s. When the steam dumping
is stopped SG pressure and temperature begin growing. As a result of decreasing of temperature difference
between the primary and secondary side, primary pressure and temperature start to increase. Temperature
increase in the cold legs at the SG outlet causes the reduction of the flow rate in circulation loops of the test-
facility. At 71 s secondary pressure reaches the set point of ADS actuation. ADS actuation was observed 17
times during the whole experiment
Second phase 71 - 6146 s
Every ADS actuation leads to a short time intensification of heat removal from the primary side and as
a consequence to the reduction of primary pressure and temperature. Temperature decrease at SG outlet
results in a short time growing of the flow rate in circulation loops of the test-facility (≈ 0.1 kg/s) At the time
of every regular ADS actuation secondary pressure after closure of ADS valve differs greatly from the low
actuation set point. Such behavior of secondary pressure is explained by a fast pressure reduction under ADS
actuation due to the decrease of steam generation intensity caused by the diminution of secondary coolant
mass and by the progressive reduction of the heat exchange surface.
Because the speed of valve simulating ADS operation during its opening and closure remains constant,
secondary pressure has time to diminish till a lower value.
Nearly simultaneously with ADS actuation a set point is reached to actuation the PRZ spray (YC01P16=16.08
MPa) at 73 s. The injection in PRZ of coolant with a temperature 30 ◦C and a flow rate 35 g/s is performed
during the period between the 77 and 98 s.
ADS operation and injection in PRZ leads to the primary pressure decrease. Further during ADS actua-
tion, primary pressure at the time of MCP operation does not reach the set point of actuation PRZ spray.
As a result of ADS operation SGs levels reduce. At 256 s as a consequence of the level decrease in SG-1
on 0.5 m from the nominal value MCP coast down begins in this loop. In the third loop MCP coast down
begins at 259 s and in the other ones at 260 s. The coasts down of all MCPs are finished at 491 s and after
that a singlephase natural circulation is set in the primary side. As MCP-1 coast down is the first one the
flow rate of the natural circulation in the first loop is set two times less than in other loops ≈ 0.45 and ≈ 1
kg/s accordingly.
At the moment of the third pump coast down the signal is generated to simulate SCRAM which leads to
the beginning of electric power decrease in the core and bypass zones at 265.5 s . At the same time with the
beginning of the fourth pump coast down the signal is generated to stop the operation of PRZ spray.
The start of electric power reduction at the core model effects to a short time cessation of pressure
increase in the primary side of the test-facility under ADS valves closed.
As a result of secondary side voiding and decrease of SG level there is a voiding of heat exchange surface.
It leads to the reduction of cooling efficacy for the primary side coolant. In spite of absence of temperature
growing at the core outlet during the period between 285 and 1500 s (it is even observed its little decrease
caused by electric power reduction) cold legs temperature of the test-facility grows.
During the period between 1500 and 4000 s there is a monotone increase of coolant temperature in the
primary side accompanying the slow pressure increase. The increase of coolant temperature occurs with
the reduction of its density. It leads to the ousting of the coolant in PRZ and as a consequence to the level
increase in it.
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By 4000 s the PRZ is nearly totally filled with water. It effects the sharp speed increase of pressure
growing at the primary side of the test-facility. As a result at 5396.5 s the set point of PRZ relief valve
actuation is reached. Totally PRZ relief valve actuation was observed 10 times during the experiment.
Third phase 6146 - 11600
PRZ relief valve operation did not influence greatly the development of the accident process. The coolant
warming-up rate in the primary side did not changes and was about 15 ◦C /h .
At 11294 s coolant temperature at the core outlet reached 350◦C and there was a start of simulation of
operators actions for accident management. At 11294 and 11300 s, FASIVs of SG-3 and SG-4 were totally
closed (closure of valves RA09S01 and RA08S01) and at 11302 and 11304 ADS of SG-1 and SG-4 were
totally opened (opening of valves RA14S01 and RA11S01). As a result of ADS opening in SG-1 and SG-4
secondary pressure in these SG decreased till the value of 1 MPa. At 11569 and 11601 s accordingly the
feed water started to be supplied to SG1 and SG4 with a temperature of ≈ 45 ◦C and a flow rate ≈ 35 g/s .
Forth phase 11600 - 17524
The feed water supplying in SG-1 and SG-4 led to the intensification of heat removal from the primary
side which resulted in decrease of primary temperature and pressure. Temperature reduction at the outlet of
SG-1 and SG-4 led to the increase of natural circulation flow rate in these loops. Further during the whole
experiment it was observed a slow flow rate decrease in all loops effected by the total cooling of the primary
side. At 12062 s the speed of primary pressure decrease slowed down which was probably explained by a
short time coolant boiling in the hot legs of loops #1 and #4 as well as at the core outlet, and also by the
formation of a steam blanket in PRZ, as a consequence of its level reduction due to the growing of coolant
density in the primary side.
During the period between 12062 and 17526 s there was a slow cooling of the installation (≈ 14-15 ◦C
/h) accompanied by a smooth fall of primary pressure and PRZ level.
Fifth and last phase 17524 - 21769
At 17524 s an automatic switching off of PRZ heater occurred according to the set point to have reached
the minimum PRZ level. PRZ power switching off led to the sharp increase of primary pressure decrease
rate. However primary temperature decrease rate did not change. PRZ power switching off also effected the
reduction of PRZ level decrease rate as a result of its cooling. During the period between 17524 and 21769
s the slow cooling of the installation in the primary side continued and at the 21769 s under the primary
temperature ≈ 312 ◦C the experiment was stopped.
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EVENT pre-set actual
Test start 0 s 0 s
Beginning of RA06S01 closing 0 s 0.0 s
Finishing of RA06S01 closing 16.6 s
Beginning of RL01S06 closing 0 s 4.9 s
Finishing of RL01S06 closing 6.4 s
Beginning of RL02S06 closing 0 s 4.4 s
Finishing of RL02S06 closing 10.8 s
Beginning of RL03S06 closing 0 s 9.3 s
Finishing of RL03S06 closing 11.7 s
Beginning of RL04S06 closing 0 s 5.4 s
Finishing of RL04S06 closing 7.3 s
MCP1 coast down onset YB01L01=1.20m YB01L01=1.21m
MCP2 coast down onset YB01L01=1.18m YB01L01=1.19m
MCP3 coast down onset YB01L01=1.20m YB01L01=1.20m
MCP4 coast down onset YB01L01=1.19m YB01L01=1.19m
Start of PCS program of the electric
power reduction at core and core
by-pass
3/4 pumps tripped 3/4 pumps tripped
Cutting off electric load at PRZ YP01L02=2.32m YP01L02=2.42m
Cycling of ADS valves pressure set point
Cyclng of the PRZ valve pressure set point
Closure of the MSIV in SG2 and
SG3
YC01T04b=350◦C YC01T04b=350◦C
Opening of BRU-A in SG1 and
SG4
TMSIV + 15s TMSIV+15s
Water supply from external source
into SG1 with flow rate of 33g/s
YB01P01 = 1 MPa YB01P01 = 1 MPa
Water supply from external source
into SG4 with flow rate of 33g/s
YB04P01 = 1 MPa YB04P01 = 0.96 MPa
Table 3.21: Imposed sequence of main events for PSB Test 1
Event Time (s)
Test start 0
Beginning of RA06S01 closing 0
Beginning of RL01S06-RL04S06 closing 0.0
Finishing of RL01S06-RL04S06 closing 4.9 - 11.7
Finishing of RA06S01 closing 16.6
Start of closing steam discharge valve RA06S01 0
Start of MCP1-4 coast down 255-260
Start of core and core by-pass power reduction 265
Beginning of ADS cycling 76
Begin of PRZ relief valve cycling 5396
Closure of MSIV in SG2 and SG3 (YC01T09=350◦C ) 11294
Opening of ADS in SG1 and SG4 11302-11304
Water supply into SG1, SG4 G=33g/s each, YB01P01=1MPa 11569 / 11601
Switching of PRZ heaters on low level 17524
Stop of experiment 21769
Table 3.22: Sequence of the principal events in the experiment 1 taken from Elkin et al. [2005a]
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Post test calculation results The results of the calculation with Relap5 for Test 1 are presented. Table 3.23
shows the time of occurrence of important events, comparing the experimental data with calculated results.
EVENT EXP (s) R5 (s)
Begin to stop feed water supply and steam dumping from SG 0 0
Steam discharge valve RA06S01 fully closed 15 16
Beginning of ADS cycling 76 54
Start of core and core by-pass power reduction 265.5 275
Beginning of PRZ relief valve cycling 5396.5 3850
Closure of MSIV in SG2 and SG3 (YC01T04b=350◦C ) 11294 7130
Opening of ADS in SG1 11302 7145
Opening of ADS in SG4 11304 7145
Water supply into SG1, G=33g/s, YB01P01=1MPa 11569 7240
Water supply into SG4, G=33g/s, YB04P01=1MPa 11601 7240
Switching of PRZ heaters 17524 12400
Stop of experiment/calculation 21769 21500
Table 3.23: Relap5 test1 comparison experiment/calculation
Table 3.24 shows the quantitative accuracy avaluation for the Relap5 calculation results. The overall ac-
curacy is well below the acceptability limit of 0.4, while the primary side pressure is outside. This calculation
is not qualified according to the standards of the University of Pisa.
Parameter AA WF ωi
1 PRZ pressure 0.50 0.009 0.070
2 SG1 pressure 0.77 0.006 0.046
3 SG2 pressure 0.62 0.014 0.046
4 SG4 pressure 0.76 0.006 0.046
5 core inlet temperature 0.16 0.008 0.107
6 core outlet temperature 0.18 0.011 0.107
7 upper head fluid temperature 0.27 0.004 0.107
8 heater rod bottom 0.13 0.008 0.075
9 heater rod middle 0.14 0.008 0.075
10 heater rod top 0.16 0.011 0.075
11 core power 0.24 0.020 0.022
12 DP core 0.22 0.007 0.017
13 DP loop seal 0.70 0.003 0.017
14 DP across DC and UH bypass 0.26 0.009 0.017
15 DP SG1 inlet and top 0.25 0.007 0.017
16 DP SG4 inlet and top 0.26 0.007 0.017
17 DP UP and core outlet 0.26 0.004 0.017
18 SG1 level 0.47 0.012 0.030
19 SG2 level 0.15 0.013 0.030
20 SG4 level 0.26 0.012 0.030
21 PRZ level 0.56 0.008 0.030
TOTAL 0.31 0.009
Table 3.24: Relap results test 1, the accuracy evaluation following the FFTBM
The results of the calculation are summarized in Figures 3.39 to 3.56 and in Table 3.23, which reports
the timing of main events.
Conclusions The analysis shows that the code is capable of reproducing the most important phenomena
of the test. However, due to uncertainties in the boundary conditions (heat losses which cannot be exactly
given), the code run show significant differences in the timing of main parameter trends such as primary side
pressure (the phenomena are well foreseen, only at different times - which can be adjusted by utilising the
130
CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS 3.1. CONNECTION TO PSB
range of possible heat losses from the facility. However, this has not been done to stay with the heat losses
close to the other tests. The run fail to pass as “qualified calculations” according to the standards of the
University of Pisa, because the primary side pressure FFTBM-evaluation result is well above the threshold.
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Figure 3.39: Relap results test 1, primary side pressure, short and long term
132
CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS 3.1. CONNECTION TO PSB
 6
 6.2
 6.4
 6.6
 6.8
 7
 7.2
 7.4
 0  500  1000  1500  2000
P
re
s
s
u
re
 [
M
P
a
]
Time [s]
SG1 pressure (short term)
YB01P01 (exp)
p608010000 (calc)
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 0  5000  10000  15000  20000
P
re
s
s
u
re
 [
M
P
a
]
Time [s]
SG1 pressure
YB01P01 (exp)
p608010000 (calc)
Figure 3.40: Relap results test 1, SG1 secondary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.41: Relap results test 1, SG2 secondary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.42: Relap results test 1, SG4 secondary side pressure, short and long term
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Figure 3.43: Relap results test 1, core inlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.44: Relap results test 1, core outlet temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.45: Relap results test 1, upper head temperature, short and long term
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Figure 3.46: Relap results test 1, heater rod cladding temperature top, short and long term
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Figure 3.47: Relap results test 1, heater rod cladding temperature middle, short and long term
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Figure 3.48: Relap results test 1, heater rod cladding temperature bottom, short and long term
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Figure 3.49: Relap results test 1, level SG1, short and long term
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Figure 3.50: Relap results test 1, level SG2, short and long term
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Figure 3.51: Relap results test 1, level SG4, short and long term
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Figure 3.52: Relap results test 1, level PRZ, short and long term
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Figure 3.53: Relap results test 1, loop 1 mass flow rate, short and long term
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Figure 3.54: Relap results test 1, loop 2 mass flow rate, short and long term
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Figure 3.55: Relap results test 1, loop 3 mass flow rate, short and long term
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Figure 3.56: Relap results test 1, loop 4 mass flow rate, short and long term
149
3.2. NODALISATION CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
3.2 Nodalisation
At the beginning of the work, a “general” VVER-1000 nodalisation was available at the University of Pisa.
The nodalisation was developed and matured over years. The “general” or generic VVER-1000 nodalisation
was also used in several international exercises, and commercial projects.
The generic VVER-1000 nodalisation was the bases to develop a nodalisation specific for the VVER-
1000/320, Unit 3 Balakovo.
The University of Pisa uses the UMAE method to “qualify” a nodalisation (see 2.4.2). Both nodalisa-
tions, the generic and the specific one, have been qualified using the mentioned method.
This section describes the steps that have been performed to derive a qualified nodalisation for Balakovo
from the generic nodalisation which was already present at the University of Pisa.
3.2.1 Description of the nodalisation
The nodalisation which was used is very detailed, the total number of heat structures is 1255, with a total
number of 7919 mesh points; 1311 thermo hydraulic volumes have been used (the number of junctions
is 1369). A “slicing” technique was adopted, meaning that the RCS has been cut horizontally in slices;
the distance between two slices is the height that was chosen tentatively for the volumes. The technique
ensures that the center of the volumes between two slices are at the same elevation, thereby avoiding to
create artificial gravitational driving forces.
The model of the primary side comprises the core, four independent modeled loops, pressurizer and
valves subsystem with steady state pressure control, ECCS and make-up.
The core comprises the volumes from 0 to 199. The upper downcomer region is modeled with eight
volumes (133-138,176,178). The cold legs are attached to 133,134,136 and 138. The four volumes are joint
on the top and on the bottom. On the bottom they lead into the volumes 139 and 130, modeling the major
part of the downcomer and ending in the lower plenum (volume 100), on the upper part volume 131 and
132 join them, and model the core-bypass (to volume 146). The active (inner) part of the RPV is modeled
with three volumes (113,110,120). Volume 113 models the core bypass for the guiding tubes, leading to the
upper head. Volume 110 (and on top of it, volume 140) models the active part of the core (all active heat
structures are connected to this volume). Volume 120 (and on top of it, 121) model the outer region of the
core. Volume 121 and 140 join in the upper plenum, volume 141. The upper plenum is modeled with two
separate stacks to allow for circulation in the upper plenum (an inner region, 141-148, and an outer region,
190, 185 and 180). The four hot legs are connected to volume 148. Volumes 150, 155, 156, 160-162, and
170 model the upper head (with two stacks, allowing for circulation). Figure 3.57 shows the nodalisation
scheme of the core.
The four loops are modeled separately, but identically except for the pressurizer (surge line and spray
line are attached to loop 4), the HHPIS and HPIS (connected to loop 1,3 and 4). volumes of loop one are
taken from 200-299, of loop two from 300-399, of loop three from 400-499, and of loop four from 500-599.
The hot leg consists of the volumes (X has a value between 2 and 5, depending on the loop) X00, X01, X03,
X05. The primary side of the SG comprises the hot collector, volumes X09, X10, X12, X14, X16, X18,
X20, X22 and X24, the SG tubes (the 11000 tubes are divided into six groups, each of which is modeled
by one of the volumes X13, X15, X17, X19, X21 and X23. The groups model different elevations of SG
tubes. Volumes X31, X60, X62, X64, X68, X70, X72 and X74 represent the cold collector, to which the SG
tubes are connected. The cold leg including loop seal to the MCP is modeled with volume X33 - here is also,
in every loop, the injection point of the make-up system. Volume X39 models the pump. The CL between
MCP and RPV is modeled by the volumes X41, X43, X45, X47 and X50. Here is the connection point for
HPIS and HHPIS. Figure 3.58 shows the nodalisation scheme for loop one.
The pressurizer subsystem consists of the surge line, volume 36 (attached to the hot leg of loop number
four, volume 503), a connection volume between the pressurizer vessel and the surge line, volume 32, the
pressurizer vessel itself, volume 30, the top of the pressurizer (volume 26) and the spray line (volume 22,
20), which is attached to the cold leg of loop number four, volume 541. The PORV and two safety relief
valves are modeled on top of the pressurizer ( 23, 24, 25 ) which discharge into the time dependent volumes
27, 28, 29. The four groups of pressurizer heaters are modeled by a single heat structure with variable
power. During steady state valve 33 opens a connection to the time dependent volume 34, which imposes
the pressure for the primary side. The time dependent junctions 42 and 48 stabilize the pressurizer level
during state at 8.47 meters by injection and suction of water respectively. Figure 3.59 shows the pressurizer
nodalisation scheme.
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Figure 3.57: Relap5 nodalisation scheme - core
The ECCS and Make-up consist of three trains of the low pressure injection system, which takes suction
from the containment sump. Train one of the LPIS injects into hot- and cold leg of loop one (line modeled
starting from time dependent volume 52, which is connected via the time dependent junction 51 to volume
280. Time dependent junction injects following a pressure - flow rate curve which simulates the LPI pumps.
Volume 281 and the junctions 282 and 283 model the connection to cold- and hot leg. Train two of the LPIS
(volume 62, junction 61) injects directly into the upper plenum (volume 148) and train three (volume 72,
junction 71) injects into the downcomer. A control variable keeps track of inventory which goes out and
which enters the sump. The emergency heat exchangers for the ECCS and residual heat removal system are
assumed to be always available. The initially the sump is filled with about 450 m3of water, with 16g of boric
acid per kg of water.
The four accumulators (accumulator component 60,70,80,90) are connected via the accumulator lines
55,56,57 - 65,66,67 - 75,76,77 and 85,86,87 in pairs to the downcomer (134,137) and the upper plenum
(148). They are set to a initial pressure of 60 MPa and 16 g of boric acid per kg water .
The HPIS is simulated by the time dependent volume and junction 246, 248 (loop one) 446, 448 (loop
three) and 546, 548 (loop four). The time dependent junctions simulate the pressure - mass flow rate curve.
This system injects up to 15 m3of water with 40 g/kg of boric acid, to simulate water supply from the tanks
(see VVER 1000 ECCS, section 2.2.3). If more water is necessary, volumes and junctions 238, 242 (loop
one) 438, 442 (loop three) and 538, 542 take over. The amount injected is debited to the sump inventory, and
injection takes place only if there is still water in the sump.
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The HHPIS is simulated by the time dependent volume and junction 244, 249 (loop one) 444, 449 (loop
three) and 544, 549 (loop four). Up to 15 m3of water with 40 g/kg boric acid are injected.
The Make-up system for chemical and volume control during normal operation is modeled with the time
dependent volume and junction 291, 290 (loop one), 391, 390 (loop two), 491, 490 (loop three) and 491,
490 (loop four). The normal operation of the system is not simulated. Some of the investigated transients
assume that the make up system is used as emergency system. It is assumed that the operator uses the full
capacity of the system to inject water into primary side. The injection points can be seen in Figure 3.58.
The secondary side model comprises steam generator, feed water system ( FW, AFW, EFW ) , steam line
and valves. The deaerator system has also been simulated for a few cases (see Figure 3.60). The feed water
line never used during steady state calculations. Its sole purpose was to verify the feasibility of passive feed
of the steam generators using the operating pressure of the deaerator tanks. When the system was included
in the calculations, it was connected after loss the main feed water.
The secondary side of the four steam generators are, like the primary side, modeled equally, but sepa-
rately. The volumes (X stands for 6, 7, 8, and 9, meaning loop one, two, three and four respectively) X00
and X01 model the steam generator bottom, below the steam generator tubes. Three stacks of volumes (
X10, X20 and X30 ) model the SG heat exchanging region. X10 the outer “downcomer” region of the SG,
X20 and X30 are connected with heat structures to the primary side SG tubes. X20 models the region close
to the hot collector of the SG, X30 the region close to the cold collector. The volumes X11, X21, X31 and
X12, X35, X40 and X45 model the top of the SG. The volumes X50, X55 and X60 model the connection to
the main steam header, volumes X65, X70 and X75. Please refer to Figure 3.58 for details.
The main steam header connects to the main steam line, volume X80, X82, X84, X86 and X88, and
attached valves. The BRU-A valves, X90 are attached at X86, and discharge to the time dependent volume
X92. The BRU-A valves model can discharge at nominal opening pressure 250 kg/s of steam. Two safety
valves ( X94 and X72 ) are attached to the volumes X82 and X84. The main steam isolation valve, also
called fast acting isolation valve, connects to volume 997, which joins the four steam lines X88.
Comment on code models While it is questionable to what extend results of an experimental facility in
scale can be transferred to the plant, the UMAE (uncertainty method based on accuracy extrapolation) as-
sumes that the accuracy of code prediction can be extrapolated, provided that the same nodalisation approach
has been used for facility and plant. Therefore the basic choices on the use of code models for the plant is
the same one as the one adopted for the facility (please, refer to section 3.1).
This is true for the basic choices on Relap5 control volumes and junctions. Again, momentum flux cal-
culation between SG hot- and cold collector and SG-U-tubes has been restricted, and the vertically statified
flow model in the volumes simulating the U-tubes has been disabled. Reflood calculation has been turned
off.
The same model for critical heat flux calculation, the Groeneveld look-up table based method, has been
used.
Heat losses, on the other hand, are specific to the PSB-VVER facility, and are modeled differently in the
plant calculations. Mainly due to the difference in the volume to surface ratio heat losses play almost no role
in the plant. Heat structures are assumed to be isolated - no heat transfer to the environment is assumed.
Plant logic
A list of the most important systems to control the unit follows. The first table describes the status quo in
the Generic VVER1000 input deck, the second table the conditions present at Balakovo3
MSIV Main steam line isolation valve - fast acting isolation valve FAV
MSIV - one for each loop
Area (m2)
Set Point
During normal operation
Open/losure time (s)
Lay Out
0.2827 Closure logic open 1 steam line,
1 Pressure MSL < 4.9 MPa AND upstream
2 TSAT (coreout)− T (MSL) > 75
◦C AND BRU-K
3 T (coolant) > 200◦C
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BRU-A valves
One BRU-A valve for each loop:
Area (m2)
Set Point
Configuration during normal operation
Open and Closure time (s)
Lay Out
0.0415 open at 7.16 MPa closed < 16 steam line, upstream BRU-K
close at 6.28 MPa
SG safety valves MSSV/SV
SG safety valves, two for each loop:
Area (m2)
Set Point
Configuration during normal operation
Open and Closure time (s)
Lay Out
0.0299 open /close closed 1 steam line, upstream MSIV
1 open at 8.43 MPa
close at 6.86 MPa
2 open at 8.24 MPa
close at 6.86 MPa
BRU-K valves
Area (m2)
Set Point
Configuration during normal operation
Open and Closure time (s)
Lay Out
0.0415 open /close closed 16 steam line, downstream MSIV
open at 6.67 MPa
close at 5.59 MPa
Pressurizer relief and safety valves
Pressurizer PORV:
Area (m2)
Set Point
Configuration during normal operation
Open and Closure time (s)
Lay Out
0.078 open /close closed 1 discharge line
(1) open at 18.14 MPa
close at 17.26 MPa
(2) open at 18.63 MPa
close at 17.26 MPa
(1) via electromagnetic device
(2) via spring
Pressurizer safety valves:
Area (m2)
Set Point
Configuration during normal operation
Open and Closure time (s)
Lay Out
0.078 open /close closed 1 discharge line
SRV1 open at 19.03 MPa
close at 17.85 MPa
SRV2 open at 19.03 MPa
close at 17.85 MPa
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Reactor Scram signals:
Scram signals:
1 Power > 107% OR
2 Does not exist
3 SGlevel < 1.60m (∆SGlevel < −0.65m) OR
4 P (PS) > 17.65MPa(17.6MPa) OR
5 PRZlevel < 4.6m(maynotexist) OR
6 P (SG) > 7.84MPa in any of the four SGs OR
7 Does not exist
8 P (MSL) < 4.9MPa OR
AND
Tsat(coreout)− T (MSL) > 75◦C
9 T (HL) + 10◦C > Tsat(HL) in any HL OR
10 P (MCPupstream)− P (MCPdownstream) < 0.245 for any (running) MCP OR
11 P (coreout) < 13.73MPa OR
AND
T (HL) > 260◦C for any HL
12 T (HL) > 324◦C (+8◦C above nominal) (delay of 8s) OR
13 Power > 75% of nominal OR
AND
two (or more) MCPs tripped (6s/1.4s delay)
14 Power > 75% of nominal
AND
P (coreout) < 14.7MPa (14.51 Riskaudit)
SGs balakovo collapsed level 2.25, water mixture level 2.65. For all SCRAM signal 0.5s delay, plus 0.5s
for signal propagation time (total delay of 1s)
MCP Characteristics
Pump trips:
1 SGlevel < 1.75m(∆SGlevel < −0.5m) for each SG OR
2 P (MSL) < 4.1MPa
AND
Tsat(coreout)− T (MSL) > 75◦C
AND
T (coolant) > 200◦C
3 MSIV closing signal OR
4 SGlevel > 2.5(∆SGlevel > 0.25)
The logic for the trips of the MCPs was derived from the chapter "set-points and interlocks" from
Mikhalchuk [1997]. For the trip in question the report states that the signal YBF04(1,2,3) corresponds
to the MCP trips: 1-trip of MCP1, 2-trip of MCP2, 3-trip of MCP3 and 4. Further in the report it is stated
that YBF04(1,2,3) is composed from signals YZS01, and YBS03(1,2,3). YBS03(1,2,3) is connected with a
loss of pressure in the steam lines 1,2,3 and 4. See p.98 to p.121.
Feed water system (normal fw, auxiliary fw and emergency fw)
Feed water (2 pumps for all loops) logic: feed water is tripped when
1 SGlevel > 2.25m(∆SGlevel > 0.0m) OR
2 P (MSL) < 4.1MPa
AND
Tsat(coreout)− T (MSL) > 75◦C
Auxillary feed (2 pumps for all loops) water logic:
AFW activiation
1 SGlevel < 2.15m, (∆SGlevel < −0.1m)
AND
T in any of the loops > 150◦C
AFW stop
feed water level recovered
Emergency feed water, three independent trains:
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AFW activiation (three trains)
train 1: SGlevelinANY SG < 1.5m(∆SGlevel < −0.75m)
train 2: SGlevelinSG1ORSG4 < 1.5m(∆SGlevel < −0.75m)
train 3: SGlevelinSG2ORSG3 < 1.5m(∆SGlevel < −0.75m)
AFW stop
T (coolant) < 150◦C
Active ECCS Logic
HPIS:
activiation
Tsat − T (coolant) < 10◦C
AND
P < 10.8MPa
flow rate/train
11.0 MPa 0.0 kg/s
9.0 MPa 41.6 kg/s
0.1 MPa 69.3 kg/s
Water supply
Tank 15 m3 per train
Sump 500 m3 for all trains HPIS/LPIS
Injection point CL loop 1,3,4
LPIS:
activiation
Tsat − T (coolant) < 10◦C
AND
P < 2.5MPa
flow rate/train
2.5 MPa 27.8 kg/s
1.93 MPa 111.0 kg/s
0.1 MPa 212.0 kg/s
Water supply
Tank 15 m3 per train
Sump 500 m3 for all trains HPIS/LPIS
Injection point HL loop 1, Acc.line DC and UP
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Figure 3.58: Relap5 nodalisation scheme - loop
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Figure 3.59: Relap5 nodalisation scheme - pressurizer
Figure 3.60: Relap5 nodalisation scheme - feed water line and deaerator tanks
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3.2.2 Qualification of the nodalisation
Steady state qualification
One steady state calculation was run. The time from -100 to 0 designates the “official” steady state time, in
which several artificial systems to control the steady state are in use (e.g. a control variable for reactivity
control, two tmdpvols to control the level in the PRZ, one tmdpvol to control the initial pressure in the PS).
After 100s they are all switched off, and the calculation runs for further 900s on its own. A summary of
main parameters of the steady state calculation are reported in 3.25.
Parameter
Unit
VVER1000/320 input deck
Balakovo3
Difference
Comment
Power Mw 3000 3000 ± 60 0
Core inlet temperature ◦C 289 289.7 -1
Core Dtemperature ◦C 29 30 -1
Core outlet temperature ◦C 318 320 -2
Coolant pressure outlet
core
MPa 15.7 15.7 0 In UP
One loop flow rate m3/h 21717 21200 517 Core flowrate/4
Core flow rate m3/h 86871 84800
±4000
0
Pump rotation speed rev/min 995 995 0
PRZ pressure MPa 15.7 15.7 0
PRZ temperature ◦C 346 346 0
Pump flow rate m3/h 21717 21200 517 pump capacity
SG exchanged power MW 750 750 0
SG steam production kg/s 408 408 0
SG pressure MPa 6.3 6.27 0.03
SG steam temperature ◦C 278 279 -1
FW temperature ◦C 220 220 0
Table 3.25: Parameters of the steady state calculation
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On transient qualification
Test No 4 (not of the TACIS project, but of the PSB-OECD project) was used as Kv-scaled analysis for the
on-transient qualification. Test No 4 OECD-PSB-Project simulates a SBLOCA in the CL. The following
chapter is quoted from Cherubini et al. [2005]:
A requirement of the UMAE methodology constituted by the ’demonstration of similarity’ block k in
figure 1. The available qualified nodalisation of the VVER1000 NPP must be capable of simulating the
selected transient. This requirement is relevant in order to applied the nodalisation to the selected transient
in nominal condition and to use the extrapolation of the accuracy (this phase is not the scope of this paper).
A Kv-scaled calculation is carried out with the following steps:
1. calculation of the Kv-ratio considering the primary system volumes of the concerned facilities or
plants;
2. achievement of steady state in the NPP nodalisation, ’scaling’ the relevant quantities on the basis of
the related values;
3. performing the Kv-scaled calculation with the scaled boundary conditions, comparison between cal-
culated and reference (experimental in this case) data and conclusion about the acceptability of the
results.
The results of step one shows that the generic VVER1000 primary system is 300 times bigger than PSB
primary system volume. This value is used for scaling, to preserve the break area and the ratio of core power
over primary system volume. Given the consideration above mentioned initial and boundary conditions are
strictly derived from the corresponding parameters of the considered test in the PSB facility. It must be
stressed that this step has been fulfilled easily because the PSB is a VVER simulator scaled 1 to 300.
The steady state conditions (step two), envisaged by the target values of the ’Kv-scaled’ calculation, have
been reached running a transient calculation for 100 s. During this time the various time trends are stabi-
lized before starting the CL-4.1-03 test in VVER1000. The relevant results regarding initial and boundary
conditions of the experiment and of NPP calculation are given in table 3, where the values reported in the
fifth column are related to the end of steady state.
The main results of step three are given in table 4 and 5. A systematic procedure consisting in the
identification of phenomena and of Relevant Thermal-hydraulic Aspect (RTA) has been applied. In details:
• subdivision of the considered transient into "phenomenological windows" (i.e. time spans in which a
unique relevant physical process mostly occurs and a limited set of parameters controls the scenario):
phenomena consequent to the physical process characterize each phenomenological window;
• for each Ph. W. the identification of the RTA (events or phenomena consequent to the physical process
and characteristic of each transient) and the selection of the parameters characterizing the RTA have
been taken into account;
• qualitative analysis of results obtained by evaluating and ranking the comparison between measured
and calculated values.
The qualitative analysis, is based on five levels of judgment (E, R, M, U and -) whose meaning is essen-
tially derived from a visual observation of the experimental and predicted trends:
E the code predicts qualitatively and quantitatively the parameter (Excel-
lent - the calculation is within experimental data uncertainty band);
R the code predicts qualitatively, but not quantitatively the parameter
(Reasonable - the calculation shows only correct behavior and trends);
M the code does not predict the parameter, but the reason is understood
and predictable (Minimal - the calculation lie within experimental data
uncertainty band and sometimes does not have correct trends);
U the code does not predict the parameter and the reason is not understood
(Unqualified - calculation does not show correct trend and behavior,
reasons are unknown and unpredictable)”.
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N. Parameter/System Unit PSB VVER1000
CL-4.1-03 test Dem. of Similarity
1 Primary system volume m3 1.23 370 (1)
2 Break:
- area m2 7.85E-5 2.355E-2
- CL with
PRZ
CL with PRZ
- Ar/V m−1 6.38E-5 6.36E-5
3 Primary system:
- HL temperature ◦C 308-311 309
- CL temperature ◦C 282-283 283
- mass flow rate kg/s 7.9 2416
- GLoop/Core power kg/s/MW 6.99 7.12
4 PRZ
- pressure MPa 15.6 15.7
- level m 4.94 4.95
5 Core
- initial power MW 1.130 339
- decay power - - -
- ∆T ◦C 27 26
- average linear power KW/m 1.905 1.878
- core power/vol. MW/ m3 0.919 0.916
6 SG SS:
- pressure MPa 6.93-6.88 6.88
- SL flow rate Kg/s 0.11 (1) 34 (1)
- DC level m 2.48-2.52 2.00(2)
- FW temperature ◦C 170 170
- GFW/Core power kg/s/MW -3 -3
- MSIV closure - - -
- FW stop - 13MPa(4) 13MPa(4)
- SRV set point MPa 7.4 7.4
7 Accumulators:
- no. - 2 2
- position - DC DC
- total volume m3 0.2 60
- pressure MPa 4.08-4.14 4.1
- liquid mass kg 157 47000
- liquid mass/PS vol. kg/m3 127.6 127.0
- total vol./PS vol. - 0.162 0.162
- temperature ◦C 26-32 25
- isolation - Lev.=1.3m Tot. M=36tons
8 LPIS:
- no. - 3 3
- position - CL 1, 3, 4 CL 1, 3, 4
- fluid temperature ◦C - 50
- delivered flow rate kg/s 0.248 -1
- flow rate/PS volume kg/s/m3 0.20 -
- actuatuion set point - CL T = 500◦C CL T = 500◦C
9 HPIS and AFW - not active not active
10 Reactor coolant pump:
- trip - 13MPa(1) 13MPa(1)
- coastdown - 4 s 4 s
11 SCRAM - 13MPa(1) 13MPa(1)
12 CMT, PRHR and RHR - - -
13 TEST END s 2591 2694
Table 3.26: Relap5 nodalisation qualification - key parameters
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UNIT EXP VVER
CALC
Judg.
VVER
RTA: Pressurizer empting
TSE emptying time s 10 13 R
scram time s 57.6 63 E
IPA integrated flow from SL (from 0 up to
emptying)
kg - - -
RTA: Steam generators secondary side behaviour
TSE main steam line valve closure s 17.5 10 R
difference between PS and SS MPa 0.33 0.27 E
pressure at 100 s
SVP SG level: m
end of subcooled blowdown 2.44;2.44; 2.11;2.11; R
2.49;2.38 2.12;2.01
- when PS pres. equals SS pres. 2.43;2.44; 2.12;2.12; R
2.49;2.37 2.13;2.05
- when ACC starts 2.40;2.41; 2.13;2.13; R
2.47;2.33 2.13;2.05
- when LPIS starts 2.35;2.26; 2.09;2.10; R
2.34;2.30 2.10;2.02
SVP SG pressure MPa
- at end of subcooled blowdown 7.31;7.34; 7.28;7.28; E
7.36;7.31 7.28;7.28
- when PS pres. equals SS pres. 7.30;7.34; 7.28;7.28; E
7.37;7.30 7.28;7.28
- when ACC starts 6.79;6.81; 7.12;7.12; R
6.83;6.79 7.12;7.12
- when LPIS starts 5.36;5.39; 6.61;6.61; R
5.41;5.37 6.61;6.61
RTA: Subcooled blowdown
TSE upper plenum in sat. conditions s 16 24 R
break two phase flow s 113 147 R
IPA break flow up to 30 s kg 183.7 38768 M
RTA: First dryout occurrence
TSE time of dry out s 97 - -
range of dry out occurrence at various
core levels
s 97 - 102 - -
peak cladding temperature K 589 - -
SVP average linear power kW/m 1.416 - -
maximum linear power kW/m 1.416 - -
core power / primary mass kW/kg 2.01 - -
IPA integral of dry out at 2/3 of core height K s - - -
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 47.6 - -
time of loop seal clearing s 109 - -
loop 1&4
RTA: Rewet by loop seal clearing
TSE range of rewet occurrence s 102 - 107 - -
time when rewet is completed s 109 - -
TSE PS pressure equal to SS pressure s 150 149 E
SVP break flow at 200 s kg/s - 317.5 -
break flow at 1000 s - 35.9 -
IPA integrated flow (200 - 1000 s) kg 236.52 62878 R
RTA: Mass distribution in primary side
TSE time of minimum mass occurrence s 430 325 M
2430 2570 R
SVP minimum primary side mass kg 171.3 40458 R
140.6 27068 M
av. linear power at min. mass kW/m 0.304 0.27 R
continued on next page
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UNIT EXP VVER
CALC
Judg.
VVER
RTA: Second dryout occurrence
TSE time of dry out s 405 236 M
range of dry out occurrence at various
core levels
s 401-478 236-315 M
peak cladding temperature K 590 723 M
SVP average linear power kW/m 0.425 0.628 M
core power / primary mass kW/kg 1.41 2.09 M
IPA integral of dry out at 2/3 of core height K - - -
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 21.6 22.9 E
RTA: Accumulators behavior
TSE accumulators injection starts s 406 - 414 325 R
accumulators injection stops s 1365- 1452 1230 R
IPA total mass delivered by accumulators kg - - -
NDP minimum mass/initial mass % 20.7 17.1 R
primary mass (acc. start)/initial mass % 21.3 17.1 R
RTA: Final dryout occurrence
TSE time of dry out s 2077 2171 E
range of dry out occurrence at various
core levels
s 2077-2313 2171-2540 R
peak cladding temperature K 783 855 R
SVP average linear power kW/m 0.304 0.274 R
rate of rod temperature increase K/s 0.8 1.1 R
core power / primary mass kW/kg 1.06 1.356 M
IPA integral of dry out at 2/3 of core height K s - - -
NDP primary mass / initial mass % 20.6 15.4 R
RTA: LPIS intervention
TSE LPIS start s 2432 2565 R
range of rewet occurrence s 2482-2518 2570 R
final rewetting s 2559 2620 E
IPA integrated flow from start to end of rewet kg 96.7 9687 M
NDP primary mass (LPIS start)/initial mass % 16.8 11.7 R
Table 3.27: Relevant thermalhydraulic aspects on-transient qualification
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Figure 3.61: KV scaled calculation, OECD test No3, primary pressure
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
 500
 550
 0  500  1000  1500  2000  2500
T
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
 [
d
e
g
 C
]
Time [s]
Hot rod temperature
YC01T11 - experimental trend
httemp19041114 - Relap5 KV scaled
Figure 3.62: KV scaled calculation, OECD test No3, hot rod temperature
163
3.2. NODALISATION CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
3.2.3 Matrix of performed calculations
Please refer to Table 3.28 to see an overview on all presented calculations using the code Relap5. An
Appendix to the present work reports a bigger number of parameters for each of the calculations.
No Initiating
event/type
ECCS used ECCS
unavailable
Operator actions
1 Loss of all
feed water
(LOFW)
4 SITs All trains
HHPIS,
HPIS
Full opening of BRU-A 1 and
4, closing MSIV 2 and 3, sup-
ply of 10kg/s into SG 1 and 4
2 Loss of all
feed water
(LOFW)
4 SITs All trains
HHPIS,
HPIS
1.) Full opening of BRU-A 1
and 4, closing MSIV 2 and 3,
supply of 10kg/s into SG 1 and
4
2.) Manual opening and clos-
ing of the PORV based on the
available saturation margin
3∗ PORV
stuck open
(SBLOCA)
all HHPIS,
HPIS, all
SITs
none none (initial conditions hot
standby)
4 Cold leg
break loop
No 4 with
equivalent
diameter
of 70mm
(SBLOCA)
4 SITS, All
trains LPIS
All trains
HHPIS,
HPIS
Cooldown of PS via SS by fully
opening BRU-A valves of SG 1
and SG 4 after core exit temper-
ature exceeds 350◦C
5 Main steam
line break
and simul-
tanious
double-
endend
guillotine
break of
one steam
generator
tube in loop
4 (PRISE)
all trains of
LPIS, SITs
all trains of
HHPIS and
HPIS
after 30min isolating of SITs,
primary depressurization by
opening the PORV, cool down
(60◦C /h) of primary with
BRU-A valves
6 total loss of
feed water
(LOFW)
two trains
of HPIS, all
SITs and
all trains of
LPIS
failure of one
train HPIS,
all trains
HHPIS
On ∆ SG level < 0.9m from
nominal depressurize the PS by
fully opening the PORV
7 loss of off-
and on site
power - full
station black
out (SBO)
SITs, fire
brigade
trucks
all active sys-
tems (only
power from
batteries
available
depressurization of all four SG
and supply of feed water from
fire brigade trucks after core
outlet temp. exceeds 350◦C
8 small break
equivalent to
a diameter
of 60mm
in cold leg
of loop 4
(SBLOCA)
SITs failure of
all trains of
HPIS
No accident management
continued on next page
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No Initiating
event/type
ECCS used ECCS
unavailable
Operator actions
9 primary to
secondary
leak equiv-
alent to 100
mm - SG
header break,
BRU-A stuck
open after
first opening
HPIS, SITS none after 30 min two trains of HPIS
switched off, SITS isolated,
cool down of primary via sec-
ondary with 60◦C /h
after 45 min last train
HPIS switched off, make-
up switched on
11 small break
equivalent to
a diameter
of 70 mm
in cold leg
of loop 4
(SBLOCA)
SITS, LPIS,
HPIS after 30
min
initial failure
of all HPIS
pumps
recovery of one train of HPIS
(injecting into loop 4), cool
down of primary via secondary
with a rate of 30◦C /h
12 small break
in loop No 4
equivalent to
70 mm
HHPIS and
make up
failure of
all trains of
LPIS and
HPIS
after 30 min cool down of pri-
mary via secondary with 30◦C
/h, switching on of HHPIS and
make up
Table 3.28: Overview on presented Relap5 calculations.
3.3 LOFW and SBO
The section contains three loss of all sources of feed water sequences, and one station black out sequence.
The station black out in the first phase is also characterized by high pressure in the primary side and a
challange to the heat removal from the primary by the secondary side, therefore it was included in this
section.
3.3.1 Scenario 1
Initiating event is a total loss of feed water. The all trains of HPIS are considered to fail, LPIS and accu-
mulators are available. Accident management consists in SS depressurization: the operator isolates SG2 and
SG3 by MSIV closure, depressurizes SG1 and SG4 to supply water with a flow rate of 10 kg/s at 1 MPa into
SG1 and SG4. The accident management is considered to be successful if the core exit coolant temperature
decreases to 300 ◦C .
First 100s: the imposed initial event is a LOFW. FW, AFW and EFW fail at time 0 s, the TSV closes
at the same time. A rapid increase in the SS pressure is the immediate result. Since the BRU-K valves
are assumed to be not operational, the set point of the BRU-A valves opening is reached after 3 s. The PS
pressure follows, and the spray line fully opens after 3 s. The BRU-A valves have a capacity of 250 kg/s
of steam, which is lower than the 408 kg/s of steam usually produced by each SG. So only a fraction of the
produced heat is removed, which leads to an increase in the PS temperature at the SG outlet of almost 10 ◦C
. This in turns leads to a negative reactivity feedback due to the reduced moderator density and a reduction
in power of almost 30%. A rapid decrease in the PS pressure occurs after 13 s, the spray line closes and after
14 - 15 s all groups of the pressurizer heaters are switched off. At 46 - 47 s the MCPs are tripped on a low
level signal of the steam generators (0.5 m less than the nominal level), the reactor SCRAM follows at 48 s
(All MCP tripped, scram with 1s delay for signal propagation time).
100s up to the AM: the upper part of the SG tubes are uncovered, thus the heat exchange (PS to SS) is
here reduced almost to zero. The SG outlet temperature is a result of the mixture of the hotter coolant from
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the upper part of the SG, and the lower part, which is cooled to the SS saturation temperature. So the PS
temperature at the SG outlet is increasing constantly, its rate depends on how many SG tubes are uncovered.
A nodalisation effect can be seen here - if one looks closely on the primary side pressure, one can detect
a step-wise pressure increase (which, as analysis showed, corresponds to the event when the SG-SS level
drops below one of the SG-tube-bundle simulations). The increasing of the PS pressure causes the increase
of PS temperature. Between 280 and 325 s the four groups of the PRZ heaters are switched off and at 555 s
the PORV opens and starts to cycle.
From accident management to the end of the transient: at 3530 s the core exit temperature reaches 350 ◦C
and the operator starts the accident management. The MSIV valves of SG2 and SG3 are closed to isolate
them, while the BRU-A valves for SG1 ad SG4 are fully opened soon after. An external sources (e.g. Fire
brigade trucks) are connected to the feed water lines of SG1 and SG4 and supply feedwater having a flow rate
of 10 kg/s into each SG up to 1 MPa. The tested countermeasure is effective in reducing the PS temperature
and pressure. Namely after 7700 s the core outlet temperature drops below 300 ◦C , which was set as criteria
for successful accident management.
No Event Time (s)
1 LOFW (FW, AFW, EFW) and closure of the TSV 0
2 First opening of the BRU-A valves (failure of the BRU-K valves
assumed)
3
3 spray line opens 3
4 spray line closes 13
5 prz heaters group 1 switched on 14
6 prz heaters group 2,3,4 switched on 15
7 MCP 1 trip (on SG low level) 46
8 MCP 2,3,4 trip (on SG low level) 47
9 scram (4 pumps tripped, 1s delay) 48
10 switch off PRZ heaters group 3 280 - 285
11 switch off PRZ heaters group 2,4 310 - 315
12 switch off PRZ heaters group 1 320 - 325
13 beginning of PORV cycling 555
14 core exit temperature reaches 350 ◦C 3530
AM strategy: SG 1 and 4 refilled, SG 2 and 3 isolated
15 switch on PRZ heaters group 1,3 4400
16 switch on PRZ heaters group 2,4 4410
17 switch off PRZ heaters group 1,2,3,4 (low level PRZ) 7350 - 7400
18 core outlet temperature drops below 300oC 7700
Table 3.29: Resulting events, test 1
3.3.2 Scenario 2
Short description of the test: Initiating event is a total loss of feed water and all the trains of HPIS are con-
sidered to fail. On the contrary LPIS and accumulators are available. The AM consists in SS depressuriza-
tion, followed by PS depressurization: the operator isolates SG 2 and SG 3 by MSIV closure, depressurizes
SG 1 and SG 4 supplying water with a flow rate of 10 kg/s at 1 MPa (into SG 1 and SG 4). This action should
decrease the PS pressure below 16 MPa and the PS coolant temperature down to 300 ◦C . When this plant
state is reached the operator opens the PORV to accelerate the PS depressurization. The saturation margin
at the core exit is used as set-point for the PORV operation. The accident management is considered to be
successful when the core exit coolant temperature drops below 200 ◦C .
First 100s: The initial phase develops exately as in test 1, section 3.3.1. The imposed initial event is a
LOFW. FW, AFW and EFW fail at time 0 s, the TSV closes at the same time. A rapid increase in the SS
pressure is the immediate result. Since the BRU-K valves are assumed to be not operational, the set point of
the BRU-A valves opening is reached after 3 s. The PS pressure follows, and the spray line fully opens after
3 seconds. The BRU-A valves have a capacity of 250 kg/s of steam, which is lower than the 408 kg/s of
steam usually produced by each SG. So only a fraction of the produced heat is removed, which leads to an
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Figure 3.63: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 1
increase in the PS temperature at the SG outlet of almost 10 ◦C . This in turns leads to a negative reactivity
feedback due to the reduced moderator density and a reduction in power of almost 30%. A rapid decrease in
the PS pressure occurs after 13 s, the spray line closes and after 14 - 15 s all groups of the pressurizer heaters
are switched off. At 46 - 47 s the MCPs are tripped on a low level signal of the steam generators (0.5 m
less than the nominal level), the reactor SCRAM follows at 48 s (All MCPs tripped, scram with 1s delay for
signal propagation time).
100 s up to the AM: the upper part of the SG tubes are uncovered, thus the heat exchange (PS to SS) is
here reduced almost to zero. The SG outlet temperature is a result of the mixture of the hotter coolant from
the upper part of the SG, and the lower part, which is cooled to the SS saturation temperature. So the PS
temperature at the SG outlet is increasing constantly, its rate depends on how many SG tubes are uncovered.
Between 280 and 325 s the four groups of the PRZ heaters are switched off and at 555 s the PORV opens
and starts to cycle.
From the AM to the end of the transient: at 3530 s the core exit temperature reaches 350 ◦C and
the operator starts the accident management. The MSIV valves of SG 2 and SG 3 are closed to isolate
them, while the BRU-A valves of the SG 1 and SG 4 are fully opened soon after. An external sources (e.g.
Fire brigade trucks) are connected to the feed water lines of SG 1 and SG 4 and supply feedwater having a
flow rate of 10 kg/s into each SG up to 1 MPa. The tested countermeasure is effective in reducing the PS
temperature and pressure. Namely after 7650 s the core outlet temperature drops below 300 ◦C , the PS
pressure drops below 16 MPa thus the second part of the AM strategy is actuated. The PORV is openend, at
7900 s the PS saturation margin above the core drops below 15 ◦C and the PORV is closed. The PORV is
opened and closed again at 9500 s and 9950 s respectively and again at 11200 s and 11600 s. At this time
the PS pressure drops below 6 MPa, the set point for the HA injection. The PORV is opened for the last time
at 13700 s, at about 14000 s the core exit temperature is below 200 ◦C and the LPIS starts to inject. The
calculation is stopped after 20000 s.
3.3.3 Scenario 6
Short characterization of the test: Initial event is a total loss of feed water. All ECCS are considered to be
available. As accident management the operator opens the PORV when the core exit temperature increases to
310 ◦C , but not earlier than 1800 s. The measure is successful if the core exit coolant temperature decreases
below 200 ◦C .
First 100 s: Also Test 6 repeats, due to the same conditions at the The imposed initial event is a LOFW.
167
3.3. LOFW AND SBO CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
No Event Time (s)
1 LOFW (FW, AUX FW, EFW) and closure of the TSV 0
2 First opening of the BRU-A valves (failure of the BRU-K valves
assumed)
3
3 Spray line open 3
4 Spray line closure 13
5 PRZ heaters group 1 swtiched on 14
6 PRZ heaters group 2,3,4 switched on 15
7 MCP 1 trip (on SG low level) 46
8 MCP 2,3,4 trip (on SG low level) 47
9 Scram (4 pumps tripped, 1s delay) 48
10 Switch off PRZ heaters group 3 280 - 285
11 Switch off PRZ heaters group 2,4 310 - 315
12 Switch off PRZ heaters group 1 320 - 325
13 Beginning of PORV cycling 555
14 Core exit temperature reaches 350 ◦C 3530
AM strategy: SG1 and 4 refilled, SG2 and 3 isolated
15 Switch on PRZ heaters group 1,3 4400
16 Switch on PRZ heaters group 2,4 4410
17 Switch off PRZ heaters group 1,2,3,4 (low level PRZ) 7350 - 7400
18 Core outlet temperature drops below 300 ◦C 7650
operator opens the PORV
19 Saturation margin 15 ◦C, PORV closed 7900
20 Saturation margin 30 ◦C, PORV opened 9500
21 Saturation margin 15 ◦C, PORV closed 9950
22 Saturation margin 30 ◦C, PORV opened 11200
23 Accumulators injection 11500
24 Saturation margin 15 ◦C, PORV closed 11600
25 Saturation margin 30 ◦C, PORV opened 13150
26 Core exit temperature less than 200 ◦C 13700
27 LPIS start to inject 14000
28 Calculation stop 20000
Table 3.30: Resulting events, test 2
FW, AFW and EFW fail at time 0 s. The TSV closes at the same time. A rapid increase in the SS pressure
is the immediate result. Since the BRU-K valves are assumed to be not operational, the set point of the
BRU-A valves is reached after 3 s and the BRU-A valves open. The PS pressure follows, and the spray line
fully opens after 3 seconds. The BRU-A valves have a capacity of 250 kg/s of steam, which is lower than
the 408 kg/s which are usually produced. So only a fraction of the produced heat is removed, which leads
to an increase in the PS-SG outlet temperature of almost 10 ◦C . This in turns leads to a negative reactivity
feedback due to the reduced moderator density and a reduction in power of almost 30 %. A rapid decrease
in the PS pressure is the result. after 13 s the spray line closes and after 14-15 s all groups of the pressurizer
heaters are switched off. At 46-47 s the MCPs are tripped on a low level signal of the steam generators
(0.5 m less than the nominal level) - reactor SCRAM follows at 48 s (All MCPs tripped, scram with 1s delay
for signal propagation time).
100 s up to accident management: The upper part of the SG - U-tubes are uncovered. The heat
exchange PS to SS here is reduced to almost zero. The SG outlet temperature is a result of the mixture of
the hotter coolant from the upper part of the SG, and the lower part, which is cooled to the SS saturation
temperature. So the temperature of the PS SG outlet is increasing constantly, with a rate increasing depending
on how many of the SG U-tubes are uncovered.
From accident management to the end of the transient: After 30 minutes the operator decides to
depressurize the PS by opening the PORV. At the same time he switches off the PRZ heaters. The aim is
to decrease the PS pressure below the set point of the HPIS. Two trains of HPIS are available - train No 2
and No 3. At 2200 s the set point for the HPIS is reached and train 2 and 3 start to inject. At 2800 s the
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Figure 3.64: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 2
HPIS tanks are empty, and supply is switched to the sump. The HPIS helps to further cool down and thereby
depressurize the PS, so that at 4800 s the HA start to inject. The pressure stays constant near to the HA set
point, while at 6800 s the core outlet temperature drops below 180 ◦C .
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.65
3.3.4 Scenario 7
Short characterization of the test: Initial event is a station blackout. Only passive ECCS is available (the
accumulators). After the rod cladding temperature rises up to 350 ◦C the operator depressurizes SG 1 and
SG 4, and isolates SG 2 and SG 3 as accident management. Water supply from an external source starts
with a flow rate of 20 kg/s into SG 1. Should the temperature increase of the cladding proceed up to 400 ◦C
despite of this measure, the operator splits the total available amount of feed water flow equally to SG 1 and
SG 4. The accident management is considered to be successful if the process stabilizes (PORV no longer
cycling, primary pressure stagnating or decreasing).
First 100 s: The initiating event is a loss of off- and on site power (station blackout). So reactor SCRAM,
closure of the TSV, MCP trip, loss of all sources of feed water occurs at 0 s. Due to the coast down time of
the pumps (232 s) the SG remove more power than the scrammed reactor produces for the first 75 s. The PS
temperature pressure and temperature drop. The SG levels start to decrease.
100 s up to accident management: The upper part of the SG - U-tubes are uncovered. The heat
exchange PS to SS here is reduced to almost zero. The SG outlet temperature is a result of the mixture of
the hotter coolant from the upper part of the SG, and the lower part, which is cooled to the SS saturation
temperature. So the temperature of the PS SG outlet is increasing constantly, with a rate increasing depending
on how many of the SG U-tubes are uncovered. After 2890 s the PS pressure increases to the set point of the
PORV (start of PORV cycling). After 5000 s the SG level drops below 15cm, which marks the beginning of
the U-tubes.
From accident management to the end of the transient: After 5650 s the cladding temperature in
the upper part of the core exceeds 350 ◦C . This is a sign for the operator to take action: SG 2 and SG 3
are isolated, SG 1 and SG 4 are depressurized. Feed water from mobile pumps (fire brigade trucks) with a
flow rate of 20 kg/s are furnished into SG 1. This measure is successful in reverting the temperature trend:
the PS temperature starts to decrease, so does the PS pressure. After 20000 s (end of calculation) the PS
temperature at the core outlet is about 170 ◦C , the PS pressure about 8 MPa.
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No Event Time (s)
1 LOFW (FW, AUX FW, EFW) and closure of the TSV 0
2 First opening of the BRU-A valves (failure of the BRU-K valves
assumed)
3
3 spray line opens 3
4 spray line closes 13
5 prz heaters group 1 swtiched on 14
6 prz heaters group 2,3,4 switched on 15
7 MCP 1 trip (on SG low level) 46
8 MCP 2,3,4 trip (on SG low level) 47
9 scram (4 pumps tripped, 1s delay) 48
10 switch off PRZ heaters group 3 280-285
11 switch off PRZ heaters group 2,4 310-315
12 switch off PRZ heaters group 1 320-325
13 beginning of PORV cycling 555
14 beginning of operator action: opening of porv 1800
15 HPIS supplying to loop 3 and 4 start to inject 2200
15 HPIS tanks are empty, supply is switched to the sump 2800
17 Accumulators start to inject 4800
18 Core outlet temperature less than 180oC 6800
Table 3.31: Resulting events, test 6
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.66.
No Event Time (s)
1 Loss of on- and offsite power. Scram, closure of TSV, MCP trip,
loss of all feed water
0
2 BRU-A valves open for the first time 4
3 first opening of the PORV 2890
4 SG1,SG2,SG3,SG4 level drops below 15cm (no U-tubes) 5000
5 peak cladding temperature exceeds 350oC , operator isolates SG2,
SG3, and depressurizes SG1 and SG4 after. Feed water with a flow
rate of 20kg/s is furnsihed into SG1
5650
6 last opening of PORV 5950
7 Core outlet temperature is less than 200oC 16620
8 pressurizer empty 17700
9 End of calculation 20000
Table 3.32: Resulting events, test 7
Influence of the SG model: Scenario 7 shows a numerical effect - the influence of the detail in the SG
Relap5 model on the calculation ([Muellner et al., 2008]). Dominant phenomena during the first phase of the
accident is the heat transfer from primary to secondary system. The VVER-1000 Relap5 model divides the
SG-U-tubes in six vertical levels. Each level is represented by one (horizontal) Relap5 pipe-component (with
18 subvolumes), which is connected to two (vertical) pipe-components on the secondary side. The secondary
side of the SG is modelled by two pipes with six subvolumes (one for each level) which are connected to the
primary system, one to the first 12 sub-volumes of the SG-U-tubes, one to the sub-volumes 13-18, the hot-
and cold riser. A third pipe of six subvolumes models the SG downcomer (to allow for recirculation). The
three pipes lead at the top in the SG dome, and are joint by one branch component at the bottom.
During a station blackout primary system parameters stay relatively stable, while the SG secondary side
inventory boils off. Once the SG U-tubes are uncovered, the heat transfer surface between primary and
secondary side decrease. This means, that part of the primary coolant passes through SG U-tubes which are
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Figure 3.65: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 6
completely uncovered (and is therefore not cooled). At the steam generator outlet coolant from covered and
uncovered SG U-tubes is mixed, and the SG-outlet temperature will be dependend on the relation of covered
to uncovered U-tubes. One would expect a continuous process of ps coolant increase and SG-level decrease.
However, this is not what the calculation result is showing. If one looks close on the primary system
pressure for the first phase of the transient (until opening of the PORV), one can identify six steps of pressure
increase (corresponding to the six levels of the SG). To understand the both, the physical phenomena and how
it is simulated by the code, the SG model has been cut out from the whole nodalisation, and an investigation
on heat transfer primary to secondary has been made. The following two paragraphs aim to explain where
the effect comes from, to estimate what might be the physical situation, and to quantify the difference to the
calculated results.
Heuristic approach To analyze the main phenomena (the heat transfer primary to secondary) during the
first hours of an SBO, a number of simplifying assumptions have been made.
Main intrest was on the effect of the SG-model in a bulk-properties code on the heat transfer. The
conditions, that were established 500 s after beginning of the calculation in scenario 7, have been taken as
boundary conditions for a reduced input, modeling just a single loop. The nodalisation of just a single loop
can be seen in Figure 3.69, the boundary conditions (line 1-3, line 4 and 5 are for information) in Table 3.33).
No Parameter Unit Value
1 Loop flow rate kg/s 200
2 Loop pressure between SG and MCP MPa 15
3 Loop temperature upstream SG ◦C 300
4 Core power MW 80
5 Feed water needed kg/s 10-15
Table 3.33: BC for analysis
The small set-up should be sufficient to study the dominant phenomena during the initial phase of a
station black out in a NPP with a horizontal type SG, i.e. the declining heat transfer in time.
At first a heuristic analysis of the situation should give an idea what is to be expected. Figure 3.67 shows
the situation. One can assume a more or less constant mass flow in natural circulation regime for several
thousands of seconds once the coast down of the pumps is complete. For simplicity, the temperature of the
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Figure 3.66: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 7
fluid at the core outlet is also assumed to be constant. This is not the case in a “real” SBO, but allows to
study the phenomena. So for the primary side one can assume a given mass flow m˙ps and specific enthalpy
hpsin upstream of the SG.
During normal operation, all SG tubes are covered with water from the secondary side. Once the feed
water is lost, the level on the secondary side of the SG will start to drop, and the SG tubes will uncover.
One can assume that the heat exchange PS to SS takes place only in the SG-tubes, and can neglect the SG
hot- and cold header. If the SG-tubes are covered with water on the secondary side, the primary fluid will
cool down to the saturation temperature of the secondary side (natural circulation). If the SG-tubes are not
covered with water, their contribution to the heat exchange again is neglible - due to the low heat capacity of
steam. The only significant contribution to heat exchange will come from the SG-tubes covered with water
- the specific enthalpy at the end of the SG-tubes is designated with hpsout.
The number of SG-tubes covered with water is proportional to the Volume of feed water still available at
the secondary side. This means, the flow that passes through the SG-tubes covered with water, and further
the total heat removed by the SG secondary side can be approximately described as
m˙pstc = m˙
ps ·
V
V2m
(3.1)
P = m˙ps ·
V
V2m
(hpsout − h
ps
in) = m˙
ps ·
V
V2m
·∆hps (3.2)
m˙pstc Total mass flow of primary side coolant through SG-tubes covered with wa-
ter on the secondary side
m˙ps Total loop primary side mass flow
V Volume of secondary side liquid fluid
V2m Volume of secondary side liquid fluid, at which all SG-tubes are covered,
corresponding to a level of 2 m (nominal collapsed level is 2.25 m)
P Exchanged power
The Power is removed by the secondary by boiling off the still available feed water, which is then released
to the environment through the BRU-A valves as steam:
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P = m˙sg (hsgout − h
sg
in) = m˙
sg ·∆hss (3.3)
The decrease in volume of the secondary side fluid is equal to the mass leaving the SG, so
ρfw · V˙ = −m˙sg (3.4)
Resolving equation 3.3 for m˙sg , substituting P from equation 3.2, and substituting finally for m˙sg in
equation 3.4 leads to
V˙ = −V
(
m˙ps
ρfw · V2m
·
∆hps
∆hss
)
= −V
(
m˙ps
M2m
·
∆hps
∆hss
)
= −kV (3.5)
Which, assuming that at t = 0 the level in the SG is equal to 2 m, leads to a rough estimate for the
decrease of SG side inventory according to p
V (t) = V2m · e
−k·t (3.6)
The relation between SG liquid level and SG liquid volume unfortunately can not be written in an easy
way (assuming the SG is a cylinder). With L being the SG length, l the level, r the radius
V = L
(
r2 · arccos
(
r − l
r
)
− (r − l)
√
2rl − l2
)(
1−
V pstubes
V ∗2m
)
(3.7)
The formula was checked against real-plant data from Balakovo3 [Mikhalchuk, 1997]. So in the end,
the heuristic approximation for the level in time will be an implicit equation. Substituting numbers for all
quantities leads to the equation
55.16 m3 ·e−4.04·10
−4s−1·t = 11.4m
(
4 m2 · arccos
(
2m− l
2m
)
− (2m− l)
√
2m · l − l2
)
·0.77 (3.8)
r 2 m
L 11.4 m
m˙ps 200 kg/s
M2m 37 tons
V2m 55.16 m
3 without volume occupied by PS in SS
V ∗2m 71.5 m
3 half of SG volume
∆hss 1.5528 MJ/kg
∆hps 0.1160 MJ/kg
k 4.04 · 10−4 s−1
V PStubes 23.4 m
3
Figure 3.68 shows a plot of function 3.8. To have also the exchanged power, one simply substitutes the
result 3.6 into 3.4 and further into 3.3:
P (t) = −M2m∆h
sske−kt = 23MW · e−4.04·10
−4s−1t (3.9)
Numeric analysis In the current analysis, the horizontal steam generators are modelled with six levels for
heat transfer. The U-tubes are during station black out conditions the primary side shows a more or less
constant mass flow and stays subcooled, while secondary side mass inventory is still available. The water
still available on the secondary side boils off in the course of two to three hours.
The situation described in the heuristic considerations is now analysed using the code Relap5.A nodali-
sation with six, three and one level for the steam-generator U-tubes has been set up.
173
3.3. LOFW AND SBO CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
Figure 3.67: SG heat transfer, heuristic
On the primary side inlet (hot leg) a flow rate of 200 kg/s at a temperature of 300 ◦C has been imposed.
At the outlet of the SG a pressure of 15.0 MPa has been imposed. On the secondary side the SG is filled up
to the nominal level with water. Feed water was injected up to 500 s (10-15 kg/s) to keep the level constant,
and then switched off (steady state time). In the Cathare calculations no feed water has been injected. A
pressure of 6.27 MPa has been imposed at the end of the volumes simulating the steam line.
In real physics, the drop of the liquid level in the steam generator, the decrease of heat transfer area
and the deterioraton of the heat transfer are continuous processes. A TH-SYS code, on the other hand, will
typically model the secondary side with volumes of 0.25 m to 0.5 m height. The heat transfer correlations are
chosen depending on the bulk properties of the volumes (see Section 2.4.1. The conditions during a station
black out are such that the code uses first subcooled/saturated nucleate boiling, “mode 3 and 4” correlations
listed in Table 2.13 (Chen). Then, when the void fraction drops below a certain threshold, the code jumps
suddenly into single phase gas and uses “mode 9” heat transfer correlations from Table 2.13 (e.g. Dittus-
Boelter). As a consequence, the transferred heat, instead of deteriorating slowly, shows a step-function.
Furthermore, since the heat transfer drops to zero only when the control-volume average void fraction is
close to zero, the heat transfer is calculated correctly only when the control-volume is full of liquid. For
intermediate stages, with void fractions between 0 and 1, the heat transfer seems to be overestimated (since
equal to the heat transfer when the volume is full of liquid).
The result of the six level nodalisation, Figure 3.69, shows a not physical step-function for the transferred
power. The function shows six steps, which, as can be seen in the Figures, take place when the void-fraction
of one of the sub-volumes drops to zero.
The calculated power is compared to the “heuristic” result. One can see that the transferred power is
overestimated, and that the heat-transfer therefore completely ceases to take place earlier than predicted by
the heuristic calculation. The heuristic calculation assumed that the level of the SG is at 2 m (height of the
U-tubes). The heuristic power curve therefore is shifted, to start when the level in the numerical calculations
reaches 2 m. This is the case at 445 s for Cathare, and 1440 s for Relap.
The nodalisations with three volumes for the heat transfer show the same behavior, refer to Figure 3.70.
Now, as expected, the power-curve shows only three steps. The error in calculating the heat-transfer is larger,
therefore the SG-level drops faster compared to the 6-node calculation.
The nodalisations with only one volume confirm the trend, see Figure 3.71. Using just one large volume,
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Figure 3.68: Level of the SG and heat transfer, heuristic evaluation
the heat tranfer degrades at a sudden.
Figure 3.72 summarizes the levels for the three Relap nodalisations. The comparison of the level with the
heuristic result should be used with care. The results should be seen more on a qualitative level. But one can
conclude that the level of detail when noding the SG has a significant influence on the heat-transfer during
SBO conditions. The time to boil off the SG inventory is significantly lower using a 1-node nodalisation than
using a 6-node nodalisation. It can be assumed that the time at which the SG is empty in the real situation
would be even further in time.
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Figure 3.69: Sc 7 heat transfer across SG, six levels, nodalisation, exchanged power, level, void fraction
(Relap)
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Figure 3.70: Sc 7 heat transfer across SG, three levels, nodalisation, exchanged power, level, void fraction
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Figure 3.71: Sc 7 heat transfer across SG, one level, nodalisation, exchanged power, level, void fraction
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rm
3.4 SBLOCA
A series of calculations to investigate the effect of a loss of coolant accident have been performed. The break
area was in most cases equivalent to 70 mm or less, and assumed to be a small break in loop No 4.
Two calculations are in a certain sense special small breaks - one is calculation No 3, the investigation
of PORV-stuck open as initiating event (Zaphoroshye VVER 1000 Unit 1, 1995 - for details please refer
to Blinkov et al. [2004]). The other one is calculation No 10, which is actually the case corresponding
to a natural circulation experiment. Coolant is continuosly drained from the lower plenum during natural
circulation conditions.
The calculations have been performed in the frame of an EC project, and are therefore also reported in
D’Auria et al. [2006].
3.4.1 Scenario 3 - Zaphoroshye
The Zaporoshye test and plant calculation aims at reproducing the Zaporoshye PORV stuck open accident
from 1995. The plant was in shut down condition, put at full pressure, 23 h after shut down. During a routine
test of the PORV and safety valves (PS pressure was increased with the pressurizer heaters up to the set point
of the valve), one of the three PRZ relief valves failed to close. Within 1000 s the PS pressure dropped down
to the set point of the ECCS, and HPIS and HA injection was observed. The dangerous point in this transient
was the cool down rate the conditions were such that the PS temperature dropped from 289 ◦C to 50 ◦C
within 1000 s.
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.73.
No Event Time (s)
1 Opening of the PORV 0
2 HPIS injection 257
3 HA injection 461
4 End of the calculation 800
Table 3.34: Resulting events, test 3
3.4.2 Scenario 4
Short description of the transient: Initiating event is a small break in the cold leg of loop 4 with an
equivalent diameter of 70 mm (Bethsy). Failure of all trains of HPIS is assumed, while accumulators and
LPIS are available. Accident management consists in cooldown of the primary side with the secondary side
by full opening of the BRU-A valves of SG2 and SG3 after the core exit temperature exceeds 350 ◦C , but
not earlier than 1800 s. Accident management is considered to be successful if the core exit temperature
drops below 200 ◦C .
First 200 s: The imposed initiating event is a break in the cold leg near RPV with an equivalent diameter
of 70 mm. Due to the depressurization a reduction in the moderator density can be observed, which in turns
leads to a reduction in power to about 2850 MW. After 21 s the SCRAM signal occurs on the signal pressure
in the PS lower than 14.5 MPa while reactor power is larger than 75 closed and the normal FW is switched
off. From the closure of the TSV the SS pressure starts to increase. After 58 s MCP1, MCP2 and MCP3 are
tripped on high SG level (it is assumed that 30 s are needed to fully stop injection of feedwater). After 87s
the BRU-A valves open the first time. At 134 s MCP4 is tripped due to low saturation margin in this loop.
200 s up to accident management: The PS mass inventory decreases. At 725 s DNB occurs in the
upper part of the core and the cladding temperature starts to rise. This first dry-out is quenched by loop seal
clearing in the loops 1 to 3. At 750 s the PS mass decreased such that the break is no longer covered with
liquid. A reduction of the mass flow through the break is the consequence. At 1150 s a second dry-out of
the core can be observed. At 1500 s the PS pressure decreased so far that the accumulators start to inject,
but they are unable fully quench the dry-out.
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Figure 3.73: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 3
From accident management to the end of the transient: Half an hour after beginning of the transient
(1800 s) the operator decides to isolate SG1 and SG4 while fully depressurizing SG2 and SG3 by opening
the BRU-A valves. 200 s later the two SG are completely depressurized. The PS pressure follows the SS
pressure, so that the injection of the accumulators is enhanced, and soon after the set point for the LPIS is
reached. The PS pressure drop stops at the LPIS set point. The combined accumulator and LPIS injection
are quickly able to restore the PS mass inventory, to quench the second dry out and to lower the PS coolant
temperature below 200 ◦C .
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.74.
No Event Time (s)
1 break of cold leg 4 with 70mm equiv. diameter 0
2 scram (PS pressure less than 14.5 MPa) 21
3 closure of the TSV, stop of FW (10s after scram) 31
4 MCP 1,2,3 trip (steam generator high level) 58
5 Set point for opening the BRU-A valves is reached for the first time 87
6 Pressurizer empty 100
7 MCP 4 trip (low saturation margin) 134
8 dry out in the core, quenched by loop seal clearing 725
9 break covered with steam only 750
10 start of second dryout 1150
11 accumulators start to inject 1500
12 operator isolates SG1 and SG4 and fully opens the BRU-A valves of
SG2 and SG
1800
13 all train of LPIS start to inject 1850
14 core outlet temperature drops below 200oC 1900
Table 3.35: Resulting events, test 4
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Figure 3.74: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 4
3.4.3 Scenario 8
Short description of the transient: Initiating event is a break in the cold leg near the reactor inlet with
an equivalent diameter of 60 mm. All HPIS and LPIS are assumed to fail. As accident management the
operator opens the PORV after 1800 s, or a peak cladding temperature of 450 ◦C , what ever comes first.
First 200 s: The initiating event is a SB in the cold leg No 4 near the RPV of 60 mm equivalent diameter.
This leads to a reduction in the moderator density and this in turns to a reduction in power of 150 MW. After
49 s the scram occurs on a low pressure signal (pressure below 14.5 MPa while power above 75 % of nominal
power). At 59 s the TSV closes and the feed water is switched off. After 84 s MCP1, MCP2 and MCP3 are
tripped on a high SG level signal, while MCP4 is tripped after 184 s due to a saturation margin of less than
10 ◦C in loop No 4.
200 s up to accident management: The PS keeps loosing mass. At 1000 s a first dry out in the core can
be observed, which is quenched at 1030 s. At 1050 s the break is fully covered with steam and the mass flow
through the break is reduced. At 1420 s a second dry out can be observed, the cladding temperature starts to
rise.
From accident management to the end of the transient: At 1600 s the peak cladding temperature
exceeds 450 ◦C . It is assumed that the operator opens the PORV valve on this signal to depressurize the PS
and enhance ECCS flow as an accident management measure. The measure is not immediately effective -
the peak cladding temperature continues to rise up to 600 ◦C (exceeded at 1730 s). At 1830 s the pressure
drops below 6 MPa and the HA start to inject. At 1850 s the temperature trend can be reversed (cladding
temperature starts to decrease) but not for long - after 2800 s the cladding temperature starts to increase
again. At 8000 s the calculation was terminated
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.75.
3.4.4 Scenario 10
Short description of the test:
Test 10 was designed to characterize the NC performance. The test consists out of two parts: in part 1
primary system mass is drained in steps from the lower plenum. NC flow-rate and NC regimes establishes
when draining PS coolant and keeping available the SG heat sink. As Part 2, following DNB and DO
occurrence, start PS refilling and observing hysteresis.
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No Event Time (s)
1 SBLOCA in cold leg no 4 0
2 scram on low pressure signal 49
3 closure of the TSV (10s after scram), feed water switched to auxil-
lary feed water
59
4 MCP1, MCP2, MCP3 tripped on high SG level signal 84
5 MCP4 tripped on low saturation margin signal 184
6 Begin of the first dryout in the core 1000
7 Dryout quenched by loop seal clearing 1030
8 Break fully covered with steam 1050
9 Begin of the second dryout in the core 1420
10 peak cladding temperature exceeds 450oC , operator opens the
PORV
1600
11 peak cladding temperature exceeds 600oC 1730
12 Accumulators start to inject 1830
13 Cladding temperature trend starts to drop 1850
14 Cladding temperature trend starts to increase again 2800
15 Calculation terminated 8000
Table 3.36: Resulting events, test 8
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.76.
3.4.5 Scenario 11
Short description of scenario 11: Initial event is break of cold leg near reactor inlet with equivalent diameter
of 70 mm into containment. ECCS availability: Failure of all HPIS pumps is assumed. It is assumed also
that at certain time moment one HPIS train (supplying water to broken loop) is recovered. Accumulators
and LPIS is assumed to be available. Accident management: Cool down of PS via SS with a cooling rate of
30 ◦C /h, recovery of one train of HPIS (injecting in loop no 4) after 1800 s
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.77
Analysis shows that the operator actions are capable of returning the plant to a safe state.
3.4.6 Scenario 12
Short description of scenario 12: Initial event is break of cold leg near reactor inlet with equivalent diameter
of 70 mm (to be scaled for PSB) into containment. ECCS availability: Failure of all HPIS and LPIS pumps
is assumed. It is assumed also that at certain time moment the operator recovers water supply into primary
circuit with makeup pumps and high pressure boron injection pumps Accident management: Cool down of
PS via SS with a cooling rate of 30◦C /h, supplying water to the PS via HHPIS and make-up system after
1800 s. Like in scenario 12, the operator actions are sufficient to return the plant to a safe state. Figure 3.78
shows primary and secondary system pressure, cladding temperature and primary inventory.
Comparison VVER and PSB-VVER
Hereafter the results as calculated for PSB-VVER and VVER-1000 are compared as far as phase separation
phenomena in the core and the loops are concerned. The results from the PSB-VVER experiment, as far as
can be seen from the measured parameters, are also considered.
Flow through core and core bypass The PSB-VVER facility simulates the reactor core of the NPP by a
single hexangular fuel assembly. The fuel assembly corresponds a single FA of the 163 of the VVER-1000.
In addition, by-pass flow is modelled by an additional line parallel to the core simulator (from lower to upper
plenum). It can be expected that the complex three dimensional flow and void distribution, once voiding in
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Figure 3.75: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 8
the core occurs, will not be accurately represented. Apart from the cladding temperature measurements that
indicate dry out, the facility offers no possibility to gain insight on the current flow regime. Measurements
of mass flows are only valid in single phase conditions. The paragraph therefore has to focus on calculated
results.
The PSB-VVER nodalisation tries to represent as good as possible the facility. Therefore, the core region
and core bypass are modelled with a pipe-component. The VVER-1000 nodalisation, again, does not model
the complex flow paths likely to occur in a SBLOCA. A second bypass, leading from the lower plenum to the
upper head to account for the control rod guide tubes is modelled. One significant difference (which leads
to a significant dry-out in the plant calculation, while the experiment and post-test calculation show only
comparably small, local dry-outs) is that while in the PSB-VVER nodalisation the heater rods are modelled
with a single structure (axial and radial uniform power profile), the VVER-1000 has a chopped-cosine axial
power profile, and three stuctures to account for three radial zones.
(see Figure 3.3 for the PSB-VVER, Figure 3.57 for the VVER-1000 nodalisation, Figure 2.13 for PSB-
VVER, Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.9 for VVER-1000 geometry).
In the PSB-VVER nodalisation pipe-component 118 simulates the core region. It has 13 sub-components
(1 at the bottom and 13 at the top). The active structures are connected to subcomponent 118-03 to 118-12.
The following flow regimes have been used by Relap5 for the calculation (for a description on the Relap5
use of flow regime maps for closure equations, please refer to Section 2.4.1.)
Until 100 s “bubbly flow” is used in all subvolumes. From there on, the volumes, starting from the
top, the flowregime starts to switch to slug flow (at 120 s subvolume 13, at 250 s subvolume 12, at 275 s
subvolume 11). This goes on until 590 s and subvolume 5, which does not clearly switch flow regime, but
oscillates between bubbly and slug flow. At roughly 800 s the subvolumes 11,12 and 13 switch to annular
mist, and a few seconds later subvolume 12 (last heated subvolume) to mist pre-chf. This corresponds
with the first temperature excursion, which is quenched by loop seal clearing 20 s later. Flow regimes in
the experiment cannot be observed, but the temperature excursion at approximately the same time into the
transient indicates that the prediction is not far away from the physics.
Until 1500 s Relap5 continues to see bubbly flow in subvolumes 1-4, and slug flow from 5 to 13. Then,
the top volumes change to annular mist, mist pre-chf, the second temperature excursion takes place. In
subvolumes 10 and 11 mist and mist post-chf are calculated. The second temperature excursion is quenched
by the assumption that the operator manages to recover ECCS at 1800 s. The second dry out is predicted to
happen earlier than can be seen in the experiment. Most likely reason is that the break flow is slightly larger
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Figure 3.76: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 10
in the calculation.
In the VVER-1000 nodalisation pipe-component 110, with 13 subvolumes, and branch component
140 simulate the core region. The three active structures (and the “hot rod”) structure are connected to all
subvolumes.
The situation in the VVER-1000 calculation shows a similiar picture in the first phase. At roughly 150 s
into the transient the flow regime starts to change from bubbly to slug flow, starting from the top volumes.
At 200 s all subvolumes show slg flow. At about 700 s the three top subvolumes change to annular mist, and
the connected heat structures show a mild increase in temperature. Again, the temperature rise is quenched
by loop seal clearing. Then, other then in the facility, at already 1100 s the subvolumes start to switch to
annular mist, to mist, and to post-chf mist. Other than in the facility calculation, this occurs not just in the
top volumes, but down to subvolume 7. A large dry out at several levels is the consequence. This difference
can be attributed to the different axial power profile, and the different void distribution in the primary system
(the overall scaled mass parameter shows the same trend in PSB-VVER and VVER calculation, as can be
seen in Figure 3.79). Again, with the partial recovery of the ECCS at 1800 s the dryout is quenched, and all
subvolumes are switched back to slug flow.
Void distribution in the core and CCFL Void distribution in the core and possible counter current flow
limitation (CCFL), i.e. that the steam generated in the core is inhibiting ECCS water and water from con-
densation in the SG to enter the core, are important for determining dry out.
Again, the complex three dimensional core is not likely to be represented by the single fuel bundle of
the PSB-VVER facility. However, CCFL can occur in the facility (not necessarily representing the situation
of the real plant). The capability of the code to predict CCFL can be estimated by comparing the facility
experimental results to the facility Relap5 post test calculation.
Pressure differences along the RPV simulator are measured, and give an indication on the distribution
of liquid and steam in the faciliy. Figure 3.80 shows the DP measurements at the facility during test 12.
Each DP reading has been linearly transformed to correspond to the elevation over which it was measured,
for elevation of DP measurements see Figure 2.16. For example, YC01DP07 pressure tap measures the∆P
from elevation 1915 mm to 2810 mm. If the section is full of liquid during nominal operating conditions,
the pressure reading would be 7.7 kPa, and almost 0 kPa if the section is full of steam. In Figure 3.80 the
parameter has been transformed to show 1915 if the reading is zero, and 2810 if the reading is 7.7 kPa.
183
3.4. SBLOCA CHAPTER 3. VVER-1000 NPP CALCULATIONS
X
X X
X
X
X X
X X X X X X
Y Y
Y Y Y
Y
Y
Y
Y Y Y Y Y
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Time (s)
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
15
17.5
P
re
s
s
u
re
 (
M
P
a
)
R5 B3 prel p-30070000X X
R5 B3 prel p-600010000Y Y
Z
Z Z Z
Z Z
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1000.0
1200.0
1400.0
T
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
 (
°C
)R5 B3 prel httemp-190100914Z Z
V
V
V
V
V V V
V
V V V V V
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
M
a
s
s
 (
to
n
s
)R5 B3 prel cntrlvar-720V V
x,y z v
Figure 3.77: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 11
What can be seen in Figure 3.80 is, again, the two dry outs, the first at 700-800 s, quenched by loop seal
clearing, and a second at 2400-2900 s, quenched by ECCS recovery. After ECCS recovery a liquid level
forms above 6 m elevation in the RPV simulator, which is not fully getting into the heated section, because
its held up at the upper tie plate. This indicates CCFL. To see if Relap5 predicts the same behavior, the liquid
void fraction in the nodes above and below the upper tie plate are looked at in Figure 3.81. The levels cannot
be directly compared to the calculation because the pressure measurement points do not coincide with the
borders of the nodalisation scheme.
What can be seen is that after ECCS injection water is hold up in the uppler plenum (higher liquid void
fraction). This means that the phenomena can be predicted qualitatively. The VVER-1000 calculation shows
similar results.
The Relap5 models for CCFL as described in section 2.4.1 have not been used, neither in the PSB-
VVER, nor in the VVER-1000 calculation. The reason is that switching on the model would hold up more
water in the upper plenum, while the dry-out already occurs to early. However, sensitivity analysis switching
on CCFL with user parameters taken from code-experiment comparisons (separate test facility) have been
conducted, without improving the agreement between code and experiment.
Horizontal stratified flow in loops and reflux condensation Generally countercurrent horizontal strat-
ified flow in the loops can be expected to happen in case of a SBLOCA, if the loss of coolant cannot be
compensated. While steam from the core flows in the top part of the loops to steam generators, ECCS water,
which might be injected into the loops, or water from the steam generators might run back into the core.
The VVER-1000 ECCS has only one loop of the low pressure injection system which injects into one
pair of hot and cold leg. HHPIS and HPIS are injecting into the cold legs, and accumulators are injecting
into upper plenum and downcomer. In test 12 the primary system pressure drops below the secondary
system pressure until roughly 5000 s (so steam from the core is not condensed, but heated further in the
steam generators). This means that for both, plant and facility calculation one would expect only marginal
occurrence of water flow back into the core.
The flow regime in the hot legs in the PSB-VVER Relap5 calculation shows bubbly flow until roughly
120 s into the transient, then switches to horizontally stratified flow (described in section 2.4.1). Following
the quenching of the second dry out (which occurs by recovery of ECCS/actuation of make up at 1800s in
the calculation) the vapor produced in the core moved in the hot legs, and the flow regime switched to mist
(pre-chf) for about 500 s.
Although the horizontally stratified flow regime in principle allows for counter current flow (i.e. hori-
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Figure 3.78: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 12
zontally stratified flow, and water and steam velocity have different signs) for the above mentioned reason
practically it cannot be seen in test 12. What seems to happen occasionally is that water together with steam
is pushed to the steam generators and flows back later on. For one example see Figure3.82, which shows
liquid and steam velocity of hot leg loop1, and the void fraction at the same location. Between 1300 and
1400 s one can see a positive spike in the liquid velocity, which means water and steam flow to the steam
generator, which coincides with a drop in void fraction. Later on, one sees a void fraction different from 1,
together with a negative water and positive steam flow for about 50 s.
Break flow Due to the large pressure difference between primary system and environment critical flow
can be expected through the break. The code model for critical flow which is used therefore has a major
influence on the capability to predict the behavior of the test.
As described in section 2.4.1 Relap5 offers two models for critical flow. The calculations shown here
use Henry-Fauske, with default values for the two user parameters. The user defined parameters should be
determined by code - experiment comparison at a separate test facility for the given break geometry. This
has not been done for the PSB-VVER tests, therefore a number of sensitivies have been run, modifying the
model coefficients, and also changing the critical flow model (and again, changing the three user defined
coefficients for Ransom and Trapp). However, the agreement with the experimental results could not be
significantly improved.
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3.5 PRISE transients
3.5.1 Scenario 5
Short characterization of the test: Initial event is a double ended main steam line break with a simultaneous
SG tube rupture in loop No 4. All trains of HPIS are assumed to fail, while accumulators and LPIS are
available. As accident management the operator isolates the SITS, opens the pressurizer PORV, switches off
the pressurizer heaters and initiates the 60 ◦C /h cool down mode of the BRU-A valves after 1800 s. Accident
management is considered successful when the pressure drops beneath 2.6 MPa and the PS temperature is
less than 180 ◦C .
First 100 s: The imposed initiating event is a double ended MSLB in loop No 4 between SG and
MSIV, within the containment. Simultaneously one SG U-tube is assumed to break (double ended guillotine
rupture) in the same loop. At 0.3 s the MSIV4 and the TSV are closed because of low pressure in the SS
while the difference in the saturation margin is still larger than 75 ◦C . At 1 s the reactor scram signal is
issued (on MSIV closure with one second delay for signaling time). Between 2-3 s all groups of pressurizer
heaters are switched on. 20 s after the scram all MCP are switched off (imposed event, to account for the
containment pressurization). After 58 s the PRZ level drops below 4.2 m and all PRZ heater groups are
switched off.
100 s up to accident management: It takes about 200 s to depressurize SG4 to almost atmospheric
pressure. During the blow down the PS coolant experiences temperatures as low as 175 ◦C in the cold leg
of loop No 4 and 255 ◦C in the lower plenum. PTS phenomena or local recriticality may be an issue - this
should be investigated with the appropriate tools. The rapid drop in the PS pressure at the initial phase of
the transient is governed by the blow down of SG No 4. After this phase the PS pressure drop is slowed
down and governed by the loss of PS inventory to the SS due to the SGTR. At 1050 s the PRZ is empty -
this marks again the begin of a second phase of rapid PS depressurization, which is halted when the pressure
reaches the saturation pressure of the coolant at the core outlet (HPIS is assumed not to be operational).
From accident management to the end of the transient: After 30 minutes (1800 s) the operator takes
several actions: the PRZ heaters are switched off, the hydro accumulators are isolated. The PORV is fully
opened (PS feed and bleed), and the intact SG are switched into 60 ◦C cool down mode. The operator actions
are successful in drastically reducing the break flow. The PS depressurization halts at the SS pressure, and
the further depressurization is governed by the 60 ◦C /h SS cool down. After 4900 s the PS pressure is less
then 2.6 MPa, and the LPIS starts to inject. After 6650 s the core exit temperature drops and stays below
180 ◦C .
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.83.
No Event Time (s)
1 MSLB with SGTR at the same time in loop 4 0
2 closure of MSIV 4 and TSV, stop of FW (pressure SS less than
4.9MPa), switch off MCP 4
0.3
3 scram because of MSIV closure, switch on prz heaters grp 1 1
4 switch on prz heaters grp 2,3,4 2
5 switch off MCP 1,2,3 (imposed as 20s after scram, simulating con-
tainment pressurization)
21
6 switch of all prz heaters (prz lvl ¡ 4.2m) 58
7 pressurizer empty 1050
8 accumulators isolated, prz heaters switched off, PORV valve
opened, BRU-A switched in 60oC /h cooldown mode
1800
9 PS pressure less than 2.6 MPa 4900
10 start of all trains of LPIS 4950
11 Core exit temperature stays below 180oC 6650
Table 3.37: Resulting events, test 5
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Figure 3.83: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 5
3.5.2 Scenario 9
Short characterization of the test: Initiating event is a primary to secondary side leak with an equiv.
diameter of 100 mm in loop No 4. The corresponding BRU-A is considered to be stuck open after the first
opening. As accident management, after 1800 s, the operator switches off two trains of HPIS (TQ13 and
TQ34), isolates all hydroaccumulators, switches off all LPIS pumps, and switches the BRU-A valves of the
intact SG into cool down mode with a cool down rate of 60 ◦C /h. After 2700 s, as a second measure, the
operator switches on the make-up system, and switches the last HPIS pump off. The accident management
is considered successful if the PS pressure drops below 1 MPa and the PS temperature below 180 ◦C .
First 100 s: The (imposed) initiating event is a primary to secondary leak in loop No 4 (SG 4 hot header
break with an equivalent diameter of 100 mm). After 1 s all four groups of PRZ heaters are switched on. The
level of SG 4 rises fast and after 8 s MCP4 is tripped due to high SG level. At 19 s the reactor is scrammed
because the PS pressure is less than 14.5 MPa while the reactor power is larger than 75 %. At 26 s the
PRZ heaters are switched off due to low level in the PRZ. Ten seconds after the scram signal (29 s) the TSV
are closed. From this time on the SS pressure starts to increase and reaches the set point of the BRU-A
valves (BRU-K valves are assumed fail) at 49 s. The BRU-A valve of loop No 4 is assumed to stuck in the
fully open position. The MSIV valves of loops 1-3 are closed at the same time to simulate the existence of
check-valves which inhibit back flow.
100 s up to accident management: The PS depressurizes to the pressure of the secondary side and
follows the pressure of the intact SG. SG 4 depressurizes due to the stuck open BRU-A valve. At 108 s the
MCP of loop 1-3 are tripped due to the low saturation margin in this loops. At 109 s all three trains of HPIS
(TQ13) start to inject. At 396 s the HPIS tanks with borated water of 40 g/kg water are empty, and the supply
is switched to the sump with 40 g/kg borated water. At about 400 s the PS depressurization continues and
drops significantly below the SS pressure (intact loops). At 421 s the set point for the HA is reached and
they start to inject.
From accident management to the end of the transient: Since the ECCS is fully operational, dry-out of
the core is not an issue in this transient. The accident management aims to limit the PS mass lost to the
SS (which means to the environment). The operator switches off two trains of the HPIS (TQ13 and TQ33),
isolates the HA, switches off the LPIS, and switches the BRU-A valves of the intact steam SG into cool
down mode (60 ◦C /h). This measure is successful: PRISE break flow is reduced from about 240 kg/s to
50 kg/s.
At 2700 s as a second AM-measure the last HPIS train is switched off, and the make-up system takes over
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(2730 s). At 4000 s the PS pressure is less than 1 MPa and the core outlet temperature is less than 180 ◦C ,
so the calculation was terminated. Up to 1800 s about 500 tons of PS mass were lost to the secondary side,
after that another 100 tons - so in total the integral break flow up to 4000 s was 600 tons.
Primary and secondary system pressure, the primary system mass and the clad temperature are reported
in Figure 3.84.
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Figure 3.84: Relap5 primary and secondary side pressure, temperature and mass inventory, calculation 9
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No Event Time (s)
1 PRISE in loop No 4 0
2 switch on prz heaters group 1-4 1
3 switch off MCP4 (SG-level too high) 8
4 SCRAM on low PS pressure signal 19
5 switch off prz heaters on low prz level 26
6 Closure of TSV (10s after scram) 29
7 BRU-A of SG 4 opens and stays stuck open (closure of MSIV in
loop No 4)
49
8 PRZ empty 60
9 switch off MCP1,MCP2,MCP3 on low saturation margin 108
10 HPIS starts to inject taking suction from the tanks 109
11 HPIS supply switched to the sump 396
12 Accumulators start to inject 421
13 Accident management: switch off two trains of HPIS (TQ13,TQ33),
isolation of hydroaccumulators, switch off LPIS, switch BRU-A in
60oC /h cooldown mode
1800
14 Accident management: switch on make-up pumps 2700
15 Accident management: switch off last train HPIS 2730
16 Calculation terminated (primary side pressure below 1MPa, core
outlet temperature less 180 oC
4000
Table 3.38: Resulting events, test 9
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Chapter 4
EOP Optimization
Chapter three investigated the effectiveness of primary and secondary depressurization based AM strategies
for different initiating events. The present chapter, on the other hand, investigates possible combinations of
primary- and secondary side depressurization in case of a loss of on- and offsite power (loss of connection
to the grid, with failure of all diesel generators). VVER-1000, unlike e.g. German plants, have no possibility
of load reduction and switch over of the turbine generator to service station operation, which means that the
only available power source are batteries.
As outlined in section 2.1, accident management is step four in the IAEA “defense in depth” concept.
The first level would be the design of the NPP, which by itself should be such that the reactor will not deviate
from its nominal conditions. In case the first level should fail, and the reactor does deviate from normal
operational conditions, the control system of the reactor should be able to lead the reactor back to a normal
state. Should the control system fail and abnormal operation condition progress into a design bases accident,
the reactor protection system, as third level, is there to cope with the accident.
Only in case that also the reactor protection system is unsuccessful the fourth level of “defense in depths”
comes into play, accident management. This is the case of a station blackout. As part of the reactor protec-
tion system three independent trains of power from diesel generators are available, each of them sufficient
(3x100% safety). But since all three are assumed to fail, the accident is beyond the design basis.
The target of accident management is to provide the plant operator with guidance on how to proceed
in such cases. Accident management means that procedures are in place which tell the operator which
parameters he should check to identify the plant state, and how to use the equipment that is still available
to improve the situation. Accident management is to be divided in preventive and mitigative accident
management. Preventive AM means that the aim of the actions is to prevent damage to the reactor core
and terminate the accident. The set of preventive accident management guidance documents usually is
called “emergency operating procedures”, EOPs, which are available at the control room for the operator.
There are two basic approaches for EOPs - event based EOPs, and symptom based EOPs. In the first case
procedures are sorted by initiating events, and the actions, that are prescribed, have been optimized for this
special case. Traditionally, EOPs have been event based. The disadvantage is that the operator has to be
able to clearly identify the event. This is not always possible. Therefore, “symptom based” EOPs have been
introduced. Instead of identifying the event, the operator just uses “symptoms” to identify the plant state,
and takes action based on the state of the plant. He continuously monitors a number of safety functions (see
Table 2.1), checks if they are fulfilled, and takes action based on the outcome of his checks.
The case that is investigated here, a station blackout with failure of the DGs, can be clearly identified.
Therefore the strategy can be targeted towards “event based” EOPs. Further, the analysis is restricted to the
preventive part of AM - the EOPs. The mitigative part comes into play if the EOPs have not been successful.
A simple, unique and clear criterion should be used to terminate the EOPs and move to the mitigative
procedures, the severe accident management guidelines - usually the core exit temperature. Superheated
steam of more than 650◦C is commonly used as signal that the core has already been damaged, or core
damage is impending and cannot be prevented. For the current work, the analysis terminates here.
To summarize, the goal of a preventive accident management strategy for a station blackout, until core
damage occurred, is to prevent core damage as long as possible. Goal of the current chapter is to use the
systems that are still available to the plant operator in way that core damage can be prevented as long as
possible.
The next section describes the situation at the NPP Balakovo. What are the signals that the operator has
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to consider for AM, and which systems are still available via batteries (or, after the batteries have finished,
by hand).
A section “qualitative optimization” follows, were a number of ideas how to make the best use of the
equipment which is still available has been made, were sensitivity calculations are presented to cover uncer-
tainties in plant parameters. The time frame, in which actions have to be performed if the strategy should be
successful, has been evaluated here.
The last section of the chapter “quantitative optimization”, a method aiming to optimize accident man-
agement strategies is presented. The method has been developed in the frame of the present work. The
method is then used to optimize the operator interventions in case of a station blackout, and the result is
presented.
4.1 Situation at Balakovo
The implementation of accident management procedures at Balakovo NPP was ongoing at the time the work
has been performed. During a work visit at the NPP [Sevastyanov and Suslov, 2005] it has been confirmed
that the strategy, which was to be evaluated, would close a hole in the analysis. Signals available to the
operator can be deducted from [Sevastyanov et al., 2004], which is done in this section. So apart from
confirming the usefulness of the analysis, goal of the visit was to find out which equipment could still be
used during a station black out by the operator.
4.1.1 Strategy
Optimization of AM strategies needs considerable analytic resources. Therefore optimization and detailed
analysis has been restricted to a single initiating event.
In line with previous experience and work of GRNSPG/University of Pisa in the field of analytic support
in developing accident management strategies (see [Madeira et al., 2003], [Muellner et al., 2003], [Muellner
et al., 2004b], [Muellner et al., 2004a], [Muellner et al., 2005a]) the initiating event has been chosen to be
either a loss of feedwater, or a total station blackout. During the work visit at NPP Balakovo [Sevastyanov
and Suslov, 2005] it has been decided that a station blackout would be of more interest to the NPP.
The challenge during a station black out is to recover the heat sink. Feedwater pumps and emergency
feedwater pumps are lost, so alternative sources of feedwater must be procured. If feedwater can be supplied
over an extended period of time, natural circulation is sufficient for decay heat removal and the plant can
be kept in stable conditions for, in principle, any period of time. Alternative sources of feedwater can be
fire brigade trucks, or mobile pumps which may be available at the plant. An example of the success of this
strategy has been demonstrated at the Narora NPP in India, 1993. A fire in the turbine hall, caused by turbine
blade failure, propagated along cables to the control room. The habitability of the control room was lost, as
well as the control over the station for more than 18 hours. By feeding the SGs from fire brigade trucks the
heat sink could be supplied until power was restored.
However, the current work assumes that neither mobile pumps, nor that fire brigade trucks are available.
This might be possible if one considers terrorist attacks - in this case the operator may need to make use of
systems which he can control from the control room, or which he can reach reasonably fast.
Goal of the strategy therefore is to make use of water which can be accessed without use of an active
system. There are two main sources of water available. Firstly, the hydro accumulators which are connected
to the primary system hold 200 tons of water, and inject once the primary pressure drops below 5.9 MPa.
Secondly, water in the feedwater line piping is partly at 20 MPa, partly at 5.8 bar (before and after a check
valve respectively). Furthermore there are two deaerator tanks for degassing of feedwater, each of them
holding about 150 m3of water. During normal operation they are pressurized at 5.8 bar. Those sources of
water can be made available by primary and secondary system depressurization. Aim of the analysis is to
find a sequence of primary and secondary system depressurization which utilizes at best theses sources of
water.
4.1.2 Signals
In [Sevastyanov et al., 2004] the safety functions, that the operator has to monitor during accident conditions,
are listed. Safety functions and how the operator can verify there status at Balakovo is presented in Table
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2.1. From there one can deduct that at least the following signals are available to the operator during accident
conditions
• core power,
• upper plenum fluid temperature,
• steam generator level,
• feed water mass flow rate,
• steam generator pressure,
• cold leg fluid temperature,
• containment pressure,
• pressurizer level,
• pressurizer pressure,
• containment sump level.
Loss of electricity can also be detected. The parameters which are available to the operator have to be
used to define the actual procedure, once the strategy has been worked out.
4.1.3 Equipment
A short description of equipment and systems that can be operated during a a station black out and that are
beneficial, will follow.
General comment on batteries - loss of all power means that the only available power source are batteries.
All systems which are used for the strategy, i.e. the pressurizer relief valve (which could be substituted by
the emergency gas removal system) and the BRU-A valves are connected to batteries. Batteries at Balakovo
must provide power for at least half an hour, but in practice are able to last for a longer period of time. For
the analysis it has been assumed that power from batteries is available for the whole transient. Reason for
this assumption is that backfitting the plant with longer lasting batteries for the above mentioned valves is
economically feasible, and can only improve safety.
Means for primary system depressurization. Primary system depressurization in a long lasting SBO
transient is beneficial for two reasons. The first reason - should it be impossible to recover power, or at
least to recover a stable source of feedwater, the reactor pressure vessel will fail. Failure of the RPV will
release core debris to the reactor cavity - but if the failure occurs at high presure, the subsequent blow
down of saturated water, steam and hydrogen from the RCS could push the core debris out of the cavity to
other regions of the containment. The heat transfer during such a process to the containment atmosphere is
termed “direct containment heating”, can increase the containment pressure considerably and challenge the
containment integrity (see e.g. [Kirn et al., 1999]). Therefore, if it comes to RPV failure, it should happen
at low pressure. The second reason is simply that by lowering the pressure water from hydroaccumulators
can be furnished into the primary side.
Primary system depressurization can happen via the PORV, or via the emergency gas removal system.
The PRZ safety valves only actuate when the primary pressure overpasses their pressure set point. A few
comments regarding both possibilities.
The PORV (power operated relief valve) has a flow rate of 50 kg/s of steam at opening pressure (18.11MPa).
Three different pilot valves can potentially open the PORV:
• Three pilot valves can potentially open the PORV:
• Valve 1 is EM actuated. Can be controlled from MCR and ECR. In automatic mode opens 18.11,
closes at 17.25
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• Valve 2 is spring actuated, and is a backup for opening the PORV in case valve one is unavailable.
If power is available, a solenoid increases the closing force of the spring. The open set-point for the
valve is therefore 18.11/18.83 if power is unavailable/available and closure set point is 16.67/17.65.
• Valve 3 is EM actuated. Failsafe of valve 1 to close the PORV. Closes automatically at 15MPa.
Possibility to override closure from CR. If electric power is unavailable, the valve closes.
• In case of an SBO, power from batteries for the PORV can be guaranteed for 30 min, although the
batteries are likely to last longer.
This means, that until power from batteries is available, valve one, which can be operated from the
control room, could be used to open the PORV. Should the power from the batteries finish, valve one and
valve three would close the PORV, and only Valve 2 would open close the PORV at high pressure.
The EGRS (emergency gas removal system) is a mode of operation of the gas removal system. During
normal operation the gas removal system is used to remove non condensable gases from top of the reactor
pressure vessel, top pressurizer and steam generators. The by far biggest contribution comes from the line
top of pressurizer. As emergency measure the gas removal system can be used as alternative way for primary
system depressurization (steam flow rate at opening pressure 25 kg/s of steam). In case of a station blackout
the emergency gas removal system is powered from batteries. Once the power from batteries is finished, the
valves of the emergency gas removal system stay in there actual position (i.e. open, unlike the PORV).
Means for secondary system depressurization Secondary system depressurization can be achieved by
opening the BRU-A valves. In case of a station blackout the BRU-A valves are powered by batteries. Each
SG has one BRU-A valve, which can discharge 250 kg/s of steam at opening pressure.
• valves with electric power only. If the connection to the grid is lost and DGs fail, power is supplied
from batteries. Once the batteries are empty, the valves stay in their current position.
• opening pressure of valve at 7.16 MPa BRU-A (valve opens 6%).
• pressure above 6.67 MPa causes BRU-A to open further, pressure below 6.67 MPa causes BRU-A to
close.
• if pressure drops below 6.27 MPa, or the open area drops below 6%, valve closes.
• in case even power from batteries is lost, valve stays in its position
• comment: in case electric power is unavailable and the BRU-A are closed, spring operated SG safety
valves ensure overpressure protection (open/close at 7.94/6.86 MPa)
• BRU-A can be operated manually - walking distance from control room to BRU-A valves (at 28.8 m)
is roughly 5 min
The main advantage of depressurizing the steam generators is that the water from feed water lines and
deaerator tanks can be furnished passively into the SG, and used for to recover at least for a limited period
of time the heat sink. A couple of comments have to be made. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the amount
of water in feed water lines and deaerator is considerable. The two deaerator tanks have a liquid volume
of about 300 m3, the feed water lines in addition have a volume of about 170 m3. The deaerator tanks are
pressurized at 5.8 bar during normal operation (Table 4.1 reports nominal conditions and related parameters).
The problem is that once the power is lost, the tanks start slowly to depressurize due to to reasons - heat
losses and losses of the line. Heat losses of the feedwater line, as well as steam and liquid losses during SBO
conditions are, unfortunately, not well characterized. Neither are the pressure losses in the feed water line.
An idea, which is tested in later sections in calculations, was to use an existing connection between SG
and steam line and the deaerator tanks to first isolate the deaerator tanks feed water side, pressurize them by
connecting them to the SGs (see Figure 4.2) to a pressure of 6.6 bar. This is the pressure set point for safety
valves which ensure overpressure protection for the deaerator. After that, the line to the SG should be closed
again, the deaerator tanks should be again connected to the feed water side of the SG, and the SG should be
further depressurized by using the BRU-A valves. As discussed in [Sevastyanov and Suslov, 2005] such a
procedure would be possible in principle.
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losses of liquid during normal operation
29,5m
5,6m
33,5m
V=300m3
V=54m3
V=34m3
V=84m3
operation
steam losses during normal
Figure 4.1: Potential reservoir of water in feed water lines and deaerator tanks
x 22 safety valves
set point at 6.6 bar
opening pressure
Figure 4.2: Potential connection between SG and deaerator tanks
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No Parameter Unit Value
RCS
1 Power MW 3000
2 Core inlet temperature ◦C 289
4 Core outlet temperature ◦C 318
5 Coolant pressure outlet core MPa 15.7
6 One loop flow rate m3/h 21200
7 Core flow rate m3/h 84800
8 Pump rotation speed rev/min 995
9 PRZ pressure MPa 15.7
10 PRZ temperature ◦C 346
13 SG steam production kg/s 408
14 SG pressure MPa 6.3
16 FW temperature ◦C 220
Deaerator and feed water lines
17 Nominal pressure MPa 0.58
18 Nominal temperature saturated
19 Deaerator water filled volume (each) m3 185
20 Nominal level m 2.5
21 Feed water line volume m3 170
Characteristic parameters
22 Primary side mass (without HA) tons 253
23 HA mass tons 198
24 PS total mass tons 451
25 SG mass tons 160
26 FW line mass tons 163
27 Deaerator mass (both) tons 337
28 SS total mass tons 660
29 BRU-A fully open area (one valve) m2 2.74 · 10−2
30 PORV fully open area (one valve) m2 1.53 · 10−3
31 Volume SS (4xSG + FwL + 2xDeaerator.) m3 780
32 4xArea(BRU-A)/Volume(SS) m−1 1.41 · 10−5
Table 4.1: Deaerator and FW lines, relevant parameters
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4.2 Qualitative
The AM strategy proposed is based on two operator actions: Secondary DEpressurization (SDE) and Primary
DEpressurization (PDE). The scope of SDE, performed by the complete opening of the BRU-A in all SG, is
to lower the pressure in the SG below the pressure of the deaerator tanks and the feed water line and allow
passive injection from the feed water line and from the deaerators. It is assumed that these two systems
remain in their nominal condition as reported in Table 4.1.
PDE is foreseen to lower PS pressure below the set point of the ECC system available, to enhance ECCS
flow, to keep the PS pressure low to avoid RPV failure at high pressure.
The strategy for the analysis was to perform one base calculation without operator actions (REF0). Then,
a second base calculation with intuitive timing for actuation for primary and secondary depressurization.
This means, that secondary depressurization is initiated after 30 min. The measure succeeds to cool down
the primary system via secondary, and by contraction of coolant to lower the primary pressure - roughly to
the set point of the accumulators. Then, primary depressurization is initiated, which further decreases the
primary system pressure, actuates the hydroaccumulators and fills up the primary system with coolant. This
is the base AM-Strategy calculation (REF1).
About thirty calculations implementing the basic strategy SDE followed by PDE were performed. One
calculation is presented in detail (REF1), main results are reported briefly about selected other sensitivities.
The differences among the thirty calculations and the main results of all are presented in two Tables, Table
4.3 and Table 4.4.
One note about PDE has to be made. PDE is performed in all cases with the PORV. The PORV cannot be
opened manually, since it is located within the containment. The PORV relies on battery power, and would
close once the batteries are finished. Power from the batteries can be guaranteed only for the first 30 min
after a SBO.
This limitation was ignored. There are two reasons: firstly, the time of 30 min is the guaranteed minimum
of time available. It is very likely that power from the batteries will be available for a longer time period.
Secondly, it would be a small back fit to designate batteries especially and only for the PORV.
No Event Set point Comment
1 SBO 0 s reactor scram, begin of coast down of
MCP, closure of feed water, closure of
TSV
2 Automatic
open/closure
PORV
open at PRZ pressure 18.23 MPa,
close at 16.67 MPa
Power from battery for PORV oper-
ation assumed to be available during
the transient
3 Automatic
open/closure
BRU-A
open at 7.2 MPa, control the pressure
to stay at 6.67 MPa, close at 6.27 MPa
Power from batteries is assumed to be
available for the first half hour, then
operation with batteries
4 SDE varies manual full opening of all four BRU-
A valves
5 PDE varies opening of the PORV (minimum pri-
mary side pressure)
6 HPIS none all trains assumed to fail
7 HA UP pressure < 5.9 MPa
8 LPIS none all trains assumed to fail
9 End of calculation Cladding Temp > 1200 ◦C
Table 4.2: SBO optimization - boundary conditions
No. ID SDE PDE COMMENT
1 REF0 NONE NONE
2 REF1 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (9360s)
3 REF1a 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (9360s) check valve substituted
continued on next page
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No. ID SDE PDE COMMENT
4 REF2 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (7865s) M
0
deaerator =M
nom
deaerator/2;
Pdeaerator = Pdeaerator/2
ABRUA = 2 A
NOM
BRUA
5 REF3 1800 s / 1 SG PMIN (24380s)
6 REF4 1800 s / 2 SG PMIN (19000s)
7 REF5 1800 s / 3 SG PMIN (10000s) Nominal losses of deaerator
4.4 kg/s SL4 discharges in
deaerator
5400 s / 4 SG
8 REF6 3600 s / 4 SG PMIN (7600s) ABRUA = 2 A
NOM
BRUA
9 REF7 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN - 1000s (8360s) ABRUA = 2 A
NOM
BRUA
10 REF8 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN + 1000s (10360s) ABRUA = 2 A
NOM
BRUA
11 REF9 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (9360s) APORV = 2 * A
NOM
PORV
12 REF10 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (9360s) APORV = 0.5 * A
NOM
PORV
13 REF11 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (18260s) ABRUA = 0.5 A
NOM
BRUA
14 REF12 LATEST MOMENT
SDE STILL EFFEC-
TIVE
PUP > 2.5 MPa and after
15000 s
15 REF13 1800 s / 4 SG NONE
16 REF14 1800 s / 4 SG NONE Nominal losses of deaerator
4.4 kg/s of steam
17 REF15 1800 s / 4 SG NONE Double losses of deaerator
8.8 kg/s of steam
18 REF16 1800 s / 4 SG NONE ABRUA = 0.05 A
NOM
BRUA
19 REF17 1800 s / 1 SG NONE (PRE REF3)
20 REF18 1800 s / 2 SG NONE (PRE REF4),
21 REF19 1800 s / 4 SG NONE (PRE REF2)
22 REF20 3600 s / 4 SG NONE (PRE REF6) ABRUA = 2
ANOMBRUA
23 REF21 1800 s / 4 SG NONE ABRUA = 0.5 A
NOM
BRUA
24 REF102 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN (7865s) M
0
deaerator =M
nom
deaerator/2;
Pdeaerator = Pdeaerator/2
25 REF106 3600 s / 4 SG PMIN (7600s)
26 REF107 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN - 1000s (8360s)
27 REF108 1800 s / 4 SG PMIN + 1000s (10360s)
28 REF120 3600 s / 4 SG NONE (PRE REF106)
29 REF105 1800 s / 3 SG PMIN (10000 s) Nominal losses of deaerator
4.4 kg/s SL4 discharges in
deaerator
5400 s / 4 SG
30 REF200 1800 s / 4 SG 1800 s PDE with GRS
Table 4.3: Performed SBO sensitivity calculations
No. ID Time of hot FA temper-
ature ≥ 1200 ◦C (s)
PS pressure at the end
(MPa)
Time interval UP pressure≤
2 MPa (s)
1 REF0 10040 18.1 n. A.
2 REF1 37928 3.24 18362
3 REF1a 35438 3.16 16037
4 REF2 19400 4.49 3600
5 REF3 39505 3.61 2650
continued on next page
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No. ID Time of hot FA temper-
ature ≥ 1200 ◦C (s)
PS pressure at the end
(MPa)
Time interval UP pressure≤
2 MPa (s)
6 REF4 33111 3.67 4000
7 REF5 36010 3.34 15680
8 REF6 37344 3.33 19421
9 REF7 35463 3.37 16900
10 REF8 35614 3.27 15016
11 REF9 35857 1.61 19860
12 REF10 39504 6.69 18676
13 REF11 41829 1.83 10614
14 REF12 46667 3.62 25935
15 REF13 42730 17.8 n. A. (3.9 MPa)
16 REF14 25300 17.9 n. A. (5.54 MPa)
17 REF15 17300 18.1 n. A.
18 REF16 42700 17.7 n. A. (4.76 MPa)
19 REF17 46852 17.8 n. A. (10.04 MPa)
20 REF18 39074 17.8 n. A. . (7.58 MPa)
21 REF19 20029 17.6 n. A. (9.75 MPa)
22 REF20 42033 17.7 n. A. (3.67 MPa)
23 REF21 43090 17.7 n. A. (4.66 MPa)
Table 4.4: Chosen single parameters - results
Calculation REF0 One calculation without any operator action at all has been performed, to have an
idea what would be to expect. The results show that about 10000 s after beginning of the transient the hot rod
temperature is reached. Figure 4.3 reports primary and secondary system pressure (X and Y respectively),
primary system mass and clad temperature (V and Z respectively),
Reference Calculation SBO, no losses of the deaerator, optimized intervention of SDE and PDE -
REF1a
The first 30 min. after the SBO Description of the scenario a total SBO is the initiating event. At 0 s the
reactor is scrammed, the MCP are tripped, all the feed water is lost, the turbine shut valves are closed. During
the coast down of the MCP more energy is removed by the SG from the PS then supplied to by the reactor
core. The primary temperature and pressure drops, while the secondary side pressure shows a sharp increase.
At about 230 s the MCP coast down is completed. From this time on, the inventory in the SG starts to boil
down. The BRU-A control valves, which are category one equipment and supplied by batteries, maintain
the SG pressure smoothly 6.67 MPa. Together with the reduction of the SG level, the heat exchange surface
from the PS to SS decreases, and the heat transfer deteriorates. An increase in PS pressure and temperature
is the result. After 30 min into the transient, the level of the SG is at about 1.15 m and the PS pressure at
16.1 MPa
The first operator action SDE Thirty minutes after beginning of the transient the operator has diagnosed
the situation and has taken the decision to depressurize the secondary side. He fully opens all four BRU-A
valves. At this time the level in the SG is still about 1.1 m, so a considerable amount of water. It takes
about 3 min for the SG pressure to reach the pressure of the feed water lines and deaerator tanks. The
SG level drops within 3 min to about 0.3 m and then starts to raise again, since feed water from the feed
water lines and deaerator tanks is furnished passively into the SG. About one hour into the transient the
SG level is at its maximum of 2.4 m. The measure lowers the temperature and pressure in the PS to about
4.5 MPa. Accumulator start to intervene, but can not yet inject effectively, since the pressure stays close to
the accumulator pressure. This phase lasts until 9260 s into the transient.
The second operator action PDE After 9260 s the operator depressurizes the PS. Here the assumption
was made that the PORV is still available this may require back fits to the NPP. The moment was chosen to
be when the primary side pressure starts to rise again. Since the pressurizer has a large steam volume at this
time, opening the PORV is very effective in lowering PS pressure. This enhances accumulator intervention
and helps in further decreasing the PS pressure. Both effects fill completely the PS and lower the PS pressure
to atmospheric pressure. The PS stays this way while the SG level is sufficiently high.
Final phase from increase of PS pressure to core dry out and heat up. About 23000 s into the transient the
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Figure 4.3: Calculation REF0, important parameters
SG are empty, and the primary side temperature starts to rise again. The PS inventory expands, and is lost
through the PORV. The PORV is not capable to maintain the pressure at atmospheric level. Primary pressure
continues to rise and PS inventory continues to decrease until about 30000 s. At this time a large part of
the core is uncovered, the release of the energy from the core to the PS is reduced and the energy is kept in
the structures of the core. As a result the PS pressure starts to decrease, and the temperature of the cladding
rises sharply due to DNB. The dry out is quenched by loop seal clearing, the core is refilled again, primary
side pressure continues to increase. About one hour later, at 33000 s, a second dry out occurs, which is not
quenched. Primary pressure decreases slightly while the cladding temperature increases rapidly. At 33500 s
the cladding temperature exceeds 1200 ◦C and the calculation is stopped.
Figure 4.4 reports primary and secondary system pressure (X and Y respectively), primary system mass
and clad temperature (V and Z respectively), By comparing the results from REF0 and REF1 one can see
that about 10 h of grace time can be won utilizing the deaerator water. Table 4.5 shows the resulting events.
No Event Time (s)
1 SBO 0
2 SDE 1800
3 SG level 0.25 m (local minimum) 2000
4 SG level 2.35 m (local maximum), deaerator empty 3500 - 3700
5 Accumulator intervention 4000
6 PDE 9260
7 PS pressure lower than 2 MPa 9430
8 SG empty 21500 - 22500
9 PS pressure above 2 MPa 25500
10 Begin first dry out 29250
11 Begin second dry out 33550
12 End of calculation, clad temp > 1200 ◦C 35350
Table 4.5: Calculation REF1 - resulting events
Conclusion and comments for the calculation REF1 SBO with SDE: In a SBO transient, the time until
the clad temperature reaches 1200 ◦C is about 10000 s if the operator takes no action at all. The combined
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Figure 4.4: Calculation REF1 - selected parameters
action of SDE and PDE achieved three goals the time to reach the final dry out of 1200 ◦C could be extended
to 35000 s. The PS pressure was kept below 2 MPa for about 16000 s, which means if the operator regains
power, the LPIS could immediately be switched into RHR operation mode and long term controllable condi-
tions would be achieved. The third goal which is achieved is that the PS pressure at the end of the calculation
was relatively low with 3.16 MPa.
These achieve good values for these three parameters was the goal of the optimization process in the
previous section, by varying the time of SDE and PDE. The method started to contract after a few iterations,
which shows that the values which were chosen represent already an optimized case. This is not surprising,
since the time for intervention was chosen deliberately to achieve a long grace time, while keeping PS
pressure as low as possible.
Selected sensitivities
A large number of calculations have been performed, to check the effectiveness of the proposed AM pro-
cedure. Table 4.3 lists the boundary conditions for all performed calculations (i.e. the changes in respect
to calculation REF1). Table 4.4 lists the chosen single parameters of the calculations, to give an idea of the
effectiveness.
Calculation REF3 In this sensitivity the SDE was achieved using one SG only. The result is that the cool
down rate of the primary side is about 20 /degC/h, instead of reaching up to 100 /degC/h. Other important
parameters, which characterize the quality of the strategy, like the gained grace time and the primary pressure
at the end of the calculation, are still comparable. Figure 4.5 shows main parameters (left, Primary and
secondary system pressure denominated by X and Y, primary system mass and cladding temperature by V
ans Z, and right, primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF1 denominated by X and Z, primary
system pressure and mass of calculation REF3 denominated by Y and V).
Calculation REF10 Calculation REF10 assumes that the PORV area is halved, which would correspond
more or less to the flow rate of the gas removal system. A little bit of grace time can be won, since the
primary side mass is used more effectively in terms of the removed of energy per unit mass, but at the cost
of high pressure at the end of the calculation. Once the SG inventory is lost, the energy bleed through the
PORV is not sufficient to maintain the primary pressure low. The results of the calculation REF9 and REF10
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Figure 4.5: Calculation REF3 - main parameters
would suggest that a variable PORV would be an ideal solution a small area while there is still inventory in
the SG, and a large area once the SG are empty. This conclusion is supported by Figure 4.6, which shows
main parameters (left, Primary and secondary system pressure denominated by X and Y, primary system
mass and cladding temperature by V ans Z, and right, primary system pressure and mass of calculation
REF1 denominated by X and Z, primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF10 denominated by Y
and V).
Calculation REF14 assumes that the deaerator steam consumes continue to consume steam after a SBO.
The nominal losses of steam to the consumers are 4.4 kg/s. Apart from this, PDE was not simulated. The
results show that the strategy relies heavily that the deaerator tanks stay pressurized. Also without PDE the
grace time won is only half of that of the calculation REF1. But nevertheless in comparison to calculation
REF0, which means no operator action, it was still possible to delay the time of occurrence of core damage
from 10000 s to about 24000 s. Figure 4.7 shows main parameters (left, Primary and secondary system
pressure denominated by X and Y, primary system mass and cladding temperature by V ans Z, and right,
primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF1 denominated by X and Z, primary system pressure
and mass of calculation REF14 denominated by Y and V).
Calculation REF17 investigates SDE with one SG only. The cool down rate of the primary side is rather
low, about 20 /degC/h, while the grace time gained is comparable to REF1. Figure 4.8 shows main pa-
rameters (left, Primary and secondary system pressure denominated by X and Y, primary system mass and
cladding temperature by V ans Z, and right, primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF1 de-
nominated by X and Z, primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF17 denominated by Y and
V).
Calculation REF18 investigates SDE with two SG only. The cool down rate is at about 60 /degC/h, while
the grace time gained is still high. Figure 4.9 shows main parameters (left, Primary and secondary system
pressure denominated by X and Y, primary system mass and cladding temperature by V ans Z, and right,
primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF1 denominated by X and Z, primary system pressure
and mass of calculation REF18 denominated by Y and V).
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Figure 4.6: Calculation REF10 - main parameters
Calculation REF200 tries to simulate as close as possible to implement the strategy with the plant as it
is now. Which means, that batteries are assumed to fail after 30 min, so the operator decides to initiate the
strategy at 1800 s. Knowing that the PORV will shut close once the power supply from the batteries is lost,
the operator decides to use the EGRS for PDE (the valves of the GRS will keep their current position once
the power is lost). So after 30 min the operator initiates both SDE and PDE. The result is a very fast primary
system depressurization, the pressure can be kept low for a long time. After the SG are empty a second
time, after all water from the deaerator tanks is used up, the GRS is less effective than the PORV to keep
primary pressure low, and the pressure rises again. Figure 4.10 shows main parameters (left, Primary and
secondary system pressure denominated by X and Y, primary system mass and cladding temperature by V
ans Z, and right, primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF1 denominated by X and Z, primary
system pressure and mass of calculation REF200 denominated by Y and V). As can be seen, the grace time
which can be won is comparable, the pressure at the end of the calculation is almost the double in REF200.
Last possible moment - REF12 the sensitivity calculation REF12 tried to find the latest possible moment
when the strategy would be still effective. Since the analysis is limited to the region where no core damage
should occur, 9000, the onset of core dry out, was chosen to be a limiting calculation. So this means, that
REF12 assumes the first intervention of the operator, SDE by fully opening all four BRU-A valves, at 9000 s
into the transient. Just to mention, calculation REF0 shows that without any intervention at 10000 s into the
transient the clad temperature locally would reach values above 1200 ◦C .
Surprisingly, the procedure proves to be even more effective if initiated at that time. The SG are filled
on the SS and on the PS with steam. Opening the BRU-A valves leads to an almost instantaneous drop in
pressure on the SS. Within 50 s the SS pressure reaches the pressure of the SL and the SG start to fill up
with comparatively cold water of 150 ◦C . The steam on the primary side of the SG is collapsed, the NC is
restarted and other hot steam of the PS is transported to the SG and collapsed. The result is that within 400 s
the PS pressure, starting from about 17.5 MPa reaches the set point for intervention of the HA. Another 100 s
later the pressure holds at about 1 MPa. The HA discharge 150 tons of cold water within 300 s into the PS.
With the SG and the PS refilled, it takes another 30000 s to loose again all water and reach the final dry out
which stops the calculation. The procedure is extremely effective from a thermal hydraulic point of view.
Since the PS depressurizes so fast, not even the CSF PS integrity would show a challenge. But it is doubtful
that the RCS would withstand the pure thermal shock of being cooled from 350 ◦C to 50 ◦C with 5 min.
Figure 4.11 shows main parameters (left, Primary and secondary system pressure denominated by X
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Figure 4.7: Calculation REF14 - main parameters
and Y, primary system mass and cladding temperature by V ans Z, and right, primary system pressure and
mass of calculation REF1 denominated by X and Z, primary system pressure and mass of calculation REF12
denominated by Y and V).
Using one SG to recharge the deaerator tanks REF5 The second sensitivity which is reported in more
detail is the calculation Ref5. This calculation assumes that the deaerator tank loose their pressure (if the
operator succeeds in insulating them, recharging is not necessary). This means, that at 1800 s SG1, SG2 and
SG3 are depressurized, while the SG4 stays at 6.2 MPa. Until 5400 the water which is furnished passively
is used. After 5400 s the last SG is depressurized, and discharges into the deaerator tanks. This succeeds in
pushing the water which is still in the deaerator tanks into the SG. Ref5 should be compared to Ref14. The
scenario Ref14 also assumes losses of the deaerator of 4.4 kg/s of steam after the SBO. The difference is,
that in Ref14 the operator depressurizes all four SG after 1800 s. Analysis of Ref14 shows that a level of
approximately 0.5 m of water stays in the SG under these conditions. Even if the safety valves to protect the
deaerator tanks open, the water which still remains in the FW lines and deaerator tanks can be pushed into
the SG. As a result it is possible to extend the grace time by 11000 s. As can be seen in Table, calculation
Ref5 reaches 1200 ◦C after 36000 s, while calculation Ref12 reaches this limit after 25000 s.
Effectiveness of the procedure when the deaerator tanks are not isolated While the method is very
robust against shifts in the timing of operator actions, the pressure in the deaerator tank is a crucial issue.
This is shown by calculations REF2 and REF102, which show that assuming half the nominal pressure and
half the nominal level reduces the effectiveness of the strategy considerably, as by calculations REF14 and
REF15 which assume that the operator is not able to insulate the tanks, and that they loose 4.4 kg/s and
8.8 kg/s of steam respectively. Tab. 8.13 shows the water level of water still present in the deaerator tanks
when the secondary system depressurization was fully utilized. With the assumption that the deaerator tanks
are insulated after the beginning of the transient, all deaerator water can be used. With the assumption of the
nominal losses of 4.4 kg/s of steam, the deaerator are still filled up to 1.25 m once SG depressurization is
finished. Should the losses be higher (e.g. 8.8 kg/s of steam), only as little as the first 0.6 m of water of the
deaerator tanks can be furnished into the SG.
Calculation of REF5 and REF105 show that there is a possibility to use all the water in the deaerator
tanks, even if the losses can’t be avoided pressure charging of the deaerator with the steam from the SG.
There is a connection of the steam volume from the deaerator tanks to the steam volume of the SG. The
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Figure 4.8: Calculation REF17 - main parameters
assumption in REF5 and REF105 was that the initial SDE is done using SG1 to SG3 only, while SG4 is
kept pressurized. Once no additional water can be expected from the deaerator tanks, SG4 is connected to
the deaerator. The pressurized steam at 6.2 MPa of SG4 succeeds in pushing the remaining water of the
deaerator into the three depressurized SG.
Visualization of results: Figure 4.13 shows all results in a single plot. All calculations assume that power
cannot be recovered, which means that the analysis has been terminated at when the peak cladding tempera-
ture exceeded 1200◦C . This end point can be seen in Figure 4.13. The x-axis shows the “grace time”, while
the y-axis shows primary system pressure at the end point. The scenario without AM is in the top left corner
of the picture, which means early core damage (roughly 3 h) at high primary system pressure. The scenarios
which assume SDE and PDE, in various variations, are all very close to each other - core damage at roughly
9 h-12 h, and primary system pressure below 2 MPa. This shows that the procedure is effective, and robust,
in the sense that there is a broad time window for the operator to initiate the procedure. The violet dot in
the map gives the results of a pen and paper calculation - for how long could the decay heat be removed, if
all water would be used in the best possible way - i.e. evaporated directly in the core. One finds about 17 h.
The comparison of 3 h without AM, 9 h to 12 h adopting the procedure and 17 h as “theoretical” optimum
shows how close the procedure comes to the optimal use of the available sources of water.
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Figure 4.9: Calculation REF18 - main parameters
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Figure 4.10: Calculation REF200 - main parameters, comparison to REF1
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Figure 4.11: Calculation REF12 - main parameters (zoom on SDE)
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Figure 4.12: Calculation REF5 - main parameters, comparison to REF1
Figure 4.13: Failure map of SBO AM calculations
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4.3 Quantitative
Looking at the qualitative analysis it becomes clear that primary and secondary system depressurization are
beneficial in case of a SBO. Furthermore, one can see that the effectiveness depends on the timing of the
action. In an accident condition it is unlikely that the operator is taking an action exactely at the moment that
would be beneficial for the plant. But, nevertheless, the analyst, who is preparing and analyzing a procedure,
should know when the procedure at earliest may be started, at what time in the transient it would be most
beneficial and from what time it is too late.
Goal of the quantitative analysis is to work out a procedure which optimizes the use of equipment by
the operator. A method which is capable to find the best moment for the actions has been worked out.
This method was then applied considering a station blackout as initiating event, and secondary and primary
system depressurization as possible actions, which timing should be optimized.
The procedure has been worked out by the author in the frame of this thesis - [Muellner et al., 2007].
4.3.1 Methodology
The procedure can be divided into four steps:
1. Identify AM Parameters find parameters which “define” the accident management procedure (non-
dimensional, if possible).
2. System availability Decide on the system availability for the investigation. Expert judgement or a
probabilistic cut-off criteria.
3. Safety Barriers / Critical Safety Functions identify the challenged Safety Barriers / Functions. In-
dicate the the state of the safety function as parameters (if possible, non - dimensional).
4. Ideal Diagram investigate the effect of the procedure, as analytical as possible, summarise results -
e.g. using ideal diagram’s of the PS pressure and temperature.
The main goal is to find a functional dependency between points one and two (independent variables
of the function) and point three (the dependent variables of the function). Figure 4.14 shows how the com-
ponents of the procedure act together. It is obvious that an analytical function, which can be optimized
using pen and paper, will not be available for a system as complex as a nuclear power plant. Evaluating the
function typically would mean to use a thermal hydraulic system code (TH-SYS) to find the effects of the
chosen AM-Parameters and system availability, or an integral code, if one chooses to extend the analysis in
the realm of the severe accidents.
A number of methods are available to optimize a function which can be evaluated numerically only,
a summary of methods can be found in [Press et al., 2005]. The present paper chose to use the downhill
simplex method [Nelder and Mead, 1965], which is known to be robust, uses only evaluation of the function
without the need of calculating derivatives. The only disadvantage is that the convergence is slow.
4.3.2 Application Of The Procedure
Next step is to apply the procedure to a total SBO. As mentioned already in section 4.2, the procedure which
is used to mitigate the accident is based on a procedure developed by Siemens for KONVOI type PWR for
a total loss of feed water (LOFW) transient. An analysis of the procedure together with a comparison to
experimental results at the LOBI facility can be found in [Madeira et al., 2003]. The basic principles of the
procedure were applied to the VVER-1000 in a total LOFW [Muellner et al., 2005a].
The base scenario of section 4.2 is used for optimization, which means that the procedure consists in
secondary side depressurisation (SDE) followed by primary side depressurisation (PDE).
As initiating event a loss of off-site power is assumed, together with the failure of all diesel generators
(DG). Only power from batteries is assumed to be available. The minimum duration of the batteries differs
from plant to plant. Figures known from certain NPPs indicate a minimum range between 15 min and several
hours. PDE relies on power from the batteries (while SDE can be accomplished manually). Although the
limitation from the batteries is known, it was assumed that PORV operation is always possible. Backfitting
the plant with batteries which are dedicated only to the PORV is technically and economically feasible.
Together with the loss of all electric power the feed water is lost. The inventory of the steam generators
can ensure decay heat removal for one to two hours. When the level in the steam generators is decreasing,
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‘
Figure 4.14: Schematic overview on the method used
and the steam generator tubes are uncovered, the heat transfer area is reduced and the heat removal from
the primary side is deteriorating. The primary side pressure starts to increase, up to the set point of the
pressurizer relief valve which ensures overpressure protection.
If no actions are taken, the primary side temperature will increase, the pressurizer level will rise - once
the pressurizer is full and water is lost instead of steam, the primary side inventory starts to decrease and the
core uncovers. After approximately 10000 s the cladding temperature exceeds 1200◦C (again, please refer
to section 4.2 for details).
Additional feed water can be made available by depressurising the secondary side. About 400 m3of
water in the feed water lines and deaerator tanks can be furnished passively into the steam generators.
Depressurisation of the primary side enhances the intervention of the passive parts of the emergency core
cooling system, i.e. the accumulators.
Dependent Variables
The selection of the dependent variables is a crucial point, where engineering judgement comes into play.
To define the success of the procedure, three parameters were chosen.
1. The “grace time” gained, i.e. the amount of time by which the grace time is extended due to the
intervention of the operator.
2. The primary side pressure when the cladding temperature exceeds 1200◦C .
3. The time interval in which the primary side pressure stays below 2 MPa.
The first parameter identifies the advantage of the operator action compared to no intervention in terms
of time won.
The second parameter was chosen considering that direct containment heating at a vessel failure at high
pressure (> 2MPa) can not be excluded. Although calculations with integral codes (see eg [Muellner et al.,
2004c]) show that from it takes still about 5000s from the time when the clad temperature exceeds 1200◦C
to the time when the vessel fails, the pressure at this instant was taken as indication for the pressure at the
time of vessel failure. The reason is that Relap5was used for the analysis (i.e. for every evaluation of the
“plant state” - function).
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The third parameter was taken because one should keep in mind that the probability for a station blackout
decreases rapidly in time. If the power is recovered and the primary pressure at about or below 2 MPa, the
LPIS can immediately guarantee long term coolable conditions.
Independent Variables
Since the system availability for a SBO is easy to define (only passive systems are available) the independent
variables are the operator actions (time of SDE, time of PDE). These parameters are varied in the optimiza-
tion process to achieve optimal values for the parameters mentioned in section 4.3.2.
However, as a second set of independent variables the time of PDE, the valve area of the PORV and
the valve area of the BRU-A were chosen. This analysis might be considered academic, however, including
the effect of the valve areas in to optimization process might help to identify improvements with by design
changes.
Functional Dependency
Goal is to define a function which is capable of acting like a measure for the success of the intervention of
the operator. A requirement for the simplex-method (see 4.3.2) is that the function should map Rn → R. In
section 4.3.2 three parameters have been chosen to characterise the final state of the transient. The goal now
is to combine the three parameters to a single non-dimensional parameter using appropriate weights.
To combine parameters of different dimensions and different order of magnitude the parameters have to
be normalised, i.e. have to be mapped to the interval [0, 1] (the points 0 and 1 are included).
Normalisation of the Extended Grace Time
The first parameter to be normalised is the grace time which was won due to the operator actions. As
normalisation function the function
t¯egt =
tegt − t
ref
egt
tegt
(4.1)
was used (see figure 4.15). In the worst case the grace time is the same as the grace time of a SBO
transient without intervention of the operator trefegt = 10000 s - in this case the function maps to zero. The
function gives more importance to grace time won at the beginning of the transient, i.e. if the grace time is
20000 s instead of 10000 s, the normalised grace time function is 1/2 instead of 0. On the other hand, if the
grace time is 60000 s instead of 50000 s, normalised grace time function is 5/6 instead of 4/5.
Normalisation of the Pressure Parameter
The second parameter to be normalised is the primary pressure at the time when the cladding temperature
exceeds 1200◦C . The procedure requires that the transient is simulated every time the function has to be
evaluated. To simulate the transient, Relap5 was used. Although a clad temperature of 1200◦C by far does
not indicate the failure a of the vessel, the Relap5 calculation at this time was stopped, and the pressure at
this time was taken as indication for the pressure at the time of RPV failure. The function (4.2) with a = 1.1
MPa−1, b = 4.0MPa was chosen:
P¯failure =
1 + e(−ab)
1 + e(a(Pfailure−b))
(4.2)
To avoid direct containment heating the pressure at vessel failure should be below 2 MPa. The function
therefore tries to penalise transients which end up with a pressure above 2 MPa, i.e. the function maps to
[0, 0.9] for pressures between zero and 2 MPa, and drops rapidly to zero for pressures bigger than 2 MPa.
Normalisation of the Time interval of Primary Pressure below 2 MPa
This parameter was selected keeping in mind that, if electricity to the unit can be recovered, it would be
possible for the operator to initiate primary side feed with the LPIS immediately, and therefore keep the plant
in a long term cool able state. From previous calculations it is known that this parameter is to be expected to
be between 0 s and 20000 s. The normalisation function was chosen as
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Figure 4.15: Function to normalize the extended grace time (equation 4.1)
t¯below2MPa =
c
1 + e(a(b−tbelow2MP a))
+ d (4.3)
The constants a,b,c, and d were chosen to impose the following properties on the function: the function
should map a time interval of 0 (which means, the primary pressure stays always above 2 MPa) to 0. When
the primary pressure can be kept below 2 MPa for about 20000 s, the function should give a value close to
one. The normalisation function should approach one with the time interval approaching an infinite value.
For a time interval between 0 and 20000 s the function should be close to linear. To full fill all this properties,
the values were selected as following: a = 3 · 10−4 s−1, b = 104 s, c = 1 + exp(−ab), d = − exp(−ab).
The function can be seen in Fig. 4.17.
Composition of the evaluation function
To summarise the results so far, three parameters were chosen to characterise the success of the operator
intervention: The grace time which can be won, the primary pressure when the clad temperature exceeds
1200◦C , and the time period in which the primary pressure stays below 2 MPa.
t¯egt = f1 (tSDE , tPDE) (4.4)
P¯failure = f2 (tSDE , tPDE) (4.5)
t¯below2MPa = f3 (tSDE , tPDE) (4.6)
To combine f1, f2, f3 three different weights w1, w2, w3 were chosen to emphasise the difference in
importance. The major weight was given the extension of the grace time with w1 = 0.5. The primary
pressure at the end of the calculation was found to be the second most important parameter with w2 = 0.3.
The weight was assigned to be w3 = 0.2. The final function computes now to
O (tSDE , tPDE) =
∑
i
wi · fi (tSDE , tPDE) (4.7)
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Figure 4.16: Function to normalise the final primary pressure of the transient (equation 4.2).
Optimization process - Multidimensional Downhill Simplex Method
A robust method to find local extrema of a multidimensional function, which only requires evaluation of
the function, is the downhill simplex method Nelder and Mead [1965]. The efficiency of the method can be
improved if a large number of parameters is needed Kaczmarczyk [1999].
The problem is how to find a multidimensional minimum of the function f(x1, x2, . . .) such that f(Pm)
with Pm = (x
m
1 , x
m
2 , ...) becomes a minimum.
1. If the problem is N-dimensional, construct a simplex of N+1 points. Evaluate the simplex at each
point. Identify the highest point of the simplex Ph. The remaining points are labelled Pi, so that the
simplex consists now of the points (Pi, Ph|i = 1, . . . , N).
2. Find a new point Pr by moving the highest point Ph of the simplex through the Baricenter Pb =
(1/N) ·
∑
Pi of the other points , conserving the volume of the simplex. Evaluate f at this new point
Pr. According to the value of f(Pr) three possible ways to continue are foreseen:
(a) ∀i : f(Pi) < f(Pr) < f(Ph): if the new point Pr is lower than the highest point of the
simplex, but higher than the lowest point of the old simplex without the highest point, construct
a new simplex by substituting the previous highest point with the new point (new simplex: (∀i :
Pi, Pr)) and start from the beginning (reflection).
(b) ∀i : f(Pr) < f(Pi): if the new point Pr is the lowest point of the simplex, construct a new
point Prr by moving Pr further in the same direction by a factor of two. Two possible ways to
proceed:
i. f(Prr) < f(Pr): the direction led further to the minimum. The new simplex will be
(∀i : Pi, Prr). The volume of the simplex increased (reflection and expansion).
ii. f(Prr) > f(Pr): moving Pr did not minimise f any further. The new simplex will be
(∀i : Pi, Pr)), and one should start from the beginning (reflection).
(c) f(Pr) > f(Ph): if the new point is higher than the previous highest point, a new point, Prr′ ,
halfway between Ph and Pb will be constructed and f(Prr′) will be evaluated. Again, two
possible continuations:
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Figure 4.17: The normalisation function (4.3) for the time interval in which the primary pressure stays below
2 MPa
i. Prr′ < Ph: the simplex already comprises the minimum and contracts. The new simplex is
chosen to be ∀i : Pi, Prr′ (contraction).
ii. Prr′ > Ph: the chacteristic length of the sides of the simplex is too large - f varies too much
inside the simplex. The lowest point of the old simplex is chosen min(∀i : Pi, Ph) and all
other points are moved along their sides towards the lowest point. The length all sides is
reduced by a factor of two (multiple contraction).
3. Find an exit criteria. Possibilities are that one of the distance-values ∀i : |Pi−Pr| drops below a preset
threshold, or that the variation of the function f (∀i : f(Pi)− f(Pr)) drops below a preset threshold.
Results
Varying tSDE and tPDE : Considering only two parameters the simplex has three points. The first point
was chosen to be (tSDE , tPDE) = (1800, 9360). The idea was that the operator would need 30 min to
analyse the situation and to find the adequate response. The second operator action was chosen to take place
when the primary pressure, due to the first action reaches a minimum. For a detailed discussion of this
special case (which turned out to be the best case investigated) please refer to Cherubini et al. [2006].
Two other points were chosen, assuming as characteristic length for the first parameter 600 s, and for
the second about 1000 s. The initial simplex, the following simplices and the results of the evaluation are
reported in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.18.
Varying tPDE , Area PORV, Area BRU-A : The next set of variables assumes that the operator initiates
secondary side depressurisation at 1800 s, and just primary side, as well as the areas of the safety valves, are
object to optimization. A simplex using three parameters consists out of four points and forms a tetraeder. It
can be seen that increasing the PORV area helps to achieve the objectives. The results are reported in Table
4.7 and Figure 4.19, where the z-axis gives the PORV area, the x and y axis the time of PDE and area of
BRU-A respectively. The red tetraeder is the first simplex, the blue the second one.
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Table 4.6: Optimization of two parameters, the time of SDE and PDE
Id tSDE (s) tPDE (s) O(tSDE , tPDE) (-)
Simplex 1
Ref1 1800 9360 0.758
Ref7 1800 8360 0.729
Sim2 2400 10360 0.715
Simplex 2
Ref1 1800 9360 0.758
Ref7 1800 8360 0.729
Sim1 1200 7360 0.731
Point to be evaluated
Sim6 1200 8360
Table 4.7: Optimization of three parameters, the time of PDE, normalized PORV area, normalized BRU-A
area
Id tPDE (s) AP /A0 (-) AB/A0 (-) O(tPDE , AP /A0, AB/A0) (-)
Simplex 1
Ref1 9360 1 1 0.758
Ref7 8360 1 1 0.729
Ref11 9360 1 0.5 0.715
Ref9 9360 2 1 0.878
Simplex 2
Ref1 9360 1 1 0.758
Ref11 9360 1 0.5 0.715
Ref9 9360 2 1 0.878
Sim3 10360 1.67 0.67 0.840
Point to be evaluated
Sim5 10027 2.11 0.45
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Figure 4.18: Optimization of two parameters, the time of SDE and PDE
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218
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The following section summarizes the main findings and achievements. A large number of beyond design
basis accidents have been simulated. The key outcome is the following:
5.1 Code validation
After the experimental database was available, post test analysis for a number of post tests has been per-
formed (four post test calculations performed with Relap5 are presented here). The post test analysis pre-
sented a validation step for the current work. Relap5 had been used for verification of the effectiveness of
AM strategies, and for optimization of an AM strategy in case of a station blackout. To gain confidence in
the results it was necessary to validate the tool by code experiment comparison.
What has been seen is that the code performs reasonably well in predicting AM relevant accident se-
quences for VVER type reactors. All post test calculations achieve good scores using the fast Fourier
transform based method (FFTBM) for code - experiment comparison. Two small break LOCA have been
analyzed - main phenomena, loop seal clearing, dry out, core heat up, quenching, counter current flow lim-
itation, critical flow through the break, critical flow through safety valves, could be predicted by the code.
Differences in the timing between code and experiment could be mainly explained by the heat losses of the
pumps of the facility, which are, unfortunately, not well characterized.
Two post tests, simulating a loss of heat sink, have been analyzed, and also here the code - experiment
comparison gives reasonable results. Heat removal by natural circulation, temperature increase of primary
system coolant, break down of natural circulation once the SG are empty and restart of natural circulation
when they are depressurized and refilled can be seen in the experiments and in the code. Again, differences
in timing can be explained by heat losses, which are not well characterized.
It should be emphasized that the main goal of the experiments was to provide data for code validation.
The results are not directly transferred to the NPP. It is not expected that the NPP behavior is reproduced by
the experiments. If one compares test 11 and test 12 dry out at the facility with the calculation for the VVER
1000 one notices that the NPP calculation predicts a large dryout lasting several hundredths of seconds,
while the experiment shows only small, local dry outs. This effect, small dry outs, has to be attributed to the
PSB facility.
A second observation that has been made was that the code predictions for loss of heat sink events with
natural circulation are very sensitive to the SG model (due to the horizontal steam generators). During such
events the SG level slowly decreases, and SG-U-tubes are uncovered. While in vertical SG all U-tubes have
the lower part covered and the upper part uncovered, horizontal SGs have some U-tubes completely covered,
and some U-tubes completely uncovered. As has been shown, simplifications of the SG model lead to an
error in the calculation of the transferred heat, and in consequence to a wrong timing of SG voiding. As could
be seen, the model as currently adopted in the VVER-1000 nodalisation (six levels of U-tubes) introduces a
small, but visible error. For PSB-VVER nodalisation (17 levels of U-tubes) a distortion to due the modeling
is not even noticeable.
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5.2 AM strategy evaluation
The second main outcome of the results of Chapter 3 regards the actual AM strategies that have been tested.
The results from the experimental facility can tell about the qualitative evolvement of a transient, but do
not provide precise predictions on the NPP response, if subjected to the same initiating event and boundary
conditions. Therefore, the main goal of the experiments is to validate computer codes and give a general
idea on the qualitative behavior of the plant. To gain deeper insights, one has to rely on NPP calculations, as
presented in chapter 3.
Three different classes of initiating events have been assumed, each time with different AM strategies
and different availability of safety systems. The initiating events, that have been assumed, are loss of feed
water, station black out, small break loss of coolant accidents and primary to secondary side leaks. The
following conclusions have been drawn:
• Scenario 1, loss of all feed water and unavailability of HPIS. Depressurization of the secondary system
and supply of feed water of 10 kg/s to two SGs is successful in achieving a temperature decrease of
primary system coolant.
• Scenario 2, as above, but with PS depressurization. Primary system depressurization (but maintaining
a saturation margin) is successful in speeding up the depressurization process. No adverse effects (like
interruption or break down of NC) have been observed.
• Scenario 3 for characterization purpose only (PORV stuck open in hot-shutdown conditions, Za-
poroshye accident).
• Scenario 4 CL break equivalent to 70 mm diameter with failure of all HPIS. The strategy, SS depres-
surization, is successful to reduce the PS pressure and allow SITs and LPIS to actuate.
• Scenario 5, PRISE, with failure of all HPIS - the operator action, primary depressurization, cool down
of primary via secondary with intact SGs, isolation of SITs, is successful in lowering PS pressure
below SS pressure, thereby terminating the loss of PS water to the SS, and at the same time leading
the PS into a long term coolable state.
• Scenario 6, total loss of feed water with one train of HPIS available and PS depressurization only. The
set point of the HPIS can be reached, for a short period even the set point of hydro accumulators. One
train is of HPIS is sufficient to provide sufficient core cooling and lead the plant to stable conditions.
• Scenario 7, Station blackout with no active systems, as operator action secondary system depressur-
ization plus injection from mobile pumps only. The operator actions are sufficient to lower the primary
system pressure to 6 MPa (just above the actuation set point of the accumulators). Primary pressure
and temperature are stable at the end of the transient.
• Scenario 8, SBLOCA without HPIS and without AM has been performed for characterization pur-
poses. Primary depressurization is fast enough to reach the set point for accumulator intervention,
but the accumulators are not effective. Periods of dryouts with core heat up follow. During core heat
up the energy released to the fluid is reduced, which lowers the pressure, which, in turn actuates the
accumulators, quenches the core, but stops primary depressurization and accumulator injection. The
calculation is stopped after eight thousand seconds without achieving stable conditions.
• Scenario 9, PRISE equivalent to 100 mm break (SG header break) with stuck open of BRU-A of
affected SG. All ECCS is assumed to be available. The strategy, isolation of SITS, switch of of two
trains of HPIS, cool down of primary with intact SGs, is not successful in lowering primary below
secondary pressure. However, the loss of primary coolant to the secondary can be reduced, and the
coolability of the core can be ensured.
• Secnario 10 for characterization purposes only (natural circulation).
• Scenario 11, a SBLOCA equivalent to 70 mm diameter, with initial failure of all HPIS pumps. Within
the first 30 min the core uncovers and core heat up occurs. The (assumed) recovery of one train of
HPIS together with cool down of primary by secondary with a cool down rate of 30 K/h is sufficient
to quench the dry out and lead the plant to long term coolable conditions.
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• Scenario 12, a SBLOCA equivalent to 70 mm diameter, with initial failure of all HPIS. Initiating event
and operator actions are as in scenario eleven, but instead of one train of HPIS the operator recovers
the make-up system and the HHPIS (which can provide in total a flow rate comparable to the one of
the HPIS at the given pressure). Again, a dry out occurs, but the operator actions are successful in
quenching the dry out and leading the plant to safe conditions.
Summarizing can be said that the investigated strategies have been proven to be successful in leading the
plant to long term coolable conditions.
5.3 EOP Optimization
In close cooperation with Balakovo 3, the reference VVER 1000 unit for the implementation of AM pro-
grammes for most Russian VVER units, one special initiating event and AM strategy has been selected for
optimization. As initiating event, a long term station black out has been selected, while the AM strategy was
based on the use of secondary side depressurization to passively utilize the water inventory still available in
the feed water lines and deaerator tanks.
A reference case, where a station black out has been assumed without operator actions, has shown that
in that case, in a VVER-1000, core damage would occur after roughly 3 h. Assuming that the accident
progresses further without operator actions, vessel failure and high pressure melt ejection could be expected
another 1-2 h later.
This case, first of all, should be compared with the reference AM case. The reference AM case initiates
after 1800 s secondary system depressurization, and after 9360 s, once the cooling effect due to the water
from deaerators and feed water lines has ended, primary system depressurization is initiated (i.e. when the
slope of the primary system pressure becomes horizontal). With the first measure the primary system can
be depressurized just above the set point of the hydro accumulators, with the second measure the primary
system can be further depressurized, and the HA fully discharge. Core heat-up occurs after roughly 10 h
(compared with three!), and at comparably low primary system pressure.
The reference AM calculation assumed that the deaerator tanks would stay at their operating pressure.
Unfortunately, this cannot be assured - during nominal operations there are steam- and liquid losses from the
deaerator, and it is not known how much would be lost during station blackout conditions. Therefore, losses
of roughly 4 kg/s and 8 kg/s of steam have been assumed (calculations Ref14 and Ref15). As result, core
heat up occurs at roughly 7 h and 5 h respectively. So it has to be concluded that this variable has a major
influence, and should be investigated better if the strategy is to be implemented in the Balakovo 3 accident
management programme.
To cope with possible losses of the deaerator, an additional strategy has been investigated (which is,
in principle, possible to be implemented): when the SGs are depressurized, not all of them depressurize
through the BRU-A valves, but SG4 discharges into the deaerator tank. Such a connection exists already.
Safety valves in the line, however, would limit the pressure of the deaerator tanks to 6.6 bars. It could be
shown (calculation REF5) that this additional strategy allows again to fully utilize the deaerator tanks (time
until core heat up was again 10 h).
A bounding case calculation assumed that the operator would initiate the procedure at the last possible
moment, when dry out already occurred and cladding temperatures already started to increase (calculation
REF12). The results could show that even in this case the procedure would be effective.
In addition to the qualitative analysis, a quantitative analysis has been performed. A method to optimize
operator actions has been worked out. This method is easily extendible for other optimizitation processes,
and although the method has been worked out in the frame of the work which is presented here, it has already
been applied in for other applications (optimization of accumulator initial pressure and flow restrictors in the
accumulator line). The method has been applied, starting from the reference AM case. After a view steps
convergence has already been reached, but the improvements that could be achieved are relatively small
(small compared to the uncertainty that one can expect for such calculations). It can therefore be concluded
that the precise timing is of minor importance - which is positive, since it cannot be expected that the operator
would initiate the procedure at just the right time.
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5.4 Achievements and open issues
Summing up, the present work contributed (in frame of the Tacis-project) to drawing up a validation database,
and to validation of Relap5 for analysis of long lasting transients with multiple failures and operator actions
at VVER 1000 reactors. This was an open point, since experiments that were available were aiming at
western type PWR (with vertical steam generators).
A second achievement was to fill a gap in the analysis of AM strategies for Balakovo 3. During a station
blackout feed water from external sources should be supplied to the SG to secure the heat sink. Supplying
feedwater by means of mobile pumps or fire brigade trucks has already been investigated, the present work
closes a hole by extending the analysis to the passive sources of feed water, the deaerator tanks and the
feed water lines. However, the analysis did not yet take the step from strategy to actual procedure. It still
should be investigated to which signals the operator actions should be tied. The losses of the deaerator
tanks should be characterized, and the pressure drop from deaerator tank to the steam generator should be
determined experimentally at the plant. It should be investigated which valves have to be opened and closed
to establish a connection from SG to the deaerator tank, in case the SG depressurization should re-pressurize
the deaerator tanks. It has to be investigated how much time it would take the operator to do so. These
investigations have to be performed at the station itself.
A third achievement was to work out an automated method for optimizing operator actions, which can
be extended to optimizing in general set points and equipment for AM. While in the present case the opti-
mization process was easy, and the result of the optimization could be foreseen by pen and paper analysis,
other situations are more complex (e.g. initial pressure of accumulators, which should work efficiently for a
wide range of initiating events) and the method could provide a tool to look for a optimal set of settings in
an organized way.
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